TOWARD AN

URBAN INSURGENCY STRATEGY

FOR LATIN AMERICA

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TOWARD AN URBAN INSURGENT STRATEGY FOR LATIN AMERICA

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ABSTRACT

TOWARD AN URBAN INSURGENT STRATEGY
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This thesis evaluates two trends in Latin America - - urbanization, and the fledging attempts to develop the theory and practice of urban insurgency (U.I.). The objective of this research is to determine the relationships which may exist among U.I. strategy, organization, and tactics by proposing a model of U.I. and conceptualizing its development.

The procedure employed to achieve this objective includes a descriptive investigation of the following topics:

-The concept of insurgency is defined, as an attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite elements of the population of a nation into forcibly overthrowing its existing government. The general nature and characteristics of this concept are investigated to determine; the range of strategic approaches open to an insurgent movement, and the conditions in a nation sufficient for the initation of insurgency.

-The state of urbanization in Latin America is reviewed and the city's potential for support of U.I. evaluated. The roles which U.I. can fulfill in insurgency are also identified.

-Selected examples of Latin U.I. theory and practice are next reviewed to establish trends in its development.

-Based on the above analysis, a U.I. strategy for Latin America is proposed. The development of this strategy is described, and its organizational and tactical components analysed.

The conclusion reached as a result of this research is that the proposed U.I. strategy may be indicative of the trend of future insurgent activity in Latin America. Further it is concluded, the methodology developed in this study can provide a framework for the analysis of insurgent activity in other contexts.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Until recently most insurgents have considered urban areas an unlikely location for decisive revolutionary action. Mao Tse-tung gave new life to the Chinese Communist Party when he reoriented its program of revolutionary action on a rural peasant basis after it had met defeat in a series of unsuccessful urban uprisings.[1] More recently Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara termed the city, "a cemetery of revolutionaries and resources."[2]

In the post World War II era, insurgent movements in the developing nations were for the most part rurally based. They relied on an elite party organization to motivate politically the rural masses with appeals to nationalism, anti or neo-colonialism and land. With the development of a base of support among the rural population and an increasingly intense level of military activity, the insurgent if all went well would control most of the countryside, confront and eventually defeat the government forces and in the end, "the cities would fall like ripe plums." This generalized insurgent strategy has been documented in the writings of Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Regis

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[1]Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 16-7; also see Anne Fremantle, (ed.), Mao Tse-tung, An Anthology of His Writings (New York: The New American Library, 1962), pp. 76, 84-5.

[2]Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Grove Press, 1967), p. 69.

Debray, et. al.[3] All of these men considered that the only fit place for an insurgent organization to prosper and grow was in the countryside among the peasantry. Mao was so convinced of this requirement that he could not see insurgency developing in Belgium because "it has no countryside."[4] Debray considers the cities, lukewarm incubators that turn the proletarians into bourgeois while the mountain turns the bourgeois into proletarians.[5]

The city had been written off as an area for decisive insurgent activity in the developing nations for a number of historically valid reasons:

- Other aspiring insurgents had been successful by basing their movements on the peasantry, and these experiences were well documemted. The conventional insurgent wisdom as purported by Mao et. al. supported looking to the countryside and the peasant as the basis for a successful insurgency.
- It is in the urban areas that the government, no matter how weak and ineffective, will have its greatest strength. Guevara commented that "in the cities armed revolt can all too easily be smothered" and an insurgent organization can never rise by itself in an urban area.[6]

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[3]These various insurgent spokesmen will be discussed in Chapter 2.

[4]Mao Tse-tung, "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," Selected Works, II (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 142.

[5]Debray, op. cit., p. 110-1.

[6]Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Che Guevara On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 5, 27-9.

- The majority of the population were peasants, and as long as the government could depend upon their loyality or passive support there was little hope for successful insurgency irrespective of the insurgents support in the cities.[7]

Thus throughout Latin America in the early 1960's the insurgent cry was, "to the mountains." However, the revolutionary men and women who took to the hills were either dead, had given up in despair or were still there in the late sixties. They had achieved little. They controlled a few mountain tops, but they encircled no cities, and no governments were in danger of defeat. The principal areas in Latin America in which these insurgents attempted to operate are depicted on Figure 1, page 4.

The death of "Che" Guevara in Bolivia (October 1967) marked a turning point in the conduct of insurgency in Latin America and perhaps in other developing nations.[8] Although this was only one of the many insurgent failures in the sixties it appears to have had a profound impact, since it symbolized the defeat of a revolutionary strategy as well as the loss of a revolutionary prophet.

As a result of these insurgent failures and changing conditions, much of the current insurgent activity in Latin America has been reoriented to address the critical role urban areas will play in the eventual

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[7]Samual P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 291.

[8]John H. Hoagland, "Changing Patterns of Insurgency and American Response," Journal of International Affairs, XXV, 1 (1971), 136.

FIGURE 1

Principal Latin American Insurgent Movements in the 1960's

Source: Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies No. 8 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970), p. 8.

outcome of insurgency.[9] While the insurgents of the 1960's were attempting to replicate the Maoist or Castro experience throughout the southern hemisphere, the demographic basis on which any insurgent movement would prosper was rapidly changing. The fact that the six largest Latin nations: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru had surpassed the 50% mark in total population residing in urban areas was overlooked in the insurgents haste to make revolution among the peasants in the mountains.[10]

Recognizing these factors some analysts have asked the question, "Is urban insurgency the wave of the future?" Further the requirement has been proposed for a new strategy of urban insurgency for Latin America.[11] This study is an attempt to shed light on the second point, and in the process it may also provide insight to the question concerning the future of urban insurgency in Latin America.

Statement of the Problem

This study will evaluate these trends--Latin American urbanization and the fledgling attempts to develop the theory and practice of urban

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[9]For a discussion of this trend see: Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies, No. 8 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Nov. 1970) pp. 4-7; also see Donald C. Hodges, "Toward a New Revolutionary Strategy for Latin America," National Liberation Fronts, 1960-1970, eds. Donald C. Hodges and Robert Elias Abu Shanab (New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., 1972), pp. 217-22.

[10]Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," op. cit., p. 9.

[11]James Nelson Goodsell, "Urban Guerrillas: Ebbing Influence or Wave of the Future?" The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 3, 1971, p. 13; Hodges, "Towards a New Revolutionary Strategy for Latin America," op. cit., pp. 219-20; and Jack Davis "Political Violence in Latin America," Adelphi Papers, No. 85 (London: Institute For Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 18.

insurgency. The ultimate objective of this research will be to determine the relationships that may exist among urban insurgent (U.I.)[12] strategies, organizations and tactics by proposing a model of urban insurgency and conceptualizing its development.

Objectives and Scope of this Research

The thorough investigation of this topic should lead to the development of a conceptual framework for understanding the organization, operations and analysis of urban insurgency. To achieve these goals the remainder of this study will be organized as outlined below:

The general nature of insurgency is investigated in Chapter 2 without regard to geographical context. This includes a review of the principal sources of insurgent/revolutionary theory and practice to isolate considerations that influence the selection or development of an insurgent strategy. The focus of this review is on the interrelationships among the objective conditions, strategy or strategies employed, and insurgent organization and tactics. This chapter develops a general typology of insurgent strategies and supporting organizations and activities that serve as the basis for the later development of U.I. strategies. Proposed general conditions that will support insurgency are explored and the conditions necessary for success are also addressed. The vehicle for this analysis is the literature on revolution/insurgency which in various ways poses the question, "Why do men rebel?"

Chapter 3 includes a brief overview of the urban environment in Latin America to include a review of statistical data that indicates

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[12]The abbreviation U.I. will be used in this study to preclude the continued use of the words "urban insurgency" and "urban insurgent."

present and future trends in urban development. This environment is analyzed from the standpoint of its ability to support violent political activity--to include U.I. Finally, a survey of the urban/rural dichotomy is explored to determine the linkages, advantages and disadvantages that accrue to an insurgent operating in the city.

Having been reviewed the subjects insurgency and the urban environment, are combined in Chapter 4 which surveys the available literature on urban insurgency. From this analysis possible roles for U.I. activities are identified, and the generalized insurgent strategies identified in Chapter 2 are evaluated in an urban context. Finally, the need for a new Latin American urban insurgent strategy is identified and investigated.

Chapter 5 is the heart of this study. The urban environment, urban insurgent theory and practice having been analyzed, a proposed strategy for U.I. is offered. The framework and descriptive terminology developed in prior chapters is employed to develop conceptually this insurgent strategy, its organization and tactics.

Chapter 6 concludes this study with a recapitulation of the methods of analysis employed to isolate and develop the proposed U.I. strategy. It also suggests applications of the methodology employed in this study in understanding the organization and development of insurgency in other contexts.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the scope and limitations of the study.

Limits of the Study

Before proceeding further it may be useful to establish the

perimeters of this study and its limitations. Firstly, this research will be focused with regard to time to the post World War II period.[13] Secondly, the primary thrust of this study will be on U.I. in Latin America. Although the study's general conclusions may have some application in other developing and developed areas of the world, including the United States, no attempt will be made to delineate these areas.

The problems and pitfalls inherent in generalizing about a complex socio/political phenomena such as U.I. are recognized.[14] By limiting this research to the area of U.I. strategy, organization and tactics, a number of other critical factors and fruitful areas for research will not be considered. The emphasis is on the how aspects of U.I. as opposed to the why its' causal or motivational aspects. This is not a study of why men rebel, but how they rebel with emphasis on organizational factors. U.I. is viewed as a process that can be delineated within broad perimeters and described in some detail.

The tentative relationships concerning U.I. developed in this study will be stated in the form of proposed tentative hypotheses. They are not tested due to the exploratory nature of the study and the lack of U.I. cases against which to test them. These hypotheses when possible are illustrated (not tested) with actual examples.

This is not a counter-insurgency study. It is recognized that the insurgent/government struggle is a two-sided game, and victory or defeat for either side is a function of the strengths and weaknesses of both

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[13]The only exception to this will be the review of insurgent theory and practice (Chapter 2) which provides some historical background information that pre-dates 1945.

[14]The question whether one can generate useful generalities concerning the nature and conduct of insurgency and U.I. is addressed in Chapter 2.

parties. This research, however, centers almost exclusively on the insurgent and considers governmental actions from the insurgent viewpoint.

Summary

This research is an attempt to establish a perspective for the analysis of U.I. in Latin America by exposing the strategic, organizational, and tactical considerations that are available to the urban insurgent. The intention is to place U.I. under closer examination than it has been previously, so that the possibilities for study which it represents may more clearly be understood. U.I. is a largely unexplored area, but one that may be of increasing concern to social scientists and governments if recent Latin American trends in urbanization and increased politicized urban violence continue.

Chapter 2

INSURGENCY, AN OVERVIEW

The trend toward increased political violence in the developing nations is a fact. Samuel P. Huntington pointed out this trend when he noted that in 1958 there were 28 prolonged active insurgencies, 4 military uprisings, and only 2 conventional wars. Just seven years later in 1965, this total had increased to 42 insurgencies, 10 military uprisings, and 5 conventional wars.[1] More recently a research agency identified more than 50 so-called "national liberation movements" active in 1972.[2] Brian Crozier's, Annual of Power and Conflict 1972-73, takes note of over 20 insurgent movements in Latin America.[3]

It is with that form of political violence, here entitled insurgency, which this study will concern itself. This chapter will define insurgency and related terms and compare them to a typology that has been developed to cover this field of organized political violence. From this discussion a view of insurgency will emerge that will be expanded to address the strategic, organizational, and tactical options available to an aspiring insurgent leadership. Next the question, can one make meaningful generalizations concerning the nature and conduct of insurgency

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[1]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 4.

[2]Lewis C. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 59.

[3]Brian Crozier, Annual of Power and Conflict 1972-73 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1973), pp. 33-46.

will be addressed. After answering this question with a conditional yes, an in-depth discussion of insurgent strategies will be undertaken. A framework of possible insurgent strategies will be identified and contrasted, and critical organizational and tactical considerations analyzed. This framework of insurgent strategies will provide the basis for the analysis of U.I. theory and practice (Chapter 4) and the development of a new U.I. strategy for Latin America in Chapter 5. Finally, the general conditions required to initiate insurgency and achieve the seizure of political power in a nation will be analyzed.

Intra-social political violence has a number of terms associated with it--insurgency, internal war, riot, rebellion, coup d'etat, civil war, insurrection, peoples' war, revolutionary war, and wars of national liberation to cite just a representative sample.[4] This proliferation of terminology, which is not mutually exclusive, nor subsumes any or all of the other, requires a delineation of those precise aspects of political violence which will be addressed in this research.

A reasonable starting point for this discussion would be to establish the dimensions of the type of violence under consideration. Two basic dimensions have been proposed which parallel the scope of this investigation in that they address the nature and goals of the violent

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[4]Harry Eckstein, ed., in his "Introduction" to Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 17-8, noted, "Writings on internal war abound in desperate classificatory schemes, some completely unique to a particular writer, others overlapping, still others using much the same concepts to denote different events." This was written in 1964 and the situation has not improved in the intervening ten years.

activities.[5] These will be termed turmoil and organized violence. Basically turmoil is aimless, purposeless violence that lacks direction and a specific goal. Organized violence, on the other hand, is purposeful behavior which is usually structured by an elite for a specific purpose.

While it is recognized that organized violence may be directed at goals other than the violent overthrow of the existing government, this research will be restricted to these activities only. What are the broad possible approaches available to a group that seeks political power, assuming it has decided to go outside the accepted legal political system to achieve these goals? There have been numerous attempts to answer this question through the development of typologies aimed at categorizing this broad area of extralegal political activity.

Prior to investigating this point further, it may be useful to review what determines the effectiveness of a typology. According to Barbara Anne Wilson in her short study, Typology of Internal Conflict, a taxonomist working in this area must address three principal criteria, which must be structured in terms of the orientation and purpose of the investigation since they tend to be mutually contradictory.[6] First, a

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[5]Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," Journal of Conflict Resolution, X, 1 (1966), 49-50. A similar two dimensional view of violence has been proposed by Douglas P. Bwy in two articles "Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross Cultural Test of a Causal Model," Latin American Research Review III, 1 (1968), pp. 17-66, and in, "Dimensions of Social Conflict in Latin America," When Men Revolt and Why, ed. James Chowning Davies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 274, 278-9. For a three dimensional view of political violence see, Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 11.

[6]Barbara Anne Wilson, Typology of Internal Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Research in Social Systems, 1968), pp. 1-2.

typology should attempt to encompass and describe all the possible and observable types. Therefore a preliminary task must be the precise delimitation of the spectrum of conflict that will be included within the typology. Second, in establishing categories within the typology one must aim for a clear definition of the boundaries between categories, and each category must be broad enough to achieve the goal of mutual exclusivity. Third, the categories must be precise and narrow enough to be useful in application to specific cases.

The first step undertaken in implementing a classification system as described above must be to establish the overall orientation and purpose of the typology, and the determination of the boundaries of the subject. In this regard, the typology discussed below will consider all organized extralegal political violence aimed at the overthrow of an existing government.[7] The objective is to define a spectrum of conflict that meets this requirement and can further be divided into categories which lend themselves to differentiation on the basis of a classification scheme. A key element in this procedure is the selection of classification criteria upon which the various categories will be based. Since this study is concerned with the methods of attaining political power, suggested criteria might include items that address the participants, the duration, the scope and the magnitude of the struggle.

A typology that closely fits these criteria has been proposed by Samuel P. Huntington in, Changing Patterns of Military

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[7]It should be noted that many typologies attempt to address this subject from the perspective of revolutionary or non-revolutionary changes resulting from the violent overthrow of government. This is not the primary concern of this study, since it principally addresses the means and methods of seizing power not what will ultimately result from the seizure.

Politics.[8] It is simple in construction yet broad in scope and proposes that the spectrum of conflict discussed above can be subsumed within two broad categories,[9] the coup d'etat and what he terms revolutionary war.[10] He distinguishes between these two categories on the basis of the duration of the struggle and the extent to which the individuals involved are participants in the existing power structure. Another factor making this typology appropriate for inclusion in this study is its orientation on post World War II conflicts in the developing nations. It thus eliminates categories based on a broader historical perspective, that may have little application in the developing nations

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[8]Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," Changing Patterns of Military Politics ed. S. P. Huntington (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 22-40. In a later work Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 264-74, Huntington proposes two other models for revolutionary change, "Eastern and Western Revolutions." The Eastern model is along the lines of insurgency or revolutionary war. The Western model is in essence a political collapse, followed by a scramble for political power in its aftermath. The coup d' etat usually plays a significant role in the attempts to seize power after this political collapse.

[9]Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," Changing Patterns of Military Politics, op. cit., pp. 23-24. Other authors who have developed a similar two factor division of this spectrum of conflict are, Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 3-4; Andrew C. Janos, "Authority and Violence: The Political Frame Work of Internal War," in Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 134-5, and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 155.

[10]Ibid., p. 32. Huntington, in this discussion of the coup d' etat further divides it into (1) the governmental coup, (2) the revolutionary coup and (3) the reform coup. This division orients on the purpose of the coup, rather than the method of seizing power, thus only the one overall category the coup d'etat will be included in this discussion.

of today.[11]

Discussing the coup d'etat Huntington notes it:

> Is undertaken by a group that is already a participant in the existing political structure... possesses institutional bases of power within that system.... In particular... some elements of the armed forces.... In a coup everything depends on the first two hours.[12]

He describes revolutionary war as:

> Divorced from the existing political system, the counterelite attempts to develop a parallel structure independent of the government. Its goal is... overthrow. A long, arduous route to power, revolutionary war can only be pursued by dedicated parties.... The instigating group gradually expands... and eventually... overwhelms the previously existing government.[13]

To keep the terminology confusion factor within bounds, Huntington's revolutionary war will hereafter be referred to as insurgency. The close parallel between these two terms will be further noted below.

Huntington offers the duration of the conflict, and the leadership's degree of elite participation in the existing political structure as the criteria for differentiating between these two categories.[14] It is

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[11]For broader typologies of internal conflict or revolution see Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964), pp. 26-31, and Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 3 (1967) 265. A proposed classification scheme that applys directly to Latin America has been offered by Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 17-35.

[12]Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," Changing Patterns of Military Politics, op. cit., p. 32.

[13]Ibid., p. 24.

[14]Ibid., pp. 22-3. The same two factors are employed in similar typologies by Karl W. Deutsch, "External Involvement in Internal Wars," Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 102-4, and Tanter and Midlarsky, op. cit., p. 265.

proposed that two other criteria can be added to this list; these are the scope and level of political violence.[15] The coup d'etat attempts to seize power quickly, with only minimum violence applied against the existing forces of authority. Insurgency, due to its initial lack of coercive capability and the requirement for mass participation, usually results in a broader scope and a higher level of violence.

Table 1, page 17, lists this spectrum of conflict in two categories, the coup d'etat and insurgency, and includes a classification scheme to compare and contrast these categories. It is proposed that these two categories represent the broad options which may be open to dissident groups that seek political power. Thus this typology meets Wilson's first criteria of encompassing all types of activity within the area under investigation. The second and third points in her proposals for an effective typology of internal conflict may be considered together. The two categories are clearly distinct, and the criteria upon which they are classified will have application in specific cases. This typology then meets all the criteria established by Wilson for the delineation of a spectrum of internal conflict and has identified two broad categories of activity, insurgency and the coup d'etat. Each of these broad approaches to the seizure of political power is a study in itself. Therefore only the subject of insurgency will be explored further in detail.[16]

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[15]These factors are employed by Tanter and Midlarsky, op. cit., p. 265. Also see Harry Eckstein, "Introduction," to Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 18-9, for a general discussion of classification schemes and criteria.

[16]For further information on the coup d'etat see, Edward Luttwak, Coup d' Etat (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1968), and D. J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators, A Study of the Coup d' Etat (New York: Viking Press, 1961).

TABLE 1

Characteristics of Extralegal

Attempts to Seize Political Power

Spectrum of Conflict	Duration of the Conflict	Leaderships Participation in the Existing Political Structure	Level of Political Violence	Scope of Political Violence
Insurgency	Long	Low	High	Wide
Coup d' etat	Short	High	Low	Restricted

Source: In part based on Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 3 (1967), 265.

Insurgency, Defined and Developed

Having placed insurgency into perspective at this point, a definition is offered which is considered broad enough to encompass the entire area of insurgent activity, yet specific in that it describes the nature and conduct of the political activities involved.

> Insurgency is an attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite elements of the population of a nation into forcibly overthrowing its existing government.[17]

This is a functional definition of insurgency consisting of three key elements. First, is the dissident leadership element which will be termed hereafter as the insurgent party or simply the party. This is the command and control element of the movement. Without this central direction, mass violence if it did occur would most likely not be focused on the overthrow of the political system. Second, is the requirement to organize and incite popular support for insurgent objectives. One of the principal differences between the coup d'etat and insurgency is the element of popular participation.[18] Although there is much disagreement as to the degree of support required, some organized support must be forthcoming in order for the insurgent to build its strength so it

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[17]This definition is largely based on one provided in U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 31-23, Stability Operations-U.S. Army Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 1967), p. 13. It should be noted that this definition of insurgency describes the worst case situation. There are a host of lesser forms of political violence separatist movements, anti-colonial rebellions, militant reform organizations, pressure groups, perhaps even bandits which may employ violent tactics similar to the insurgent, but toward the achievement of lesser political goals.

[18]Luttwak, op. cit., p. 12, notes, "the coup does not make use of the masses," in fact he considers it a precondition for a successful coup that political participation be restricted to a small fraction of the population, p. 29.

can confront the government and its forces of authority.[19] The third element in this definition is the objective of overthrowing the existing government by force through violent and illegal means. If the insurgent will compromise for less, he is not an insurgent as defined here.

The insurgent must organize for this form of violent political activity and the definition and discussion above have already identified the requirement for a party or central control mechanism. Further the insurgent, in order to gain the required mass support, must create, assimilate or subvert to his will a variety of mass participation organizations. These elements will be termed the mass support organizations or mass organizations. Third, since violence will play a crucial role in the insurgents' plans, an armed element must be formed.[20] Based on this definition and discussion a representative insurgent organization can be identified as shown below, Figure 2, page 20.

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[19]Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., in Rebellion and Authority (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 8-13, contend that an insurgent organization can exist, admittedly at a very low level, with little or no popular support, so long as a high degree of popular neutrality exists. They do, however, recognize that for insurgency to succeed it must eventually gain widespread popular support either voluntary or coerced.

[20]U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Security Assistance, RB 31-7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1973), pp. 1-5, 1-6.

FIGURE 2

Insurgent Organization



Source: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Security Assistance, RB 31-7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1973), p. 1-5.

The various ways in which these three functional elements of an insurgent organization can be structured in response to differing insurgent strategic approaches will be discussed later in this chapter.

Other terms important to understanding the perspective of insurgency proposed by this study are the objective conditions, insurgent strategy, organization and tactics.

What objective conditions in a nation are sufficient to initiate insurgency, and of greater importance what are the required conditions for insurgent success? This crucial question will be analyzed later in this chapter, however, let it suffice at this point to state there must be such conditions. Furthermore, the manner in which these conditions are viewed by the insurgent will impact on the methods of their exploitation.

The goal of the insurgent is political power and this is a constant. The principal variable in this equation is the method of obtaining this goal. Within the broad field of insurgent activity it is proposed that strategies of insurgency can be identified. A strategy then will be

a generalized approach or method to reach the political objective, not the goal itself but the means adopted to obtain it.

Two other terms should be delineated, the first being the insurgent organization. This is the institution developed to operationalize the insurgent strategy. Figure 2, page 20, illustrates the three functional elements of this organization. Second are the tactics employed by the insurgent organization to carry out the strategy. Typical insurgent tactics include violent and non-violent activities such as: propaganda, raids, ambushes, infiltration operations, rumor campaigns, blackmail, terrorism, bank robbery, recruiting, strikes and riots, sabotage, etc.

The perspective in this approach to the study of insurgency is from the viewpoint of the insurgent practitioner and is illustrated in Figure 3 below.

FIGURE 3

The Dynamics of the Insurgent

Development Process



Briefly stated, based on the dissident elements view of the objective conditions--it first determines if an insurgent approach is appropriate

(versus other types of political activity). Assuming the insurgent method is adopted, the perception of the objective conditions will influence the adoption of an overall strategy. This strategy must then be operationalized through an organization which is structured to carry out the tactics appropriate to the insurgents' view of the conditions. This is not a linear relationship. It is proposed that each of the four factors, insurgent strategy, objective conditions, organization, and tactics are interrelated and interact to produce a dynamic process. A significant change in any factor, e.g., the objective conditions as viewed by the insurgent leadership, will lead to the adoption of a new or modified strategy. This would then lead to a modification of the organization and tactics employed. Likewise, the failure of certain tactics to produce the desired results would influence the insurgent organizational structure and ultimately might even produce a major or minor shift in the overall insurgent strategy.

Lest the idea develop that this process is akin to the purchase of an item at an insurgent strategy "supermarket," the following quote from the writings of Mao Tse-tung concerning insurgent theory and practice should dispel any notions of a simplistic approach to its development.

> From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully shown in Lenin's statement: 'Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.' But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory, but merely prate about it, pigeon hole it, and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, has no significance. Knowledge starts with practice, reaches the theoretical plane via practice, and then has to return to practice... this is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of knowledge...[21]

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[21]Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," Selected Works, I (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 304.

Insurgency is a dynamic process. As Lucian Pye stated, insurgents "must live by their wits" tied only to the goal of political power. All else is negotiable in the pursuit of that goal.[22] However, the process is not unstructured, for living by one's wits entails organizing resources and operating what may become an extremely complex and sophisticated political instrument.

As can be discerned from the discussion thus far, this study emphasizes the structural and functional aspects of the complex socio/political phenomenon--insurgency. This approach has not been taken to downplay the political aspects, for insurgency is first and foremost a political struggle with military and violent overtones. An insurgent leadership which loses sight of its political goal will normally experience a quick setback or total defeat. By expanding our knowledge of insurgent strategies and organization it is proposed that a non-value loaded (non-ideological) perspective of insurgency can be established which will aid in understanding this political phenomenon that has few unbiased advocates or commentators especially in the areas of the insurgent practitioners and the counterinsurgents.

Before delving more deeply into insurgent strategies and operations, one question still remains unanswered and should be responded to at this point. This concerns the always troublesome question, "Can one make useful generalizations on the subject and if so how far can one go in that direction?" This next section will respond to these questions.

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[22]Lucian Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions," in Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein, op. cit., p. 162.

Generalizing About Insurgency

For this study to be of value to other social science researchers, it should produce general insights and observations concerning the nature and conduct of insurgency and U.I. that have application outside the confines of this research. Thus the question, is insurgency a topic upon which useful generalizations can be generated? One possible answer is that the conduct of insurgency is situation specific, and any observations gained must be restricted in their application to that specific nation or case example. The other pole would be represented in a reply contending there is one model of insurgency that can be applied in every case. Like so many questions posed in an attempt to explain complex political phenomena, the answer appears to be neither black nor white but shades of gray.

A review of insurgent practitioners' views on this question leaves them somewhere in the middle. Vo Nguyen Giap, commenting on the character of what he terms "revolutionary war" stated:

> Revolutionary armed struggle in any country has common fundamental laws. Revolutionary armed struggle in each country has characteristics and laws of its own too.[23]

"Che" Guevara, in his book On Guerrilla Warfare expresses a similar view but in a much more tactical vein concludes:

> Guerrilla warfare... has many different characteristics and facets ... war is subject to certain strategic laws, and those who violate these laws will be defeated. Guerrilla warfare, a phase of general warfare, must be governed by all these laws; but in addition it has its own laws, and this unique set of rules must be followed if it to succeed. Of course, different geographic and social factors in

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[23]Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 68. This work was also published by Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

> individual countries may call for different methods and forms of guerrilla warfare, but the basic laws apply to all guerrilla campaigns.[24]

Brian Crozier, in attempting to establish approaches to the study of conflict, oriented on the similarities but also noted the differences between internal conflicts. He states, "No one conflict is precisely similar to another; but conflicts do lend themselves to conceptual analysis and classification, and the differences and variations of circumstances and models are as important as the parallels."[25]

Chalmers Johnson adds a caution that the form insurgency, (he terms it revolution), takes cannot be studied outside of the specific political system and the sources of dysfunction in that system. He considers these two elements the primary factors in causing differences between the forms of insurgency and thus the requirement for a high level of abstraction in any generalizations that may be generated.[26] His conclusion in part supports a proposal made earlier in this chapter, that the insurgent's view of the objective conditions which include the political system and the sources of dysfunction in the system, will directly influence the selection of a strategy for the seizure of power.

Taking Johnson's proposals one step further, Lucian Pye notes there are no "principles of war" for the insurgent. He also draws an interesting comparison between the conduct of insurgency, (he terms it insurrection), and conventional war between nation states:

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[24]Ernesto "Che" Guevara, "Che" Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 5-6.

[25]Brian Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," Conflict Studies, No. 7 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, October 1970), p. 1.

[26]Chalmers Johnson, "Revolution and the Social System," Struggles in the State, eds. George A. Kelly and Clifford W. Brown (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1970), p. 105.

> The character of any insurrection is largely determined by the peculiar social structure and pattern of political relationships of the society in which it takes place. In contrast, in conventional wars between states that are geographical entities, there are more constant factors, like the fundamental character of armies and military establishments, levels of technology, and the more controlled range of situations that can arise when formally organized armies clash on fairly clearly defined fields of battle. The difficulty in generalizing about insurrections arises from the fact that strategies that may be highly successful in one situation may be completely irrelevant in another ... guerrillas must live by their wits, ... must be quick-witted and unencumbered by doctrines.[27]

In support of Pye's point that insurgent strategies successful in one situation may be irrelevant in another, one needs only to review the decade following the Castro victory in Cuba which saw a number of attempts to duplicate the Castro insurgent model throughout Latin America. They all failed. These defeats, in large measure, can be traced to the insurgents' failure to view the different situations faced in each Latin nation and to adapt their activities to meet them.[28]

Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., in an analytic study of insurgent conflict proposed:

> Each major insurgency is, in some sense, unique.... But most of them have shared many features--organization, tactics, violence, coercion, persuasion, ideology, internal grievance, external influence. The common features make insurgency a proper subject for more general analysis. The diversity warrants caution to avoid pushing generalizations too far.[29]

The conclusion that must be drawn from this discussion is that surely there is no mandate for the wholesale development of generalizations concerning the nature and conduct of insurgency. On the other hand,

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[27]Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellion," Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein, op. cit., p. 162.

[28]For a further discussion of this topic see: Charles A. Russell and Robert E. Hildner, "Urban Insurgency in Latin America," Air University Review, XXII, 6 (1971), 54-6.

[29]Leites, op. cit., p. 2.

there is justification for accepting the idea that general approaches and hypotheses may be developed and applied with discretion in differing insurgent situations. Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al. in a study of U.I. noted, "similarities among insurgencies are even greater than they would be from the force of circumstances alone."[30] Circumstances in a specific situation may be critical, however, circumstances may also exhibit patterns and regularities. The identification of these common features of insurgency and insurgent strategy, even if at a high level of abstraction, should provide for the development of insights and hypotheses with general application beyond the limits set for this study. If this were not the case, this study could be ended now since it is directed towards the development of a new U.I. strategy for Latin America (Chapter 5).

Before proceeding, it may be useful to recapitulate briefly this investigation thus far. First, within the area of extralegal political violence, a spectrum of activities has been typologically divided into categories of the coup d'etat and insurgency. These terms have been defined, and the coup d'etat not being of primary concern to this study, has been only briefly discussed.

Insurgency, on the other hand, has been further explored in a structual and functional sense to determine the dynamics of the insurgency process. Terms to include the objective conditions, insurgent strategy, organization, and tactics have been evaluated as descriptive of the process and critical to the understanding of insurgency proposed in this research.

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[30]Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al., Report on Urban Insurgency Studies, I (New York: Simulatics Corp., 1966), p. I-21.

The problem of developing useful generalizations concerning the conduct of insurgency has been reviewed. It was determined that within some limits such insights can be developed.

To this point the insurgent process has been developed only in outline and in a rather one-dimensional manner. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to place the insurgent process in a multi-dimensional framework by elaborating on the available strategic options open to the insurgent, and by exploring the objective conditions upon which it may develop.

Insurgent Strategies

A brief review of the post World War II period reveals a host of attempts, most of them unsuccessful, to seize political power via the insurgent method. Are there any patterns of activity in these conflicts? If such general approaches or patterns of activity are recognizable they should lend themselves to categorization and further to the development of variables or factors that would be useful in this and other research.

Prior to beginning the elaboration of insurgency into a series of strategic perspectives, the type activity being analyzed should be restated. Insurgency is organized, extralegal political violence which includes a high degree of mass participation, and is directed at the violent overthrow of a government. Although legal political activities can play some role in this process the final seizure of power depends most critically on illegal and violent means.

Having already established the requirement for the insurgent to organize for this form of conflict and provided some terminology to describe the process, this perspective will serve as a convenient point to initiate this investigation. With this in mind it is proposed that

within the broad category of insurgency various strategies can be identified. Further, this investigation should also identify additional variables that will be useful in the later analysis and development of urban insurgent strategies.

The overall area in which the insurgent will operate can be visualized as a continuum (Figure 4, page 30) with legal political activity to the right end, with a cross over area (shown as cross hatched in Figure 4), and moving to and toward the left end the area of insurgent activity. On the far left end of this continuum one could place anarchist activity and extralegal political activity with little organization and poorly defined objectives beyond violence.[31] The cross hatched areas are included to illustrate that some insurgent activity may be of two worlds and not precisely fit the divisions of this neat theoretical continuum. This point will be illustrated when the popular front insurgent strategy is discussed.

What does the insurgent activities portion of this line represent? First, it will be developed to represent various insurgent views of the objective conditions which result in the adoption of differing insurgent strategies, organizations and tactics. Second, as one moves to the left on this continuum it represents greater reliance on violence versus mass politicization and participation in attempts to achieve insurgent goals. Other less critical variables will be identified in the discussion below and are listed in Table 3, page 48.

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[31]The basic idea for this representation was drawn from an Atlantic Research Corp., study, A Historical Survey of Patterns and Techniques of Insurgency Conflicts in Post 1900 Latin America (Alexandria, VA: Atlantic Research Corp., 1964), pp. 3 and 5.

FIGURE 4

The Insurgency Spectrum



Source: Based on an approach employed in Atlantic Research Corporation Study, A Historical Survey of Patterns and Techniques of Insurgency Conflicts in Post 1900 Latin America (Alexandria, VA: Atlantic Research Corp., 1964), pp. 3 and 5.

To establish an initial perspective for this discussion one must look to Communist insurgent examples. This is not to imply that all insurgents are Communists, however, one must recognize that in recent times they have been the most successful practitioners of this form of political activity. Obviously non-communist insurgents could employ the same or similar techniques, since the objective, seizure of political power, is the same regardless of ideological leanings. Recognizing that the possible number of insurgent strategic variations are legion, a brief examination of three generalized approaches will reveal both similarities and differences. Michael Charles Conley in his article, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," describes three broad insurgent strategic options, or as he terms them "general lines."[32] These strategies have been referred to in Communist literature as the "Left Line," "Right, United or Popular Front Line," and the "United Front From Below." Conley's general approach, but not his terminology, will be employed to elaborate and expand this investigation of insurgent strategies. Since Left and Right may cause confusion with the generally accepted political usage of these terms which denote legal political activity, they will be replaced with other descriptive terms. The "Left Line" will be entitled the elite or elite strategy. The "United Front From Below" will be termed the mass strategy. The rationale for these titles will become obvious during the discussion of each strategy. The "United" or "Popular Front" terminology will be retained with the latter term used in most cases.

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[32]Michael Charles Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," Orbis, IX, 4 (1966), 970-85. Also see Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press 1969), pp. 108-66, esp. pp. 109-11 for a similar proposal.

The Elite Strategy. The approach of the elite strategy, involves the most blatantly illegal acts of violence and can be said to be the strategy of the true elitist. (I understand truth even if the masses do not, hence I will force them to accept salvation regardless of cost.) In this strategy, objective conditions (the situation in the target nation) are of least concern to the insurgent. He envisions the creation of a revolutionary situation through violence.[33]

The Cuban insurgent experience as expanded upon by "Che" Guevara and Regis Debray, falls within this category, with its avoidance of urban political parties and nearly total reliance on armed insurgents engaging government forces in rural guerrilla warfare.[34]

The elitist insurgent usually holds violence to be an act of faith, which, if performed frequently enough, will generate the necessary political conditions for the assumption of power. Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist born in Martinique, and deeply influenced by the Algerian Insurgency, has taken this concept of the redeeming value of violence to the point where he considers it the catharsis to free men from bondage and the creator of freedom and liberty.[35] Fanon's aim is individual and

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[33]Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," op. cit., pp. 970-3.

[34]General sources for Castroite insurgent theory and practice include Guevara, "Che" Guevara On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Grove Press, 1967), and Theodore Draper, Castroism; Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), esp. pp. 3-26. For information on other Latin insurgencies along the lines of the Cuban/Castro model see Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), and Enrique Martinez Codo, "Insurgency Latin American Style," Military Review, XLVII, 11 (1967), 3-12.

[35]Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 35-94. Also see: Paul A. Beckett, "Algeria vs. Fanon: The Theory of Revolutionary Decolonization, and the Algerian Experience,"

group transformation, with violence being the midwife. The most extreme forms of this "salvation through action" show themselves in 19th century anarchism and the modern New Left wherein violence may come close to being an end in itself.[36]

Organizationally the insurgent will stress the armed element, and the party and the armed element may become one at the apex; i.e., top leadership playing dual roles as combat leaders and political policy-makers. Little if any attention will be paid to mass organizations.[37]

The basic tenents of the elitist view of the objective conditions are summarized below:

1. The population is in a mood to support the insurgents or can quickly be brought to that point through the development of widespread popular disorders. This will provide the insurgent organization the opportunity to seize power quickly.[38]

2. "Che" Guevara further refined this view when he stated, "One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise; it can be created."[39]

Western Political Quarterly, XXVI, 1 (1973), 5-27. For a critique of Fanon's glorification of violence see Hanna Arendt's, "Reflections on Violence" Journal of International Affairs, XXII, 1 (1969), 1-35.

[36]The writings of a number of the contemporary advocates of these ultra-violent techniques are included in Carl Oglesby's, ed. The New Left Reader (New York: Grove Press, 1969).

[37]Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, op. cit., p. 106, notes that the military (the guerrilla forces) and the party are not separate. The nucleus, of what he terms the "vanguard party," is the guerrilla force or "foco." It is the embryo of the party.

[38]Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," op. cit., p. 970.

[39]Guevara, "Che" Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., p. 4.

3. In addition he contends: "Popular forces (read this as guerrilla forces) can win a war against an army." "In the underdeveloped countries of the Americas, rural areas are the best battlefields for revolution."[40]

One of the principle tenents of Castroism is that an armed minority can create the objective conditions for insurgent success. Guevara's caution that such could be the case only against an unpopular dictatorial government has been disregarded since the mid-1960's.[41] This has led to the so-called foco theory. Political analysis and organization are no longer necessary. To start the insurgency one simply starts to fight. The insurgent foco (nucleus or base) presents a challenge to the government and a rallying point to the masses.[42] Failure has not appreciably changed the Castroite position that a small determined "foco" can bring down any government.[43]

This discussion of the elite strategy has mainly employed Castroite examples, however, this should not imply that they are the only exponents of this insurgent approach. Many of the so-called "terrorist groups" active today throughout the world hold similar or even

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[40]Ibid., p. 5.

[41]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[42]Regis Debray, "Castroism: The Long March of Latin America," Struggles in the State, eds. George A. Kelly and Clifford W. Brown (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 438-81, esp. pp. 447-468.

[43]For Debray's analysis of the failures of the Foco theory in Latin America see: Ibid., pp. 448-453.

more radical views.[44] Castroite examples have been stressed in this discussion because of their high degree of development in both theory and practice.

A caution should be noted which applies to the writings of most insurgent practitioners but especially to the Cuban case. This concerns what actually happened during the insurgency and what is documented after the fact by the insurgents. The two may be very different. This habit of rewriting history is well demonstrated in the Cuban case. For example, many observers credit urban insurgent activities in Havana as being a major factor in the final defeat of the Batista government.[45] This aspect is generally ignored or downplayed in the writings of both "Che" Guevara and Regis Debray.

In summary, the elite insurgent envisions violent actions creating and heightening the "revolutionary awareness" of the masses. Although mass support is expected, little insurgent effort is expended in its development or politicization. The insurgent looks to a quick victory and assumes the guerrilla forces can ultimately defeat the government's armed forces. The insurgents formal organization usually will be loosely structured with little differentiation of roles among the movement's top leadership.

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[44]Crozier, Annual of Power and Conflict, op. cit., pp. 2-12, 33-93, provides an overview of the worldwide trend towards extremely violent insurgent activity, and a nation by nation analysis of the various insurgent movements.

[45]For arguments in support of this point see, Jay Mallin, ed., in his "Introduction" to "Che" Guevara, On Revolution (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), p. 31.; Draper, Castroism Theory and Practice, op. cit., pp. 77-88; Robert Moss, War for the Cities (New York: Coward-McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), pp. 142-3, and Jack Davis, "Political Violence in Latin America," Adelphi Papers, No. 85 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 13.

This may appear a simple-minded approach to the conduct of insurgency since risks are high, and organization of the masses is not stressed. The resulting lack of organization could lead to difficulties in consolidating the victory if it were achieved. Lenin had little tolerance for this insurgent strategy and authored a study, Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, which attacked it for its lack of a disciplined party organization and its disregard of politics in favor of violence.[46] Disregarding these cautions of Lenin, Castro was able to bring about the downfall of the Batista regime employing a basically elitist strategy.

The United or Popular Front Strategy. In sharp contrast to the elite strategy stands the popular front strategy. This approach involves the fielding of a political party which enters into understandings, deals and coalitions with other political parties and interest groups to gain influence and ultimately control of the structure of government and society.[47] While not necessarily an insurgency as defined in this study, it deserves a brief examination because of its use of violence and subversion in seizing power. Moreover, this strategy may fit in the cross hatched area in Figure 4 and points out that in the real world not all things fit neat theoretical constructions.

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[46]V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder (New York: International Publishers, 1934), p. 9. As cited in Conley "The Framework of Communist Strategy," op. cit., p. 970.

[47]Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," op. cit., pp. 973-6. Also see Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., pp. 155-7.

In its simplist form, this technique entails the insurgent's legal political party entering into a governing coalition.[48] The party need not be openly identified with the insurgents, but a party legally participating in the political life of the nation is a prerequisite. Entry into governing coalitions may be effected by one of two routes. First, by gaining the required electoral support to permit participation in a coalition government with other parties. A second route is through participation in a "Front" formed with kindred parties. The Front then gains enough support to permit participation in formulating a government (as the term applies in parliamentary systems).[49]

Once in the government, the party begins to make impracticable demands, agitate, employ criminal techniques, or even initiate riots, etc., to discredit opposition members of the government and show the populace that the party and its "Front" affiliates are the only alternative to a weak, ineffectual, and corrupt government. Normally this approach involves little overt violence and obviously no armed conflict with the forces of the incumbent government, at least not by organizations publicly identified with the party.[50]

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[48]It should be noted that this coalition differs in meaning from the common parliamentary coalition which implies power sharing among political parties. This type of coalition is not so much power sharing as it is a means to seize total control from within. See Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," op. cit., p. 974, and Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong, op. cit., pp. 91-5, 131-3.

[49]The Chilian Communist Parties participation in the "Popular Front" that supported President Allende is a recent example of this technique. See, "How Communists Took Power in Chile," U.S. News and World Report, December 21, 1970, pp. 33-5.

[50]Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), pp. 184-8, provides a general discussion of "Popular Front" methods.

Quite predictably, in this situation the insurgent will place first emphasis on the party, place mass organizations in second priority, and armed elements last. Since the centers of political control are in the cities, most insurgent activities will be urban based.

The crucial objective condition is a political system which will allow the insurgent to enter the legal political arena in the guise of a legitimate party and will tolerate its disruptive activities. Another key factor is the role that the nation's armed forces play in politics and the society in general. The popular front technique can only be successful with the acquiescence or neutralization of the armed forces.[51] The recent demise of the Allende Government in Chile once again demonstrated this fact.

The popular front strategy has been employed for many years by the "old line" Moscow leaning Communist Parties in Latin America.[52] Although not successful to date in capturing a government from within, this approach does provide for a political force in being which can await the development of the proper conditions. Given the conditions it will be prepared, organized and ready to move decisively. Another option open to the popular front follower is, to move out of the "gray area" (depicted on Figure 4), and attempt the seizure of power by following a variation of one of the insurgent strategies described in this chapter.

The best example of the popular front strategy in action does not come from Communist insurgent experience, it hails from the Hitlerian

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[51]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 158.

[52]See, Alexander T. Edelman, Latin American Government and Politics: The Dynamics of Revolutionary Society (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 356-9 and Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 137.

takeover in Germany.[53] This is a classic case of the erosion of government (including the armed forces) and popular resistance which resulted in the Nazi party's final consolidation of power being given the trappings of legality. Similar popular front techniques were employed in the 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia.[54]

The Mass Insurgent Strategy. This strategy is primarily based on the Maoist/Chinese revolution and is the most complex of the three insurgent strategies under discussion.[55] Where the proponents of the elitist strategy rely on violence to propel themselves into power on a rising tide of rather spontaneous popular support, a follower of the mass strategy would consider this approach simply "adventurism." In his view insurgent success can only be ensured through the proper analysis and exploitation of the objective conditions, coupled with a strict party leadership of an organized and politicized mass base and military force. Violent activities to include guerrilla warfare and finally

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[53]William Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1959), pp. 211-262.

[54]Elias Zdenek and Taromir Netik, "Czechoslovakia," Communism in Europe, II, ed., William E. Grippen (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press 1966), pp. 205-18.

[55]For a discussion of Chinese Communist insurgent theory and practice see: Edward L. Katzenback and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," Political Science Quarterly, LXX, 3 (1955), 336-42; Howard L. Boorman and Scott H. Boorman, "Chinese Communist Insurgent Warfare, 1935-49," Political Science Quarterly, LXXXI, 2 (1966), 171-95; Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of Peoples War!" Peking Review, No. 36 (September 3, 1965), pp. 9-30, and Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

conventional warfare will be required to defeat the government.[56] According to Mao, "political power flows out of the barrel of a gun;" however, there must be no doubt as to who controls the trigger. It must be the party.[57]

This insurgent strategy is distinct from the popular front technique in the manner in which the insurgents collaborate or ally with existing social and political organizations.[58] Here the front organization, although it may carry on some political activities, is not intended to be a legal political party or coalition. It is primarily an organizational device which serves as a mechanism to bind together the insurgent leadership and its base of mass support. Where the popular front uses coalitions and front organizations to horizontally link elements with like interests, the mass insurgent employs them to both vertically link elements of the population to the party, and also to make party appeals acceptable to a broader range of the population than that which would respond to direct appeals from the party.[59]

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[56]Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Struggles in the State, eds. George A. Kelly and Clifford W. Brown, Jr., op. cit., pp. 415-6. Also see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., pp. 160-5, and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 266-8.

[57]Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, II (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 224.

[58]Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Struggles in the State, eds. Kelly and Brown, op. cit., p. 409.

[59]For a discussion of the Viet Cong's extensive use of front organizations see Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 43-4, 80-1, 166-93. Also see Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution, op. cit., p. 184, for a general discussion of insurgent employment of front organizations.

Another major difference in these strategies is the locale in which the insurgents place primary emphasis. The mass strategy to date has been primarily associated with the rural environment.

In the almost classic development of this strategy the insurgent begins from a geographical "heartland" (isolated, reasonably secure base of operations) and establishes what is literally a "shadow" governmental structure competing for legitimacy with the existing administrative structure of the incumbent government. This results in two possible courses of insurgent action on the local level. One is the military defeat of the government forces and the establishment of a new government by the insurgent. This action usually entails regularization of the insurgent governing structure (shadow government) that had existed. The second course is available in the event total military victory is not obtainable and entails the transferal of popular allegiance to the insurgent governing structure, while the established government's administrative structure continues to exist but is rendered ineffectual.

Organizationally this approach requires emphasis on the mass organizations if the insurgent's shadow government is placed in the mass organization category. Party primacy is a paramount concern even though it may not be the most visible element. Control mechanisms whereby party dominance is assured will take various forms and may achieve a high degree of complexity as attested to by the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) organization in the Republic of Vietnam. See Figure 5, page 42.

A military arm is essential for the insurgent's ultimate success, although its relative importance will vary with local conditions (e.g., government military presence) and the insurgent leadership's evaluation

FIGURE 5

Structure of the National Liberation Front (NLF)

in the Republic of Vietnam



Source: Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 215.

of circumstances.

In the progression of this insurgent strategy from initiation to success both Mao[60] and Giap[61] provide a similarly phased developmental scheme as shown in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2

Insurgent Phases - Mass Insurgent Strategy

Mao Tse-tung	Vo Nguyen Giap
Phase I, Latent and Incipient	Stage of Contention
Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare	Stage of Equilibrium
Phase III, War of Movement	Stage of Counteroffensive

Both of these insurgent practitioners visualize insurgency as a three stage or phase process. The initial phase is concerned with organization and preparing for later activities. Eventually the process develops through guerrilla operations into a conventional war of movement in which the government's forces and its supporting political structure are defeated. In contrast to "Che" Guevara who envisions guerrilla activities defeating the government, Mao and Giap consider it necessary to move up to conventional military activity prior to the final seizure

[60]Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., p. 21.

[61]Giap, People's War, People's Army, op. cit., pp. 46-7.

of power. Perhaps in these views all of them are to some degree prisoners of their own experiences.[62]

These progressions, even if the insurgent is successful, may nevertheless have many false starts, defeats, and may include the forced return to an earlier phase. Also there is nothing that requires the insurgency to progress through all of these phases. Victory or defeat for the insurgent may come at any phase of its development. For example, during the guerrilla war phase or even earlier, the existing government may collapse thus providing an opportunity for the insurgents to seize power.

The mass strategy provides the insurgent with an extremely viable political instrument if it is properly developed on a base of dissatisfied citizens combined with effective leadership and organization.[63] It can sustain crushing military defeats; however, so long as its party core and a portion of the mass base is secure it can raise new military forces and again confront the government. For example, the Communist insurgents in Malaya that were defeated in the late 1950's are now reestablishing

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[62]Mallin, "Che" Guevara on Revolution, op. cit., pp. 11-2.

[63]The term mass may be misleading in one respect. Although the party attempts to appeal to and develop a large mass following, it will usually not be led by the masses. A socialist observer in describing the Viet Cong (NLF) noted, "the difference between the mass base of the movement and its class bases ... the mass base of the NLF lies among the peasantry does not mean that the NLF is controlled by the peasantry.... The NLF is controlled by an incipient bureaucratic ruling class--that is its class basis." Source: Don Bacheller, "Guerrillaism, the Peasantry and the NLF," Independent Socialist (April 1968), pp. 19-20. As cited in Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 45. Robert C. North, with Ithiel de Sola Pool, in "The Social Characteristics of Chinese Party Elites," in World Revolutionary Elites, eds. Howard D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 376-417, came to similar conclusions concerning the Chinese Communist Party elites.

themselves as an active insurgent force in the Malay-Thai border region.[64]

By definition, the mass strategy will work in its classic form only in a situation where geography and demography will permit establishment of base areas.[65] Here will be found the relative security necessary to train, organize, and educate insurgent forces for future battle. In short, this will provide the insurgent with the nucleus from which the movement can grow and expand and take in more land and population until control passes from the established government.

It should be noted that the rural conditions on which the original mass insurgencies were based are quickly disappearing as nations continue to develop. This is especially true with regard to the geographic and demographic factors as they apply to Latin America. Before dismissing this insurgent strategy as out of date, it should be remembered that its basis, as well as being geographic, is a highly politicized mass base and a structured party organization. These latter two factors are not tied to geographic considerations.

Insurgent Strategies, Summarized

In the previous discussion insurgency has been subdivided, based on a strategic view of its activities, into three broad approaches: the elite, the mass, and popular front strategies. The discussion of these

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[64]"Malaysian Guerrillas Widen Action," The Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1974, p. 5c.

[65]For a detailed discussion of the factors in base area development see: Robert W. McColl, "A Political Geography of Revolution: China, Vietnam and Thailand," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 2 (1967), 153-67; also by the same author "The Oyiiwan Soviet Area - 1927-1932," Journal of Asian Studies, XXVII, 1 (1967), 41-60.

strategies has oriented on the general approach each takes toward the seizure of power. Particular emphasis has been placed on the role of organization and tactics. This is not represented as a complete exploration of this subject, however it will be sufficient for the purposes of this research.

What do these insurgent strategies represent since experience has demonstrated there are no sacred rules which demand slavish adherence if victory is to be gained? The three generalized strategies identified above have been modified in practice as circumstances dictate. It should also be pointed out that these insurgent strategies are three artifically constructed points on a continuum of possible insurgent activities. They should not be a crutch to stereotyped thinking. The insurgent is not tied to any one strategy. For example, the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1920's employed a popular front strategy in cooperation with the Kuomintang (KMT) and attempted to build its support on an urban base. When this coalition with the KMT failed, the Chinese Communists were forced to move their operations to the rural areas of China and during the next 20 years developed the mass strategy.[66] The Tupamaros, an elitist urban insurgent organization in Uruguay, supported a coalition of legal Leftist parties in the 1971 elections. When this attempt to influence the electoral process failed, they reverted to their previous elitist insurgent activities.[67]

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[66]See, John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 3d ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1972), pp. 212-5; or Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., pp. 16-7.

[67]Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 235-6.

Given the flexibility open to the insurgent in the development and operationalization of a strategy, certain distinctive characteristics were identified in the previous discussion and are noted on Table 3, page 48. This table points out the principle criteria for differentiating among the three insurgent strategies.

This study is primarily concerned with insurgent strategies which seek the violent overthrow of government from without. Therefore, the popular front strategy, which has been retained in this discussion for comparison purposes, will not be discussed further. However, it remains an option for the insurgent who wishes to exploit its capabilities in a quasi-legal political struggle.

To further contrast the two remaining insurgent strategies (the elite and mass) a brief comparative description of their development follows. It illustrates the manner in which the basic differences in their views of objective conditions, organization and tactics influence their development. This concept is depicted in Figure 6 below.[68] The three elements in this diagram are the government, the insurgent and the populace. The objective of the insurgent is to gain support within the populace and defeat the government. The methods employed in these two insurgent strategies differ in a number of respects.

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[68]The basis for this diagram was taken from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Prevention of Insurgent War, Lesson Plan M/R7060 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1973), p. LP2-38.

TABLE 3

Comparison of Insurgent Strategies

Insurgent Strategy	Relative Ranking of Organizational Elements (Party-Mass-Armed)			Violence		Duration of Struggle	Common Types of Leadership	Insurgent Efforts Directed at Politicization of Mass Support
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Use of to Achieve Goals	Scope of			
Elite Strategy	Armed	Party	Mass	High	Broad	Short	Warrior Elite	Low
Mass Strategy	Party	Mass	Armed	Moderate	Broad	Protracted	Political/ Warrior Elite	High
Popular Front Strategy	Party	Mass	Armed	Low	Narrow	Moderate	Political	Moderate

FIGURE 6

Development of the Elite and Mass Insurgent Strategies



First the elite strategy will be developed. Starting from a small clandestine group, the party immediately undertakes violent activities directed at the government (see arrow no. 1, Figure 6). The objective of this violence is to precipitate a governmental over-reaction, (see arrow no. 2, Figure 6) which as "Che" Guevara states will, "expose the dictatorial nature of the regime."[69] The result is the government in effect pushes support to the insurgents, (see arrow no. 3, Figure 6). Thus begins the build up of support for the insurgents. To this point the process is viewed as somewhat circular. The insurgent increases the guerrilla attacks on government and other prominent targets. Some efforts may be directed into political activities; however, the main thrust is violence. The result is an ever greater government over-reaction and increased support of the insurgent which eventually causes the collapse or overthrow of the government. The elitist insurgent is victorious.

A follower of the mass insurgent strategy on the other hand first initiates activities on the political level. A small clandestine party is

[69]Mallin, "Che" Guevara on Revolution, op. cit., p. 30.

formed, but rather than initiating violence it undertakes the development of a base of support among the populace (see arrow no. 4, Figure 6). Thus ideally, the movement is highly developed before the government learns of its existence. With a small but expanding base of support (usually in a rural area), the party now undertakes violence to sever the link between the government and the populace (see arrow no. 5, Figure 6). The intent is not necessarily to provoke a government over-reaction and thereby push support to the insurgents. Rather, it is to sever the links between the government and the populace and thus facilitate the insurgents continued and expanded control over the populace. This cycle of politicalization, violence and insurgent development is of a protracted nature. As the insurgent gains in military capabilities and has major segments of the population under its control or influence, its military and political activity will be directed at the neutralization and annihilation of the remaining governmental forces (see arrow no. 6, Figure 6). This is the "war of movement" described by Mao.[70] In the resulting conflict the government is defeated and the insurgent seizes power.

This review illustrates that basic differences in the insurgent's views of the objective conditions, strategy, and its implementation can have impact on the manner in which the insurgency develops. Later chapters will demonstrate how these two insurgent strategies, mainly developed on rural experience, can be adapted to the current Latin American environment.

Lest this approach to the study of insurgency appear too mechanical, brief mention of other factors in its development should be addressed.

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[70]Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., p. 21.

First is the subject of insurgent leadership. This study has oriented on the insurgent party without specifically mentioning the role of individual or group leadership.[71] All insurgent movements require effective direction and leadership. In the Latin American context individual leadership may be a critical element due to the personalistic nature of Latin politics.

Lenin stated, "Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."[72] Some type of rationale for action must be provided to bind the insurgents together in their difficult and dangerous endeavor. Although a recognized requirement, there is no type or common insurgent ideology. Perhaps, ideology is one of the most situation specific of the factors in this study.

Foreign support for insurgency is another consideration not yet discussed. Some authors propose that insurgency cannot succeed without it.[73] This point will not be debated. Foreign support is a factor which all insurgents should consider. Should it be sought or accepted, from whom and what are the liabilities in accepting foreign support? These are some of the decisions which all insurgents face.

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[71]For studies along the lines of the "great man theory" see: Bertrum Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (New York: Dial, 1964.), E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), and Brian Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[72]Robert H. McNeal, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev: Voices of Bolshevism (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 9.

[73]John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), pp. 64-9; Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution, op. cit., p. 300; Mao Tse-tung "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism," Selected Works, I, op. cit., p. 173, and James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 10.

These three additional considerations will be discussed further in the development of urban insurgent strategies for Latin America.

Can any of these general conclusions concerning the nature and conduct of insurgency be restated as tentative hypotheses? In this regard the following are offered:

> The resort to insurgency by a group (party) will be directly related to their analysis of the objective conditions in the nation that would support such activities.
>
> The development of an insurgent strategy will be directly influenced by the insurgent's view of the objective conditions.
>
> The insurgent strategy developed will directly influence the organization and tactics employed in its implementation.

To summarize, the insurgent has open to him a vast number of possible approaches all of which aim at the seizure of political power. For purposes of this discussion insurgent strategies have been grouped into two broad areas entitled the elite and mass strategies. There is no "rule" which dictates the path or in which sequence the insurgent will proceed. He may employ any combination of strategies and if blocked in one direction may try another approach. The insurgent is influenced by local conditions and must adapt activities to suit these conditions, whether they be rural, urban, geographical, racial, linguistic, tribal, or whatever. Given these constraints, there should be some logical association between insurgent strategy and organization. The insurgent must organize and structure the movement based on an analysis of the situation such that it can carry out the tasks he feels are required for the seizure of power.

Insurgency--Causal Conditions

The previous discussion established a view of the insurgent method of power seizure. The departure point for this research was the insurgent view of the so-called objective conditions. It has been hypothesized that the exploitation of these conditions by the insurgent is crucial to its effective organization and development. What might be these objective conditions?

The literature that addresses this subject is voluminous and approaches the study (usually entitled revolution) from a number of diverse aspects.[74] It is not the objective of this study to completely review the literature on revolutionary theory; however, a number of these researchers' observations will be cited below. It should be noted that many of these studies, especially the older ones, orient on the so-called "Great Revolutions."[75] Therefore, the conclusions which they have drawn concerning the conditions for the overthrow of government are thus derived only from successful cases. As Huntington has noted, such conditions are rare.[76] Also in historical treatments of the subject, whether one is labeled a revolutionary, insurgent, or insurrectionist et. al. is

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[74]See Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, XVII, 2 (1966), 159-76, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution," The New Republic, XV, 22 (1968), 22-9.

[75]Brinton, op. cit., esp. pp. 250-1, Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), Alexis De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and The French Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1955), and Stone, op. cit., pp. 159-60. A longer historical view is provided by Carleton Beals, The Nature of Revolution (New York: Crowell, 1970).

[76]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 264.

based mainly on the degree of success achieved[77] not on the methods employed. One becomes a revolutionary if successful. If defeated one is usually relegated to some lesser category.

As previously pointed out, this study holds this view invalid and contends that general methods of insurgent power seizure are constant irrespective of success or failure. Further, the insurgents mode of operations will be reflective of his view of these conditions. The degree to which the insurgent is able to read these conditions and exploit their potentialities will directly influence the possibilities of his success. The purpose of the investigation below is to identify and briefly discuss these conditions. In doing so it is recognized they are ideal conditions, and thus seldom completely existent in the real world. The specific manner in which they manifest themselves will vary from case to case.

A condition for insurgency could be simply a group's desire to do so. A "victory or death" attitude may permit the initiation of insurgency; however, the probability of its success without the supporting conditions would be nil. Another interesting question concerns which comes first the insurgent or the conditions? This is a "chicken or egg" proposition. The insurgent existing first would be purely the conspiracy theory.[78] The other side of the coin would place the existing conditions

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[77]Wilson, op. cit., p. 3.

[78]This is a variant of the "great man" approach, see Wolfenstein, op. cit., and Wolfe, op. cit. Although the pure conspiracy theory is generally dismissed, there is much study of elites, for example Lasswell and Lerner, World Revolutionary Elites, op. cit.

first.[79] The situation in effect produces the insurgency. This study proposes that the conditions outlined below must exist for insurgency to have any chance of success. They will not insure success, but they can make it possible. The insurgent however is not a completely passive actor in this process. As will be demonstrated below, he can to some degree influence and shape the conditions to his own ends. Hofheinz, for example, contends that the principal factor in the Maoist success in China was predicated on the organizational effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[80] But the same dynamism would have had little effect if the sources of discontent and other factors were missing. Imagine, for example, the frustration Mao would have experienced in trying to organize the present day complacent and wealthy farmers of the American Midwest into supporting an insurgent organization.

Ted Robert Gurr further proposes that the degree of "Dissident institutional support varies strongly with the cohesiveness and complexity of dissident oriented organizations."[81] He suggests a progression that starts with discontent, advances to politicized discontent, and finally

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[79]The social science related literature on revolution abounds with approaches that see it as a consequence of social strain, dysfunction, disequilibrium, modernization, relative deprivation, et. al. On dysfunction see Johnson, Revolution and The Social System, op. cit; on disequilibrium his, Revolutionary Change, op. cit; on social strain see Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962); on the impact of modernization see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit.; and on relative deprivation see Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit.

[80]Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923-45," Chinese Communist Politics in Action, ed. A. Doak Barnett (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 3-77.

[81]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 12-3.

is actualized into political violence. He also notes that all three activities can be active at one time.[82] This view of a dynamic process in which objective conditions and insurgent exploitation of conditions interact is the position adopted by this study.

Chalmers Johnson has noted we do not know "precisely what are revolutionary conditions;"[83] however, the broad categories discussed below may have explanatory value in this investigation and the latter development of urban insurgent strategies. To establish a framework for this review of possible causal conditions, the factors of popular dissatisfaction, government failure, foreign support, existence of an insurgent organization, chance, and precipitating factors will be addressed.

The thrust of this discussion is that sufficient conditions must exist for insurgent success even though it is impossible to describe precisely what they might be. This is not a search for specific causes but for the general conditions which in specific cases may be exploited by an insurgent.

The first factor to be considered is popular discontent. The literature takes two principal approaches to this subject. One looks to general conditions in the society.[84] The other approach attempts to isolate specific factors in the society that contribute to the discontent.[85]

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[82]Ibid., pp. 14-5.

[83]Johnson, "Revolution and the Social System," Struggles in the State, eds. Kelley and Brown, op. cit., p. 95.

[84]For example, Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., and his, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review, LXII, 4 (1968), pp. 1104-24; Brinton, op. cit; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit.

[85]For example Manus Midlarsky and Raymond Tanter, "Toward a Theory of Political Instability in Latin America," Journal of Peace Research, IV,

This discussion will stress the more general approach with some references to the specific factors.

That successful insurgency is based on a degree of popular support is axiomatic, although there is little agreement on the degree of support required. Leites and Wolfe contend that popular neutrality or apathy may be sufficient at least to begin insurgent activities.[86] However, it is difficult to envision an insurgency developing to any great degree in a society that feels comfortable with its social, economic and political situation.

For insurgency to prosper there must be dissatisfaction about something. Additionally this dissatisfaction should take on certain characteristics. First it must be widespread across geographic, ethnic, religious, linguistic lines, etc.[87] Brinton, in one of his four uniformities in a revolutionary situation, noted the role of, "bitter class antagonisms."[88] Huntington states that a precondition for success is discontent, especially the alienation and the alliance of disgruntled middle class and intellectuals in the cities with the rural peasant.

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3 (1967), pp. 209-25; Alexander Gerschenkron, "Reflections on Economic Aspects of Revolutions," Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 180-204, and Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," When Men Rebel and Why, ed. James C. Davies (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 215-27.

[86]Leites, op. cit., pp. 8-13. For opposing views on this point see Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., pp. 43-4; J. Bowyer Bell, Myth of the Guerrilla (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 95; De Sola Pool, op. cit., pp. 1-12-3, and Oppenheimer, op. cit., pp. 94-5.

[87]Stone, op. cit., p. 165; George Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1938), p. 12; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 277.

[88]Brinton, op. cit., pp. 250-1. Chalmers Johnson refers to this as "elite intransigence" in Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 94.

Further he notes the existence of a growing middle class element and its discontent are critical not only to the magnitude of political violence but also to the manner in which the political violence will manifest itself. He proposes that a prerequisite for insurgency is a growing middle class that is unsure of its values and new-found status.[89]

Besides being widespread the various elements of the population must be dissatisfied about generally the same thing at the same time. This will provide the focus for what otherwise might be only random discontent.[90] Given widespread alienation, Huntington believes that the two issues of nationalism and the threat posed by a foreign power may be the glue to bind these lesser frustrations to the greater goal of political overthrow.[91] Thus for popular discontent to assist the insurgent, it must ultimately orient on the governmental system and its failures.[92] (The topic of governmental failure is investigated in detail below.)

Intellectual and elite discontent is critical in shaping popular disaffection in two respects. First, as Brinton noted, the desertion of the intellectuals from the existing order is a harbinger of revolution, for they are responsible for the perpetuation of the ideas and myths which support the existing government and society.[93] More important to

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[89]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 300-8.

[90]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 232-74, 366.

[91]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 300-8.

[92]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 12-3. Also see James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," When Men Revolt and Why, ed. James C. Davies (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 134, 136.

[93]Brinton, op. cit., pp. 250-1. Also see Davis, op. cit., p. 10.

the insurgent is the role of elite and intellectual support for its activities. To persuade the populace to follow the insurgent a new myth must be put forth that meets their needs as they see them. Thus a plausible rationale for action must be offered that explains the causes of discontent and offers a hope for their rectification. The disgruntled intellectual will be the formulator and propagandist for this new myth.[94] This tie between the insurgent and the intellectual is a crucial factor especially in a protracted struggle.

Although abstract ideas may be required by a few, the bulk of the population will be dissatisfied with and respond to more mundane things. As Gurr has proposed, economic factors usually play a major role in popular dissatisfaction.[95] One should not mistake this for an endorsement of the poverty thesis. In contradiction to the views of Marx,[96] who proposed that dissatisfaction was based on want and privation, De Tocqueville, Brinton, et. al., have noted that the possibility of betterment not poverty gave rise to the "Great Revolutions."[97] Putting both Marx and De Tocqueville together, James C. Davies in his "J" curve theory, noted that discontent was greatest during a downturn (Marx), but only if

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[94]Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," op. cit, pp. 3-4. Also see Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 20.

[95]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 59-91, 361. Also see Olsen, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," When Men Rebel and Why, ed. James C. Davies, op. cit., pp. 215-27; Luttwak, op. cit., p. 17; and Alexander Gerschenkron, "Reflections on Economic Aspects of Revolutions," Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 180-204.

[96]For a discussion of Marx's views on revolution see, Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton, 1969), Chap. 1.

[97]Brinton, op. cit., pp. 250-1, and De Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 176.

proceeded by a period of improving conditions (De Tocqueville).[98] This and other variations on the same theme have been expanded upon by Huntington, et. al., who proposed that the process of national development is basically unstabilizing.[99] Thus a curvilinear relationship is proposed between the level of development and the level of political violence experience by a nation. Political violence is low in traditional societies, high in developing or transitional ones and low in developed societies.

In summary, the first prerequisite for insurgent success is popular dissatisfaction. This alienation must be widespread throughout various elements of the nation. Whatever the basis of this discontent, it will usually be strongly influenced by economic factors. Further, it must ultimately be focused on government failure. The intellectual community will have a key role to play in undercutting the popular support for government and providing the insurgent a coherent rationale for its activities.

Governmental failure as a contributing factor to insurgency has been noted by most authors.[100] This phenomenon can best be explained in terms of the loss by government of two major factors, legitimacy and the

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[98]Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," When Men Revolt and Why, ed. James C. Davies, op. cit., pp. 134-7.

[99]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 264-5, 216, 274-5, and Olsen, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," When Men Rebel and Why, ed. James C. Davies, op. cit., pp. 215-7.

[100]See Brinton, op. cit., pp. 250-1; Huntington, Political Order and Changing Societies, op. cit., pp. 1-78, 274-5; Egbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary War and Counter-Insurgency," Journal of International Affairs, XXV, 1 (1971) 14-15; Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," Adelphi Papers, No. 79 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 3.; Stone, op. cit., p. 165, and Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

ability to enforce. Taking an Eastonian view, a political system is supported by system supports (legitimacy) and demands, these factors being highly interdependent.[101] A loss of governments' capability to satisfy systemic demands leads to a loss of governmental legitimacy and vice versa. With the loss of legitimacy the government may be forced to resort to increased coercion to enforce compliance. Over time, if this situation continues, it may lead to the weakening of governments' ability to engender compliance and a resulting over reliance on coercion. The net result may be a downward spiral of government inefficiency.

This weakness of government must be widely understood by the population. Thus a primary task for the insurgents' politicization efforts should be to focus popular dissatisfaction on this failure of government. Mao viewed the mind of the Chinese peasant as a "blank sheet of paper" and one on which the Chinese Communist Party could inscribe its political ideas.[102] Thus energized, the newly politicized individual saw the insurgent as the supporter of the "right" and "good" and the KMT Government as the evil to be eliminated. In addition to demonstrating governmental failure, the question of governmental or systemic reform is also important. It must appear that the present system is irreparable and thus requires insurgency. Not many members of a dissatisfied society will initially support the idea of the violent overthrow of government. There will always be those who seek reform and compromise. These elements are

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[101]David Easton, "An Approach to Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, IX, 1 (1957), 383-400, esp. 383. Also see, Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 274-316, 365.

[102]Mao Tse-tung, Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 19-20.

as much an enemy of the insurgent as is the government. Hoffer noted when a society is ready for a mass movement, it is ready for any mass movement.[103] The reform option may have as much or more appeal than the radical proposals of the insurgent. The possibility of a moderate or compromise solution must be eliminated from contention. One of the first targets of the Viet Minh, after the collapse of Japanese occupation rule in Indochina, was the Vietnamese Nationalist (or Peoples) Party, (the so-called VNQDD).[104] This was the only political organization which might have contested Ho Chi-Minh and the Communists for leadership in the anti-French struggle. With the VNQDD eliminated the Viet Minh insurgents were able to portray themselves as the only truly anti-colonial movement.

As "Che" Guevara so wisely noted and then ignored in Bolivia, before an insurgent can hope for success all means of reform within that system must have been exhausted.[105] The perception of this situation by the dissatisfied elements is as important as the situation which really exists. The insurgent must place itself in the position of offering the only alternative to what now exists and convincingly demonstrate what exists is irreparable.

Brinton noted a key element in government failure was the status and relationship of the nation's armed forces to its government.[106] Through defeat in war, financial crisis, ineffective leadership, et. al., the military must become estranged from the government it was created to

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[103]Hoffer, op. cit., p. 25.

[104]Pike, Viet Cong, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 26, 43-4.

[105]Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[106]Brinton, op. cit., pp. 252-3.

protect. It may be proposed as a rule that no insurgency will succeed as long as a nation's military capabilities are intact and willing to resist the insurgents.[107] Critical signs of military weakness might be the reluctance to obey central authority, bitter discontent, officer versus officer, or officer versus enlisted, a marked increase in military concern for political activities, recruitment restricted to one geographical or ethnic group, etc. Indications of advanced disintegration of the military might be defections of key officers to the insurgent cause, attempted coup d'etats, or simply resignation from the service, or the seeking of assignments outside the nation.

The insurgent must not be a passive actor to this process of government failure. In its most basic sense the insurgent must make the situation ungovernable. It must repeatedly demonstrate that the government cannot provide for the basic security of the populace or even its direct supporters.

This investigation has thus far identified the two elements of popular discontent and government failure. In practice both will be highly interrelated. Although this discussion has oriented on government failure, for insurgency to develop there also must be some government strength. The government must be weakened but not so moribund that it falls without a protracted struggle.[108]

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[107]In support of this see, V. I. Lenin "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," Collected Works, II (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 174; Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, op. cit., p. 28; Moss, "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," op. cit., p. 3; Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., p. 364, and Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution, op. cit., p. 17.

[108]Bell, op. cit., pp. 52, 99.

By itself the situation outlined above does not produce insurgency. There must also be an organized force capable and willing to exploit the situation. Lietes and Wolf contend organization is central to insurgent success.[109] Gurr notes organization provides cohesiveness and a means to focus dissatisfaction.[110] Such an organization is usually characterized by its adherence to a set of defined ideological beliefs, centralized direction, and the employment of direct methods for the seizure of power.[111] If conditions are sufficiently advanced, the insurgent offers a rallying point for popular frustrations in effect providing a lifeboat in a sea of frustration.

This gaining control of the vulnerable elements of the population is one of the most difficult tasks the insurgent must accomplish.[112] It has been at this critical point which many aspiring insurgent movements have failed. Mao in his writings goes to great length in analyzing the objective conditions that existed in China to determine how they could be exploited to support his insurgent activities.[113]

It should also be noted that the insurgent leadership will usually be drawn from the disgruntled intellectual elite, and middle

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[109]Lietes, op. cit., pp. 32-41. Also see Roger Darling, "A New Conceptual Scheme For Analyzing Insurgency," Military Review, LIV, 2 (1974), 27-38.

[110]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 310-7, 365.

[111]Luttwak, op. cit., p. 141.

[112]Bell, op. cit., pp. 52, 249; Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., pp. 161, 164-5, and Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution, op. cit., p. 19.

[113]See, Fremantle, op. cit., pp. 51-60, and Mao, Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., pp. 5-12, 25-31.

class elements identified above.[114] The myth of the poor and downtrodden leading insurgency is just that, a myth. The exception that may prove this observation is Zapata in Mexico.[115] He was successful in capturing Mexico City, however, when it was time to plant the corps his forces simply went home and the movement disintegrated.

The conditions outlined above may exist for a number of years with the only result being continued government inefficiency and random popular discontent. Chalmers Johnson proposes that accelerating factors may take this situation out of limbo and speed up the process of politicized mass violence.[116] He describes three types of accelerators. A break in the effectiveness of the armed forces. This factor has been discussed above. Secondly, is the development of an ideology that challenges the existing order and describes the methods for possible overthrow of government. The third type of accelerator may be the actions of the insurgent which demonstrate that effective resistance is possible. The nature of these accelerators is such that in a normal situation government and society could easily absorb their impact. However, given the conditions described above they serve as a spotlight to point out popular discontent and government failure. Gurr in describing the "demonstration effects" impact on political violence came to similar

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[114]See James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements," Latin America: Reform or Revolution? eds. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 362-3; Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit.; Wolfe, op. cit., and Wolfenstein, op. cit.

[115]John Womack, Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).

[116]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., pp. 91, 99-100, 103-5, 153-4.

conclusions.[117]

Some of these precipitating activities may be beyond the direct control of the insurgent. It should not be overlooked that they may be premeditated insurgent actions. A situation in which the government troops open fire on a mob (after being provoked by hidden insurgent marksman) is a common scenario. The resulting deaths are laid at the doorstep of government which discredit it and may provide the basis for increased insurgent actions. Whether an incident serves as an accelerating factor may also be a function of its exploitation by the insurgent.

Although accelerating or precipitating conditions are necessary for insurgency, a distinction must be drawn between them and the underlying conditions. Without the underlying conditions an incident will accelerate nothing.

Foreign support for insurgency was previously discussed, at which point it was noted that some authors consider it a prerequisite for successful insurgency. That view is too categorical for this study, since it is impossible to visualize all possible insurgent situations. The position taken in this research is that foreign support is not absolutely required; however, it can make important contributions to insurgent success.[118]

Foreign support is important to both sides in the battle, the government and the insurgent. Davis, for example, noted that United States support was a prime factor in improving the counterinsurgency

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[117]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., pp. 92-122, 362. Also see Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution, op. cit., pp. 11-7.

[118]Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., p. 366, notes that the "likelihood of internal war varies with the degree of foreign support for dissidents." Also see Deutsch, "External Involvement...," Internal War, ed. H. Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 100-10.

capabilities of Latin American armed forces in the 1960's.[119] The result was the quick defeat of the rural insurgent "focos." Outside intervention, e.g., the United States in the Dominican Republic or Viet Nam may smother the insurgent or at best force its return to a lower level of activity. The Tupamaro's, early in their development, stated that one of their objectives was to prompt United States, Brazil or Argentina to intervene in Uruguay.[120] They saw this as creating the cause for their later liberation struggle. This would have fit perfectly Huntington's proposal concerning nationalism and anti-foreignism as the rallying cry for insurgency.[121] However, the result might have been a repeat of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic which resulted in insurgent defeat.[122]

Foreign support for insurgency may take on many forms.[123] It may be only moral and psychological. It may also include provision of physical support to include money, equipment, training and direct political intervention in the international arena in support of the insurgent. For example, the gaining of international recognition for the insurgency by foreign governments may be materially assisted by an outside supporting

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[119]Davis, op. cit., p. 25.

[120]Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger Publications, 1973), pp. 23.

[121]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., p. 277.

[122]Fred Goff and Michael Locker, "The Violence of Domination: U.S. Power and the Dominican Republic," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al. (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 275-8.

[123]Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution, op. cit., pp. 300-1; Ahmad, op. cit., p. 14; McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, op. cit., pp. 61-4, and Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., p. 260.

psychological aspects of such support should not be overlooked. It can provide the needed hope for the movement to struggle onward and the idea that the world is watching.

The introduction of the chance element may seem heretical in a field which attempts to be scientific in its approach. Nevertheless, chance events do play a major role in the ultimate success or failure of insurgency. For purposes of this study chance will be defined as events or actions over which the two parties to the struggle, the government and the insurgent, have little or no control. Since these events can work to the advantage or disadvantage of either party, a critical factor will be the manner in which they adapt to the opportunities provided and exploit them.[124]

The following are offered as examples of such chance events. Mao Tse-tung could not forsee World War II when he began to rebuild the CCP in the early 1930's, however, this chance event provided the opportunity to gain relief from the KMT "Annihilation Campaigns" and to coalesce widespread popular support for CCP aims via the "Anti-Japanese" theme. After the war ended the CCP gained extensive stocks of armaments from the USSR (another chance event) who had occupied Manchuria and disarmed the Japanese "Kwangtung Army."[125] The Cuban and Dominican Republic both represent the chance element of United States intervention in Latin America. In the Cuban case the U.S. withdrew support for

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[124]See Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 153, for a discussion of the chance element in accelerators of insurgency. Also see, Stone, op. cit., p. 164.

[125]Howard Boorman, et. al., "Chinese Communist ...," op. cit., pp. 171-195, and Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 83-113, 120-131.

Batista at a critical point and within two weeks he wisely chose to leave Cuba. Castro had attempted to influence U.S. public opinion in his favor but surely could not insure U.S. support for his activities or its withdrawal from Batista.[126] In the Dominican Republic (1965) the reverse occurred; the U.S. intervened with 20,000 troops and the insurgent effort failed.[127]

The picture to be drawn from this discussion should not be one of the insurgent adrift in a small boat in a wind storm without a paddle. Chance events will significantly influence the outcome of insurgency, however, the insurgent who can adapt to change will be in the best position to exploit these events.

The discussion above has proposed factors which describe the objective conditions for insurgent success and has indicated some of their more salient features. A question was posed earlier concerning the interrelationship between insurgency and its supporting conditions. Table 4 below responds to this question on the basis of this discussion and indicates the relative influence which the insurgent exercises over these conditions.

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[126]U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Cuba," Selected Readings in Insurgent War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1973), pp. 7-19 to 7-23.

[127]Goff and Locker, "The Violence of Domination...," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., pp. 275-8.

TABLE 4

Degree of Influence Exercised By Insurgents

Over the Objective Conditions

Factors	Degree of Insurgent Influence
Popular Discontent	-
Government Failure	-
Insurgent Organization	+
Foreign Support	0/+
Accelerators	-/+
Chance	0

Legend: + = Indicates a high degree of influence.
- = Indicates a low degree of influence.
0 = Indicates no influence or control.

Two items in the table bear further explanation. In the area of foreign support the insurgent has no control over what may be offered (thus a "0") but does control what support it accepts (a "+"). With regard to accelerators, the insurgent will exercise some control but also is subject to chance activities. This is shown as "-/+" which indicates a hybrid of moderate insurgent influence.

In summary an insurgency is most likely to have some possibility of success when: (1) a nation is subject to widespread discontent; (2) a belief grows which identifies the sources of this discontent, attributes

certain characteristics to its sources, and specifies the government as a contributing factor to this discontent; (3) an insurgent movement is operative; (4) precipitating factors focus attention on the sources of the discontent; and (5) some type of foreign support is available to the insurgent.

Although this section has described the general conditions for insurgent success they are not offered as measurable factors and surely not as a scheme for predicting insurgent success or failure. However, these conditional factors will provide a rough framework for the later discussion of Latin American urban insurgency.

Summary

This chapter has traced a course from random political discontent to mass politicized violence bent on the overthrow of government. This concept, insurgency, has been defined and various insurgent strategies have been identified. The approach has been to view insurgency as a process with definite political goals and various strategic methods for securing this goal. The means employed (strategy, organization and tactics) in the attempted seizure of power have been hypothesized to be a function of the insurgents view of the objective conditions, (the conditions in the target nation).

Two broad insurgent strategies have been identified and contrasted. They have been presented as ideal types, recognizing in the real world there will be few ideal reproductions of these strategies. They do, however, serve to illustrate a broad spectrum of insurgent strategies and the manner in which they may be operationalized. The final section of this chapter has briefly surveyed the general conditions sufficient for the initiation and possible successful outcome of insurgency.

The perspective of insurgency developed in this chapter and the general observations concerning conditions conducive to its success will be employed in later chapters to develop the case for a new urban insurgent strategy for Latin America.

Chapter 3

LATIN AMERICAN URBANIZATION AND URBAN INSURGENCY

Latin America is highly urbanized while still considered to be a developing area. This may seem a paradox, for a high degree of urbanization and development, in Western European and North American terms, are considered to go hand in hand. However, in Latin America the process of urbanization has preceded many other indices of development e.g., increased industrialization, higher GNP per capita, increase in per capita agricultural output, mechanization of agriculture, etc. All of these have been associated with a high degree of urbanization in the developed nations.[1]

The decade of the 60's saw a continued increase in Latin American urbanization, and Table 5, page 74, outlines its extent and projects these trends into the future. Certain characteristics of this urbanization are significant, the first being the rate of increase. The cities in the developing world have been growing at a rate of 3 to 8 percent per year. This will result in a doubling in their size every ten or twenty years. This process has been most rapid in Latin America.[2] Not only has

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[1]See, Walter D. Harris, Jr., The Growth of Latin American Cities (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1971), pp. 10-38; Glen H. Beyer, ed. The Urban Explosion in Latin America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Charles M. Haar, "Latin America's Troubled Cities," Foreign Affairs, XXXXI, 3 (1963), 536-49, and Raymond J. Barrett, "Urbanization in the Developing Countries," Military Review, LIII, 3 (1973), 17-22.

[2]T. G. McGee, The Urbanization Process in the Third World (London: Murray, 1969), pp. 13-4.

TABLE 5

Urbanization in Latin America As a Percentage of Total Population[a]

(Living in centers with a population of 2,000 or over)

Country	Rank[b]	Census Year	Last Census	1965	1970	1975	1980
Uruguay	1	1963	82.2%	82.6%	83.5%	84.2%	85.3%
Chile	2	1960	66.5	67.6	71.1	73.8	75.4
Venezuela	3	1960[c]	62.9	67.0	70.2	72.8	74.4
Argentina	4	1961	62.5	68.8	69.9	70.9	71.7
Mexico	5	1960	50.7	59.2	63.3	67.1	70.7
Cuba	6	1960[c]	56.1	58.8	61.2	63.3	65.2
Colombia	7	1960[c]	46.1	50.4	54.4	58.3	62.1
Brazil	8	1960	45.1	44.3	47.9	51.2	54.0
Panama	9	1960	41.5	45.3	48.2	51.0	53.5
Peru	10	1961	47.1	43.1	46.7	50.0	52.8
Nicaragua	11	1963	41.1	36.4	39.3	42.3	45.7
Ecuador	12	1962	35.3	35.8	38.9	41.8	44.2
Costa Rica	13	1963	34.5	33.7	36.6	39.6	43.0
Bolivia	14	1960[c]	29.9	32.5	35.5	38.7	41.9
Guatemala	15	1960[c]	29.9	32.3	35.2	38.3	41.6
Dominican Republic	16	1960	30.5	30.5	33.6	36.0	39.6
El Salvador	17	1961	38.5	30.6	32.3	34.3	36.1
Honduras	18	1961	30.7	25.6	29.0	32.2	30.0
Paraguay	19	1962	35.4	29.0	29.4	29.7	30.0
Haiti	20	1960[c]	12.4	14.7	17.6	21.2	25.3

a. From United Nations, Statistical Bulletin For Latin America Vol. II, No. 2 (New York: United Nations, 1965), pp. 9-10.

b. Ranked according to projected percentage of urban population in 1980.

c. Estimated.

the rate of growth been significant, it has been building on a considerable base of prior urbanization. Thus many of the Latin nations by 1970 had surpassed a 50% level in urban population.[3] Of particular importance to an urban insurgent (U.I.) is that in many cases this development has been concentrated in only one metropolitan area. Thus this one area has become the political, economic and social center of the nation. Whoever controls this area, controls the nation.[4] Figure 7, page 76, indicates the urbanization in selected Latin nations on the basis of three patterns of development, the one city nation, the multi-city nation and nations with undefined urbanization patterns.[5]

The impact this rapid urbanization can have on political violence and insurgency in these nations will be investigated below. The literature related to the topic will be briefly reviewed, and the perspective current in the early 1960's, which saw the rapidly expanding Latin city as a "bomb" will be addressed. More recent revisions of this view will put urban development and the prospects for urban violence into clearer focus. This investigation will take note of the principal groups in the urban milieu and assess their potential for support of U.I.. Having reviewed the demographic basis for U.I., the relative advantages and disadvantages of such activities will be analyzed. In addition, the possible linkages with rural

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[3]Charles Louis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 219-21. Also see, Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies, No. 8 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970), pp. 4-7.

[4]Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electorial Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," Latin American Radicalism, ed. I. L. Horowitz, et. al. (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 144-6.

[5]Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al., Report on Urban Insurgency Studies, I (New York: Simulmatics Corp., 1966), pp. II-5 to II-8.

FIGURE 7

Comparison of Urban Populations and Urbanization Patterns in Selected Latin American Nations[a]



a. Urban population figures are for 1970 as shown in Table 5, page 74.

b. Urban population figures expressed as a percent of total population.

Source: The concept for this figure is taken from Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al. Report on Urban Insurgency Studies, I (New York: Simulmatics Corp., 1966), pp. II-5 to II-7.

insurgent activities will be established. Finally, possible roles for the urban area in insurgency will be outlined and discussed.

This discussion of the urban area and insurgency is not intended to imply a go it alone in the city attitude. Observers generally agree that insurgency in the urban area alone will have little or no chance for success.[6] By orienting this discussion on the city, it will allow for a more detailed examination of its characteristics than would be the case if this arbitrary division were not made. The result will be to put the city under closer examination. The discussion below of urban - rural linkages and subsequent chapters will reintroduce the rural element into this discussion. The variance then is a matter of degree, which tends to reverse the traditional insurgent orientation on rural activity which looked to the city only as a supply base.

There is an easy trap to fall into when discussing Latin America, and that is to assume all the nations in the area are alike. While some attempts at heroic simplification are perhaps required, it is also essential to recognize the limitations of such generalizations. First, despite important similarities in culture there is still considerable diversity among the Latin nations, e.g., in size, racial make up, geography, political traditions, natural resources, and level of economic development, etc. Second, Latin America has been undergoing great pressure

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[6]For example see, Hugh Tinker, "Can Urban Guerrilla Warfare Succeed?", Current, No. 129, May 1971, pp. 52-7; "The City as a Battlefield: A Global Concern," Time, LXXXXVI, 11 (1970), 19-27; Robert Moss, War For The Cities (New York: Coward-McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), p. 13, and John L. Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases (Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Research Corp., 1965), pp. 13-4.

for change. Thus the views of the 1950's or 60's may have less relevance in explaining the Latin America of the 70's.[7]

Urbanization as a factor in the process of development is usually acknowledged to accompany the rise of a significant industrial base. At least this was the experience in nineteenth century Europe and North America. However, there are some striking differences in Latin urbanization. The first is simply the rate of its growth. As mentioned above this rate is about twice that of the other developing areas. Second the economies of Latin America are generally dependent in that they act as suppliers of raw or partially processed materials and agricultural products for foreign sale. Only to a limited degree is industrial activity directed toward production for local consumption. In many respects urbanization has been the result of the importation of technology rather than its development. Lastly, the rate of industrialization has lagged behind the urban population growth. The disproportionately swollen urban populations have been attracted to the cities before the rate of industralization was prepared to absorb them into the labor force. Therefore, it is doubtful if any meaningful analogies can be drawn between the previous urbanization experiences in nineteenth century Europe and the United States and the current situation in Latin America. This may be especially true with regard to views of a rising urban middle class and the associated general

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[7]David H. Pollock and Arch R. M. Ritter, "Revolution in Latin America: An Overview," Latin American Prospects for the 1970's, eds. Pollock and Ritter (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 29; Jack Davis, "Political Violence in Latin America," Adelphi Papers, No. 85 (London: Institute For Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 6, and Josue De Castro, "Not One Latin America," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., pp. 235-48.

decline in political violence.[8]

What is the potential for U.I. in Latin America, and who might be the vulnerable elements of this population? In order to organize this discussion of the urban environment's potential for political violence the divisions of the population shown in Figure 8, page 80, will be utilized. This diagram divides the urban populace into four broad classes; the elites, the middle class, the workers, and the urban poor according to their relative economic/political status and influence.[9] Each of these groups will be briefly discussed, and their possible potential for support of U.I. will be determined.

The Urban Poor

The theory that the Latin city with its burgeoning population and concomitant lack of employment, housing, and social services was a "bomb" ready to explode was a recurrent theme in the literature of the early 1960's.[10] Descriptions of the conditions in the Chilean callampas

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[8]Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," Violence in America, eds. Graham and Gurr, (New York: Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969), p. 33; Moss, War For The Cities, op. cit., pp. 5-6, 132, and Irving Louis Horowitz, "Masses in Latin America," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 10-2.

[9]Michael Charles Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," Orbis, IX, 4 (1966), 983; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 278, and Horowitz, "Masses in Latin America," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 10.

[10]The following is only a representative sample of this literature: Barbara Ward, "The City May Be as Lethal as the Bomb," New York Times Magazine, April 19, 1964, p. 22; de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. II-44; Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962); Malcur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, XXIII, 4 (1963), 529-52; Gerald Clark, The Coming Explosion in Latin America (New York: David McKay, 1962); Barrett,

FIGURE 8

Latin American Urban Class Distinctions



Sources: Michael Charles Conley, "The Framework of Communist Strategy," Orbis, IX, 4 (1966), 983; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 278, and Irving Louis Horowitz, "Masses in Latin America," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 10.

(mushrooms), the Venezuelan ranchos (camps), the Argentinian villas miseria (misery towns), and the Mexican colonias proletarias (proletarian colonies) all described the same phenomenon, slums.[11] The common scenario was of ex-rural dwellers with little education and few marketable skills living in poverty and filth in the midst of great wealth. These elements were deprived in comparison to others in the city, and that this deprivation could be readily perceived by the urban poor was acknowledged. It was assumed these conditions would lead to a frustration reaction and ultimately result in widespread urban violence. Some researchers have looked to specific factors, e.g., the rate of urbanization and population growth in the cities, social mobilization, and the general level of economic development to explain the proposed high level of urban violence.[12] But the urban "bomb" did not explode in the 1960's.

A review of the conditions surrounding the urban poor will note a number of factors which have tended to moderate the expected development of

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"Urbanization ...," op. cit., pp. 18-19; Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII, 3 (1964), 432-46; T. Lynn Smith, Current Trends and Problems in Latin America (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1957); Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 129; Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, Evolution or Chaos, Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics (New York: Praeger, 1963), and Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[11]de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. II-42; Moss, War For The Cities, op. cit., p. 130, and Clark, op. cit., p. 7.

[12]For example, on urbanization and population growth see, Smelser, op. cit., Phillip M. Hauser, ed. Urbanization in Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), and, K. L. Johnson, op. cit., p. 439; on social mobilization, Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV, 3 (1961), 493-514; on the general level of economic development, Olson, op. cit., and Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 3 (1967), 264-80.

individual and group frustration.[13] Although living in poverty in the urban slums, the conditions of this poverty were relatively better than the situation left behind in the rural environment. Social mobility was limited, but it was perceived as possible. Education was available where there was none before, and business, albeit small ones, could be initiated. In some cases even home ownership was possible. Political activity, not unlike the "bossism" of nineteenth century America, has developed orienting on low level and immediate "pay offs." This has tended to lessen the frustration which might otherwise have been directed at the political system.

As Eric Hoffer proposed there is a "conservatism of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged."[14] The urban poor are as liable to vote for a conservative candidate of the right as they are the radical left. The principal concern appears to be which candidate will promise to do the most for the poor immediately. There seems to be little attraction to either abstract political ideals or long term political goals.[15]

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[13]See, Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 43-64; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America," Latin America, Reform or Revolution, eds. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 29-30; Harris, op. cit., p. 217; Wayne A. Cornelius "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," American Political Science Review, LXII, 3 (1969), 833-57; Joan M. Nelson, "Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations," Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 22 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1969).

[14]Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 17.

[15]Moss, War For The Cities, op. cit., pp. 134-5; Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., p. 279, and Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 48.

A point that bears further development is the extent and type of political development among the urban poor. Alan Riding noted that to date the urban poor have been unwilling to support U.I.[16] The question then is why? A number of authors have noted the generally prepolitical and non-radical nature of these elements.[17] Huntington outlines four factors that he considers have shaped this political behavior.[18] First is the general improvement, however small, in living conditions occasioned by the migration to the city. Second is the retention of rural values that dictate political passivity. Third, the satisfaction of immediate demands requires one to work within the political system. Thus, the resort to "political bossism" versus more radical alternatives. Finally, Huntington considers the lack of mutual trust and confidence among the urban poor tends to discourage concerted group activities which would be the basis of any political radicalism.[19]

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[16]Alan Riding, "The Death of the Latin American Guerrilla Movements," World 7/3/73, II, 14, (1973), 31.

[17]See Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies, No. 8 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Nov 1970), p. 6; Riding, op. cit., pp. 30-1; Davis, op. cit., p. 10; Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 278-83; Daniel Goldrich, et. al., "The Political Integration of Lower-Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 175-214, and Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 242.

[18]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 279-81.

[19]An opposing view to this lack of organization among the urban poor is noted in Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez (New York: Random House, 1961), also by the same author, "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case Study," Contemporary Culture and Societies of Latin America, eds. D. B. Heath and R. N. Adams (New York: Random House, 1965).

Some authors have proposed that the rapid urban migration in Latin America has reduced the potential for violence in the rural areas.[20] This may have been the case for the first generation of urban migrants, but what about the later generations? The second and now the third generations of the urban poor have few ties with their rural heritage and can only judge conditions based on their urban experience.[21] Will these elements continue to be satisfied with underemployment, in the service sector of the economy, which simply provides for a sharing of the poverty and a bare existence for all? Whether this discontent will result in support for U.I. is questionable. It would appear that the urban poor will be a difficult group to politicize in support of U.I. and will most likely respond to appeals which stress immediate gains and personal benefit.

The Urban Worker

The next element on the urban demographic scene to be investigated is the urban worker. Although relatively small this group exercises influence out of all proportion to its size. Table 6, page 85, provides data concerning the occupational distribution and unionization in selected Latin nations.[22]

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[20]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., p. 299; Horowitz, "Electorial Politics ...," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., pp. 43-44.

[21]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 281-3; Barrett, "Urbanization ...," op. cit., p. 19, and Olson, op. cit., pp. 530-2.

[22]See Horowitz, "Electorial Politics ...," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., pp. 158-61.

TABLE 6

Occupational Distribution and Unionization in Selected Latin American Nations

Nation	Occupational Distribution (Percent per 100 Active Population)						Unionization
	Urban Sector			Rural Sector			
	Combined Urban	Urban Middle Strata	Urban Workers	Combined Rural	Landowners and Medium-Sized Farming Entrepreneurs	Peons and Other Rural Workers	Percent of Workers (urban and rural) Affiliated with Unions
Argentina	73	28	45	27	8	19	48.4
Chile	71	21	50	29	1	28	31.7
Venezuela	61	16	45	39	2	37	30.8
Cuba	59	21	38	41	-	41	80.4
Ecuador	48	10	38	52	1	51	10.4
Panama	46	15	31	54	1	53	1.3
Costa Rica	45	14	31	55	8	47	4.4
Paraguay	45	12	33	55	2	53	26.5
Colombia	44	12	32	56	10	46	18.4
Brazil	37	13	24	63	2	61	26.0
Guatemala	37	6	31	63	2	61	1.1
Bolivia	27	7	20	73	1	72	34.1
El Salvador	36	9	27	64	2	62	3.0
Honduras	16	4	12	84	-	84	9.7
Haiti	14	2	12	86	1	85	3.6

Source: Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electorial Politics, Urbanization and Social Development in Latin America," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al. (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 158, 161.

In discussing urban labor one invariably turns to a discussion of union activities. This is due to a number of factors. As cited above, the first is labor's relatively high degree of influence considering the small percentage of organized workers. Second is the developmental experience of the Latin unions. Rather than being forced to fight for government recognition during their formative years as was the case in Europe and the United States, the Latin unions in general have been fostered by government. In some cases governmental recognition and assistance to the labor movement has preceded rather than followed large scale industrial development. This has produced a situation where labor looks to government for protection and direction.[23]

There are also close ties between many of these unions and various political parties. The unions perform the vote-getting function, and in return they and their members receive preferential treatment from government. Communist and various Social Democratic or Christian Democrat parties, et. al., have a traditional basis of support among the Latin unions.[24]

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[23]See, Alain Touraine and Daniel Pecaut, "Working Class Consciousness and Economic Development in Latin America," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 65-94; Robert J. Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965); Emilio Maspero, "Trade Unionism as an Instrument of the Latin American Revolution," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., pp. 207-31.

[24]Henry A. Lansberger, "The Labor Elite: Is It Revolutionary?" Elites in Latin America, eds. Seymour Lipset, et. al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 256-300; Maspero "Trade Unionism as an Instrument of the Latin American Revolution," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I.L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., pp. 207-8, 216; Alexander T. Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 296-7, and Frank Bonilla, "The Urban Worker," Continuity and Change in Latin America, ed. John J. Johnson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964).

Although organized labor has developed in advance of industralization and has strong political ties it should not be considered a revolutionary force in Latin America. It is reformist to some degree but not revolutionary. This attitude of labor is partly explained by the fact that it is already a privileged group. Lansberger concludes that although involved in politics, labor is not to any great extent political. Mainly concerned with jobs and job security, labor will respond vigorously to threats in these areas, however it is not generally interested in political activity.[25]

That labor can be energized into political action was demonstrated in the case of Peron's seizure of power in Argentina.[26] It should be noted that the underlying cause of this support was related to economic conditions. Although labor on occasions can be raised to support violence there is no strong tradition of political violence among Latin American labor. This may reflect the rational view that jobs are few, unemployment high and there is too much risk for relatively unimportant gains.

Unionism is most highly developed in the cities and in the larger capital intensive sectors of the economy, which includes most of the foreign owned businesses. The oil workers, for example, in Venezuela

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[25]Lansberger, "The Latin Elite ...," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 260, 265, 294-6, and Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Grove Press, 1967), p. 35. For a discussion of a more revolutionary view of Latin labor unions see Alexander, op. cit., p. 12.

[26]See, Horowitz, "Masses ...," p. 21, and Touraine, et. al., "Working Class ...," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 67.

represent only 2% of the work force but are almost completely unionized and receive extremely high salaries based on the prevailing Venezuelan wage scales.[27]

A number of authors have noted that Latin labor organizations have tended to become bureaucratic with an associated development of ineffectual leadership and in some cases corruption.[28]

As a general observation the Latin American urban worker holds only a marginal potential for support of political violence and U.I. He is simply doing too well, is usually organized in a union with political affiliations, and potentially has too much to lose by falling from the good graces of government. Given these difficulties, the fact that labor is already organized can present opportunities for U.I. exploitation. Unlike the urban poor, the workers can be manipulated if one can gain control of the union structure.[29] Leadership for the U.I. movement can also be drawn from the ranks of the labor movement. The organizational and motivational skills essential in this profession will be valuable assets to an insurgent leader. For example, Raul Sendic, the highly

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[27]Maspero, "Trade Unionism ...," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., p. 214.

[28]Ibid., p. 217; Edelmann, op. cit., p. 292 and Lansberger, "The Labor Elite ...," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 294-6.

[29]See Edward Luttwak, Coup d'etat (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 144-5; James Petras "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements," Latin America Reform or Revolution, eds. J. Petras, et. al., op. cit., pp. 360-2; Moss, War For The Cities, op. cit., p. 137; Riding, op. cit., p. 31; Robert J. Black, "A Change in Tactics," Air University Review, XXIII, 1 (1972), 56.

effective leader of the Tupamaros, (the Uruguayan U.I. movement) gained his early experience in the cane cutters union.[30]

Returning to the earlier discussion of the conditions which may support insurgent activity, it would appear that an economic downturn and widespread unemployment will be critical factors in motivating labor to violence. Anything short of these conditions will make the urban worker a very difficult target for the U.I.

The Urban Middle Class

An important aspect of the developmental process is the expansion of the middle class. However, when viewing this phenomenon in a Latin American context it evidences a very uneven development. The middle class has been growing rapidly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Mexico and is playing an important role in these nations. This class represents over 50% or more of the population in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and about 30% in Mexico and Brazil. In the other less developed Latin nations the pattern is less pronounced. In some cases, i.e., Haiti and Colombia, there is no sizable group that even resembles a middle class.[31]

In some respects the Latin middle class lacks the aspects of a "class" in that it lacks a common heritage, similar interests and in effect

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[30]Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 214-6.

[31]Edelmann, op. cit., pp. 70-1; Ritter and Pollock, "Revolution ...," Latin America Prospects ..., eds. Pollock and Ritter, op. cit., pp. 28-9; John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); Huntington, Political Order ..., pp. 288-91; Luis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Class," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 61-93, and Edward A. Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Development of the New States," Political Development and Social Change, 2d ed., eds. Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), pp. 249-76.

a class-consciousness. While some elements aspire to identify with the nations elite values, others strongly sympathize with the lower classes and are ardent supporters of social reform. It should be noted that the middle class is made up not only of individuals who have attained this status through upward social mobility but also "fallen" members of the elite. This factor may contribute to the disparity in middle class values. Although the values and goals may vary, middle class elements exhibit a high degree of political activity and a pronounced nationalistic viewpoint.[32]

Several factors have been responsible for the emergence of the Latin middle class with the primary one being industrialization. Another stimulant has been the expansion of government and its assumption of new functions. The result is a greatly expanded bureaucracy and the creation of many new white collar positions.[33]

Although there is no set criteria for precise determination of who will be in the middle class, in most Latin nations it does not include individuals who perform any kind of manual labor. If the Latin middle class has one thing in common it is a distaste of manual labor. One simply must not get his hands dirty.[34]

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[32]Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups...," Elites ..., eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 79-80; Edelmann, op. cit., pp. 73-5, and Jose Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," Latin America Reform or Revolution, eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 170-1.

[33]Ratinoff, op. cit., pp. 89-90; Ritter and Pollock, "Revolution ...," Latin America Prospects ..., eds. Pollock and Ritter, op. cit., pp. 28-9.

[34]Edelmann, op. cit., p. 74.

Huntington notes that a highly developed middle class structure leads to a low level of political violence and usually stable governments, however, the emergence of this group has the reverse effect.[35] During its development the lack of agreement on goals and the methods for their achievement makes the middle class the fulcrum of political violence and in some cases revolution.

As was noted in Chapter 2, the leadership for insurgency is usually drawn from the disgruntled elements of the middle class. "Che" Guevara was a medical doctor, Castro a lawyer, and Raul Sendic a labor organizer. Not only the leadership but also many of the followers of insurgency can be expected to emerge from the middle class. Table 7, page 92, provides statistics on the social origins of the Tupamaro membership.[36] Taking the year 1969 and combining the students, professionals and salaried employees, they represent 70.4% of the movement's followers.

Of the elements in Latin American urban society the middle class possess the highest potential for support of radical causes to include U.I. All recent Latin insurgent activity has been built around a core of middle class leadership and support. Even Castro's "26th of July" movement, although portrayed in the "revolutionary literature" as a peasant movement,

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[35]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., p. 287.

[36]Serigio L. d' Oliveira, "The Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, LIII, 4 (1973), 29. Also see, James Nelson Goodsell, "Urban Guerrillas: Ebbing Influence or Wave of the Future?" Christian Science Monitor, December 3, 1971, p. 13, and Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 29-31. A similar middle class composition was noted by Z. Pazmany in a study of insurgency in Venezuela (1960-64) in, Background For Counterinsurgency Studies in Latin America, III (Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Research Corp, 1964), p. 11.

TABLE 7

Occupational Origins of the Tupamaro's

(as a percent of total membership)

Occupation	1969	1972
Students (total)	24.4%	44.1%
High School Students	(1.8)	(2.2)
University Students	(20.0)	(11.5)
Other Students	(2.6)	(30.4)
Professional People (with university degrees)	16.5	8.1
Salaried Employees (mostly white collar workers)	29.6	47.8
Tradesmen	23.5	
Other	6.0	-
totals	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Serigio L. d'Oliveira, "The Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, LIII, 4 (1973), 29.

developed on a solid basis of middle class leadership and significant support in the cities.[37]

Huntington noted that there is a natural alliance between the middle class intellectual, the urban worker, the poor on the one hand, and the old elite and the newly politicized rural peasant on the other. The key to minimizing the radical aspects of this marriage of middle and worker/poor interests is the counter force provided by the old elites and peasants. The two forces tend to balance each other and Huntington contends that over time the politicization activities of both tend to minimize the level of political violence.[38] If the U.I. is to radicalize this situation it cannot depend only on urban support for its activities. It must either attempt to politicize the peasant or at least neutralize any effective elite/peasant alliance. For this reason a U.I. strategy which attempts to go it alone in the city will most likely fail. Further the U.I. must establish its influence over elements of the urban workers and poor. This may not be as difficult a task as it might appear, for traditionally the leadership of these elements has come from the middle class.[39]

The students and intellectuals as elements of the middle class, bear particular emphasis in this discussion. The roles of intellectual

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[37]See, James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America," Latin America Reform or Revolution, eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 362-3.

[38]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 288-91, 300-8. Also see, Horowitz, "Electorial Politics ...," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., op. cit., p. 141, and Horowitz, "Masses ...," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

[39]J. J. Johnson, Political Change ..., op. cit., pp. 41-2; Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 135-6; Clark, op. cit., pp. 7-10 and de Sola Pool, op. cit., pp. I-15.

leadership in insurgency have been previously established. Huntington considers the intellectual to be in constant rebellion with the elites and government. This is not because he deserts the old order, as Brinton contends, but because he has never been and does not desire to be a part of it.[40]

The Latin students' role in political activities and violence is widely recognized. They are alienated along the lines of the intellectual, but in addition they have the idealism of youth and the desire to achieve quick and easy solutions to the complex problems of the day. These views make them prone to respond to radical political appeals.[41]

Horowitz has noted that much of Latin education is "mis-education." In an increasingly complex and technical society, the emphasis in university education is still on the classics, - medicine, philosophy, letters, and law. Even the attainment of a medical degree is seen not as an entry point for an occupation but as the attainment of social status. The result is an abundance of over-educated and under-skilled university graduates who reside mainly in the larger urban areas. These elements may experience

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[40]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., p. 290, and Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 39-49, 250-2. Also see Shils, "The Intellectuals ...," Political Development ..., eds. J. L. Finkle, et. al., op. cit., pp. 251, 258-9.

[41]See, de Sola Pool, op. cit., pp. I-15, II-29, II-37; Clark, op. cit., pp. 52, 55-6; Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, "Intellectual Identity and Political Ideology Among University Students," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 431-53; Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., pp. 132-137; K. H. Silvert, "The University Student," Continuity and Change ..., ed. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 206-26.

frustration in seeking employment and occupational satisfaction due to their lack of marketable skills and the rather slow rate of development.[42]

From this brief discussion of the urban middle class it can be concluded that this class will be the pivotal element in U.I.

Two other groups which are generally referred to as Latin American middle class elements will have an impact on the potential for U.I. The first such group is the Latin military officer corps.[43] Mainly drawn from the sons of the middle class, these officers have emerged as a major force not only in politics but also in the economic development of Latin America.[44] The military in government is a historic feature of the Latin political scene, however, the old image of the military "Caudillo" has given way to the new military who see themselves as a modernizing managerial elite. This change in orientation of the military has manifested itself in a general middle class outlook complete with nationalistic

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[42]Horowitz, "Masses ...," Masses in Latin America, ed. I. L. Horowtiz, op. cit., pp. 17-18. Also see Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 112, and Clark, op. cit., pp. 55-6.

[43]Although most Latin nations have a military structure consisting of an Army, Navy and Airforce, the Army is the predominant element based on size and degree of political influence. The police forces of these nations are also highly influenced by the placement of military officers in key positions within the civil police structure. See, Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 141.

[44]See Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 122-53; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 102-33; Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 141; Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 66; Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon ...," Latin America ..., eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 170-1, and Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 201-2.

tendencies and the desire for economic and social development.[45]

As discussed in Chapter 2 the military is the arch enemy of the insurgent. Without its defeat or neutralization insurgency is doomed to failure. Although traditionally associated with support of the elites, the military, especially in the more developed Latin nations, has become extremely nationalistic and reform oriented. This appears to be a contradication since the elite values and the new modernizing values may conflict.[46]

One method of resolving this conflict of values has been for the military to seize power via the coup d'etat and attempt to achieve the reforms they deem necessary. Since World War II this option has been exercised in most Latin nations.[47] Associated with these political takeovers has been the elimination of radical political opposition, the actual or potential insurgents. Although such actions can be a setback to an insurgent organization, it has the potential for long-term insurgent exploitation. Latin society, especially the middle class, widely

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[45]Ritter and Pollock, "Revolution ...," Latin America ..., eds. A. Ritter and D. Pollock, op. cit., pp. 27-8; Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 104-5, and Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 27-29.

[46]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 201-2; Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., pp. 143-4, 148; Gary MacEoin, Revolution Next Door, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 132-6; von der Mehden, op. cit., pp. 65-6, and Lieuwen, op. cit., pp. 126-8.

[47]Huntington, Political Order ..., op. cit., pp. 192-263, terms this "Praetorianism" and provides an extensive discussion of the reasons for and roles of the military in power. Also see Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon...," Latin America ..., eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 145-185 and Huntington, "Introduction ...," Changing Patterns ..., ed. S. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 32-40.

accepts the concept of democratic and representative government. With the military in power it provides the insurgent with a powerful rallying cry for the development of its movement.

Another factor that could provide potential for U.I. exploitation is the lack of unanimity in the military.[48] Although usually considered a monolithic group responsive to central direction and control, a number of researchers have noted a high degree of factionalism within the Latin military. Some of this may be based on the elite-middle class value conflict mentioned above, or it can be on personal or clique lines. For example, in the 1960s there was a bitter debate within the Brazilian officer corps concerning whether the military should intervene in the political direction of the nation and if so to what degree.[49] These factional divisions on whatever grounds they arise can be exploited by the U.I.

The garrisoning of large bodies of troops in or near the principal urban areas presents a particular threat to U.I. The same units which have been effective in supporting military coup d'etats can be employed to suppress urban insurgent activity.[50]

Although the Latin officer corps are generally career personnel,

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[48]See Lieuwen, op. cit., pp. 126-8; Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," Latin America Reform or Revolution, eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, op. cit., p. 79, and Needler, op. cit., pp. 65-6.

[49]Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., pp. 143-4.

[50]Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Military Elites," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset and et. al., op. cit., p. 170.

the enlisted ranks are primarily involuntary short service soldiers.[51] Mainly recruited from the rural areas they serve a one or two year obligation and return to civilian life. Generally illiterate or at best poorly educated these soldiers provide a reasonably effective force for rural policing and especially the suppression of the rural guerrilla threats such as in the 1960s. A question that remains unanswered is how well these soldiers will perform in the more complex environment encountered in combatting U.I.? Military analysts agree that soldiers involved in such activities require a high degree of discipline, restraint and judgment to respond effectively to U.I. without creating incidents that play into the insurgent's hand.[52]

Ritter and Pollock noted that Latin insurgents have generally ignored attempts to infiltrate the officer corps.[53] Obviously this is a difficult task but not an impossible one, and if successful, promises significant returns for the insurgent.

The military has been and will continue to be a significant factor in Latin American politics. The military can be viewed as the fulcrum in the balance of power between the elite/rural, and the middle class, worker,

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[51]T. N. Dupuy and Wendell Blanchard, The Almanac of World Military Power, 2d ed. (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1972), pp. 17-68, provides an analysis of each Latin American nation's military situation, to include enlisted recruitment policy.

[52]Charles A. Russell and Robert E. Hilder, "Urban Insurgency in Latin America," Air University Review, XXII, 6 (1971), 54-64; Jay Mallin, "The Military vs. Urban Guerrillas," Marine Corps Gazette, LVII, 1 (1973), 18-25; J. L. Hillard, "Counter-Subversive Operations in Urban Areas," Military Review, XLVI, 6 (1966), 12-9; C. N. Barclay, "Countermeasures Against the Urban Guerrilla," Military Review, LII, 1 (1972), 83-90.

[53]Ritter and Pollock, "Revolution ...," Latin America ..., eds. D. Pollock and A. Ritter, op. cit., pp. 827-8.

and urban poor alliances. The military by supporting either side or remaining neutral can exercise considerable leverage over government and society. Although subject to strong modernizing and generally middle class influences, Edwin Lieuwen considers that on balance the military has been a force for the status quo.[54]

Although a powerful force in Latin society, the military is not without its vulnerable flank. Like other middle class elements it tends to lack homogeneity and cohesion. These internal weaknesses and any other which develop must be exploited by the U.I. if the military is to be neutralized or defeated.

The remaining element of the middle class to be investigated is the Catholic Church. Like the military, the church in Latin America is of two worlds. On one hand associated with the support of the old order, and on the other subject to a changing value system.[55] However, unlike the military it has little direct influence over government or Latin society.[56] Although the church cannot be completely discounted its impact on the outcome of a U.I. struggle appears to be minimal.

The Elites

As with the other groups discussed in this section, the Latin elites are in a state of transition. The power of the old propertied

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[54]Edwin Lieuwen, "The Military: A Force For Continuity or Change?" Explosive Forces in Latin America, eds. John Te Paske and Sydney N. Fisher (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 77.

[55]Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites: Differentiations and Developments in Roman Catholicism," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 190-232.

[56]J. Johnson, Political Change ..., op. cit., pp. 12-13; Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., pp. 115-27; Edelmann, op. cit., p. 177, and Mac Eoin, op. cit., pp. 107-131.

interests is on the decline while being replaced by the emerging industrial elite.[57] This element is of concern to U.I. in two respects. First, the elites will be the target or scapegoat for insurgent propaganda.[58] Second, as Horowitz has noted, the "Elites are by no means uniformly conservative .... Sectors of the traditional elites may be particularly committed to radical approaches to social change."[59] Both of these factors can assist the U.I.

Demographic Factors - A Summary

This investigation of the Latin American urban milieu has identified the scope and magnitude of its urbanization and the elements of the population which may be exploited by an U.I.. While it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions concerning those societal elements which would support U.I., the emerging middle class stands out as the major potential supporter. The urban worker and the poor have considerable potential, but they may be much more difficult to politicize than the middle class. Leadership for U.I. can be drawn from any societal element, however, the middle class and elite sectors appear the most promising in this regard. The military stands squarely between the U.I. and its goal of political power. Although a powerful element in Latin society, various potential weaknesses in the military have been identified.

Thus far this discussion has oriented on demographic factors in

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[57]Fernando H. Cardoso, "The Industrial Elite," Elites in Latin America, eds. S. Lipset, et. al., op. cit., pp. 94-114, and Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., pp. 127-32.

[58]Schmitt and Burks, op. cit., p. 129.

[59]Horowitz, "Masses ...," Masses ..., ed. I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., p. 20.

the Latin urban area. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to place U.I. into clearer perspective by evaluating its physical aspects. The city will be investigated with regard to its relative advantages and disadvantages in support of U.I., and possible linkages with rural insurgent activity will be proposed. In conclusion, various roles for the urban area in insurgency will be reviewed.

The Urban Insurgent Environment

This investigation will explore the modern Latin urban environment to determine the opportunities and pitfalls which it offers to an U.I. On the one hand, the city appears to be extremely vulnerable to insurgent attack. Resources, both men and material, are readily available, and the complex nature of urban life, so dependent on mutual trust, is both physically and psychologically vulnerable. On the other hand, the city appears able to absorb significant political violence. What then are the advantages and disadvantages which will accrue to the U.I.?

It is proposed that the urban area offers the U.I. at least seven major advantages not usually available to rural insurgents. (1) The city is the seat of power. The instruments and symbols of government are located in its cities, and the takeover of a city is a step towards a successful insurgency. (2) It is an excellent area for insurgent recruitment. (3) The urban terrain can be exploited to the insurgents' advantage. (4) It provides unparalleled opportunities for the development of intelligence. (5) The city provides targets for insurgent activity in the delicately interwoven and easily interrupted systems of transportation, water, electricity, production, and distribution. (6) The supplies and equipment essential to the insurgent are readily available in the city. (7) Finally, it provides access to a mass audience and the communications media.

Since the cities, particularly the capitals, are the centers of administration, communication, wealth and power, insurgent control of one major city may be sufficient for the establishment of a convincing claim to control of the entire nation. This may be especially true in those Latin countries noted as "single city nations" on page 76. Conversely, the government still holding the capital or other major city may still be viable. Further the disruption which insurgency can produce in a city may have a nationwide impact since the cities are increasingly the nerve centers of the nation.[60]

A second advantage of the city is its potential for insurgent recruitment. The large city offers an insurgent the opportunity for relatively quick capture of political power by providing intellectual leadership, student and other activists, and masses for image building, protest demonstrations, riots, and terrorism without the need for the tedious organization of the usually apathetic rural inhabitants. The U.I. leadership is likely to be educated and highly skilled. The technological capability among the insurgents will be superior to that found in the countryside.[61]

The city's third advantage relates to the physical and psychological setting. Che Guevara stressed that the insurgent needs favorable terrain in which to operate:

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[60]Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), pp. 283-4, and Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases, op. cit., p. 8.

[61]Phillip D. Caine, "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," Military Review, L, 2 (1970), 73-8; Davis, op. cit., p. 10; and Doris M. Condit, "Modern Cities: Insurgent Opportunity or Insurgent Trap?" (Paper presented at the meeting of the 29th Military Operations Research Society, June 27-29, 1972, Colorado Springs, CO.)

> When we analyze the tactics of guerrilla warfare, we see that the guerrilla must possess a highly developed knowledge of the terrain on which he operates, avenues of access and escape, possibilities for rapid maneuver, popular support and hiding places.[62]

For those who know how to take advantage of it, the geographically complex and physically intricate urban milieu can be as protective as the jungle or the mountains. Physical cover is multi-dimensional due to walls, roofs, basements, and utility passages.

Where a stranger entering a rural area is immediately noticed, the same person walking in a city neighborhood attracts little or no attention. The city thus offers an easy invisibility for the insurgent within the mass of people that crowd the urban area. After an insurgent action, the participants can blend into crowds and become innocent bystanders. Alleys and sewers offer avenues of fast retreat and urban traffic patterns on the streets and highways can create difficulties for pursuit.[63]

The urban environment yields a fourth advantage in the opportunity it affords the U.I. for intelligence gathering. Simply by observing what government is doing the insurgent can gain useful information. Given the numbers of people in the city, the authorities will have few means of determining who among the entire population may be watching and reporting government activities. Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian U.I., noted,

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[62]Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 7.

[63]James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 45-6; Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases, op. cit., pp. 8-9, and Momboisse, Blueprint ..., op. cit., pp. 282-3.

> By living among the people, listening to every conversation, observing every kind of human relationship.... He must know what may be going on in factories, in schools, in universities, in the neighbourhoods where the fighters are living; he must know people's opinions and states of mind, where they travel to, what their business is like, whom they are meeting, everything that concerns them.[64]

It will be extremely difficult for government to isolate the U.I. from the population and prevent them from having access to sources of information which are available to the public as a whole. In the cities there is easy access to mass media, bookstores and libraries all of which are ready sources of information.

Recent U.I. activity in Latin America has been composed primarily of middle class and sometimes upper class individuals. These insurgents have personal or family connections which allow direct access into the government.[65]

The city offers a fifth advantage to U.I. in the concentration of targets it presents. It abounds in property targets with both real and symbolic value. The complex web of services and intercommunication which spreads out across the city and into the countryside can be disturbed with only minimal insurgent effort. The destruction of electric utility substations, telephone exchanges, bridges, trains, etc. can have a paralyzing effect greatly in excess of the actual destruction. Targets of symbolic value are also available and can be attacked to obtain psychological

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[64]Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1971), p. 77. This Brazilian U.I.'s name is variously spelled Marighella or Marighela with the former being the most common. Marighella will be used in this research except when citing sources with the other spelling.

[65]Russell and Hildner, op. cit., p. 57; Enrique Martinez Codo, "The Urban Guerrilla," Military Review, LI, 8 (1971), 8.

objectives.[66]

In addition to property targets, the city also offers human targets either as carefully selected persons or classes or persons selected randomly as victims.

The insurgent, for example, may target the upper echelons of government and influential members of non-governmental institutions. The Tupamaros successfully employed this tactic to expose corruption in high governmental and commercial circles. Documents were stolen that linked ministers to large firms or exposed illegal financial operations. With these documents in their possession, the Tupamaros were in a position to blackmail individuals, kidnap and place them in "peoples jails," or release the documents to the public and place the burden of prosecution on the government. According to a Tupamaro spokesman, "Actions against the regime are mainly aimed at undermining the foundations of the regime itself."[67] As a result the populace may begin to question the propriety of the existing system on both utilitarian and moral grounds. Governmental functioning may suffer with bureaucrats unwilling to vigorously enforce laws and regulations.

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[66]Barrett, "Urbanization ...," op. cit., pp. 19-20; Jay Mallin, "Terrorism in a Vulnerable Society and the Counter Role of the Military" (Coral Gables, FL: Institute for the Study of Changes, undated), p. 3., (Mimeographed) and Condit, "Modern Cities ...," op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[67]"Interview with a Leader of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)," National Liberation Fronts, 1960/1970, eds. D. C. Hodges and R. E. A. Shanab (New York: Wm. Morrow, 1972), pp. 285-6. Also see Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 224-5, and Russell and Hildner, op. cit., pp. 56-7.

The sixth advantage of insurgent activities in the city is the lack of logistical problems encountered in this environment. As opposed to the chronic shortage of supplies, especially sophisticated equipment encountered in the countryside, the U.I. resides in a veritable supply depot, the city. Basic needs such as food and clothing present no problem. As Carlos Marighella noted, insurgent requirements for transport, arms, ammunition, or communications equipment, etc. can be either purchased or "expropriated."[68]

The last advantage which can be assigned to the city relates to the availability of a mass audience and the communications media. Urban insurgent activities occur in the full view of a mass audience and no act will go unnoticed. Whereas an insurgent attack in a rural area may be eclipsed by government censorship or a lack of access to the communications media, Clutterbuck noted "violence is news,"[69] and usually urban violence is more newsworthy than rural violence.[70]

Not only does the city provide access to a national audience but also an entry point into the international press. Sympathetic representatives of the foreign press can focus worldwide attention on insurgent activities, gaining international recognition for the insurgents.[71]

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[68]Marighela, op. cit., pp. 72, 111-2.

[69]Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Two Typical Urban Guerrilla Movements," Canadian Defense Quarterly, I, 41 (1972), 20.

[70]Barrett, "Urbanization...," op. cit., p. 19; Condit, "Modern Cities...," op. cit., p. 7; Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases, op. cit., p. 125, Brian Michael Jenkins, The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1971), p. 15.

[71]John L. Sorenson, The Relationship of Rural to Urban Insurgency in Venezuela and Colombia (Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Research Corp., 1965), pp. 28-9, and his, Urban Insurgency Cases, op. cit., p. 127.

In contrast to the many advantages cited above, the U.I. faces a series of constraints and disadvantages as well. The principal negative factor is that the U.I. normally meets the government and its forces of authority at their point of greatest strength. Second, the time and space factors encountered in the city can inhibit effective U.I. operations. Third, despite the fact that the city provides a degree of anonymity, the U.I. is always surrounded by potential police informers. Fourth, although supplies and equipment are easy to obtain in the city, finding secure storage areas for these items is a problem. Fifth, the tactics of the U.I., especially if they turn to indiscriminate terrorism, may alienate popular support.

Urban insurgent weaknesses exist primarily in its general inferiority compared to the government's political, economic and armed strength. The U.I. must operate under the threats implicit in curfews, checkpoints, and government controls on materials--together with police surveillance, identity cards, security checks at work and in the streets. The entire network of controls available to the authorities in a modern city can be mobilized to inhibit the activities of the U.I.[72]

A second consideration inherent in the urban milieu relates to time and space factors. Everything happens much faster in the city. The concentration and mobility of government forces is greater. Communications are swifter and transportation is better. These factors place

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[72]See, Momboisse, Blueprint..., op. cit., p. 281, Peter Paret and John W. Shy; Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 57, 75; Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla, op. cit., p. 96, and John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1966), pp. 32-3.

certain constraints on U.I. activities. For example, the assemblage of a large group of insurgents for an operation can be difficult, and the U.I. normally must be content with quick hit-and-run tactics which involve at most only four or five persons. Debray, in criticizing U.I. as practiced in Caracas during the 1960's, noted that as soon as the government suspected an area was harboring insurgents, it was immediately cordoned and searched by the authorities. He considers the lines of insurgent retreat to be easily cut off in the city.[73] These constraints will influence the manner in which the U.I. command and control structure will be developed, the size of the organization and the type of activities which can be carried out successfully.[74]

The third problem encountered in the urban environment is the always troublesome area of security. Although the city provides anonymity to the U.I. in crowds and by the general disinterest of neighbors, there is always the possibility of recognition. Marighella noted, "The urban guerrilla is in constant danger of being denounced to, or discovered by, the police.... In fact our worst enemies are the spies who infiltrate our ranks."[75] This risk may require the U.I. to take elaborate steps to insure its security. Marighella warned, "We should never admit anyone into our organization without full knowledge of his

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[73]Regis Debray, "Castroism: The Long March of Latin America," Struggles in the State, eds. George A. Kelley, et. al. (New York: Wiley, 1970), pp. 468-9.

[74]Jenkins, The Five Stages ..., op. cit., pp. 14-5, and his, An Urban Strategy..., op. cit., p. 9; Condit, "Modern Cities ...," op. cit., p. 7, and Caine, op. cit., p. 78.

[75]Marighela, op. cit., p. 92.

past and revolutionary background."[76] The U.I. leadership must be extremely selective in recruiting co-conspirators since the nature of the urban environment will normally preclude the exercise of direct control and discipline over them.[77]

The next disadvantage associated with U.I. is the difficulty of providing for the secure storage of supplies and equipment. This may not be a problem when the organization is small, however, as it develops so will the requirements for the stockpiling of supplies and equipment. Storage locations must be sufficiently dispersed so that discovery of a few of them will not compromise future operations, while at the same time they must also be situated so as to be readily available.[78]

The fifth problem has been central to much of the recent U.I. activity in Latin America and concerns the factors of appropriate tactics and popular support. Tactically the impact of U.I. activities is usually limited to the provocative and erosive. If the insurgent turns to indiscriminate terrorism the erosion of popular support may not always be away from the government. This was the case in Venezuela where urban terrorism in Caracas prepared the populace to accept the government's restrictive measures when they finally came in 1963 and 1964.[79]

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[76]Ibid., p. 118.

[77]See, Paret, et. al., op. cit., pp. 57, 75; Cross, op. cit., pp. 45-6, and Condit, "Modern Cities...," op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[78]See, de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. II-144, and Condit "Modern Cities ...," op. cit., p. 7.

[79]Pazmany, op. cit., pp. 8-11, 58-71. Also see, Jenkins, The Five Stages ..., op. cit., pp. 14-5, and Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), p. 177.

The purpose of this discussion was not to make a value judgement concerning the appropriateness of U.I. but to expose the relative advantages and disadvantages of such activities. The investigation has revealed a number of significant advantages inherent in the urban environment which can be exploited by the U.I. These operations also entail considerable liabilities, the principal one being that the U.I. encounters the government at its point of greatest strength. The concluding sections of this chapter will review the manner in which the urban and rural aspects of insurgency can be linked and the possible roles which the city can play in insurgency.

Urban-Rural Linkages

There are many possible linkages between urban and rural insurgency. An insurgent leadership in the process of evaluating the objective conditions and attempting to maximize its effectiveness should exploit the opportunities offered by both environments. The advantages offered above for the urban area can also be exploited by a primarily rural movement. Ithiel de Sola Pool noted:

> Every rural insurgent movement, when it has grown beyond a certain size, has had to maintain a covert urban operation for such purposes as warning of forthcoming government operations, purchase of equipment, and the like... every nationwide insurgency... has had to maintain an underground organization in the cities.[80]

The case for the city as a base for recruitment, intelligence gathering, contact with the communications media and logistical requirements has been established above and needs not be restated. The city offers other potential linkages with rural activities. It can serve as

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[80]de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. I-11.

a safe haven or alternate battleground for rural insurgents and as a base for attacks on targets in the rural areas.[81]

If government counter-insurgent operations are effective in the countryside, the city can serve as a temporary safe haven; or insurgent operations may be shifted to this area as has frequently been the case in Latin America, in Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala and Columbia, for example.[82] The defeat of Guevara in the Bolivian hinterland marked a continent-wide trend in this direction.

The construction of paved highways and the availability of motor vehicles affords urban insurgents the opportunity to expand their operations into the countryside in the form of motorized attacks on rural targets. The "weekend guerrillas," university students who traveled to the hills for a few days of play as rural guerrillas, were common throughout Latin America in the 1960's.[83] More sophisticated activity along this line is typified by the Tupamaro's one day seizure of the provincial city of Pando.[84] The situation may also be reversed with rural insurgents conducting attacks on the city. Usually these attacks are undertaken as part of the final defeat of the government or to gain political and psychological advantage. The most outstanding

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[81]Ibid., pp. I-7 to I-14.

[82]James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru," Latin American..., eds. J. Petras, et. al., op. cit., pp. 329-69.

[83]See, de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. I-7, and Sorenson, The Relationship..., op. cit., pp. 22-3.

[84]The city of Pando is located 30 kilometers east of Montevideo, Uruguay and was seized by the Tupamaro's on October 8, 1969. See, d'Oliveira, op. cit., p. 27 and Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 226-7.

examples of this tactic were the Viet Cong's Tet-1968 attacks on Saigon, Da Nang, Can Tho, et. al.[85]

Another interdependency concerns the use of the rural areas as points of contact for foreign assistance. The ambitious U.I. plan to disrupt the 1963 election in Caracas, the "Plan de Caracas," intended to culminate in an armed uprising among the workers' sections of the city. The arms for this uprising were supplied by Cuba and brought into Venezuela across isolated beaches.[86] Furthermore, the movement of personnel and supplies in and out of the country may be facilitated by maintaining a rural arm solely for this purpose.[87]

Perhaps the most important linkage of the urban and rural aspects of insurgency is that control of both areas, or the effective control of one and neutralization of the other, is required to insure the final seizure of power.[88] This point was established earlier in this chapter during the discussion of the Latin urban social structure.

In summary, the urban and rural aspects of insurgency can be linked as follows:

> -Technical assistance, supplies, intelligence information, recruits and other vital material needs can be supplied by the city.

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[85]See, Donald Oberdofer, TET, (New York: Doubleday, 1971).

[86]See, Sorenson, The Relationship..., op. cit., p. 33 and his, Urban Insurgency..., op. cit., pp. 116-7; Atlantic Research Corp. Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela, (Alexandria, VA: Atlantic Research Corp., 1970) and Pazmany, op. cit., pp. 66-8.

[87]Sorenson, The Relationship..., op. cit., pp. 33-4; de Sola Pool, op. cit., pp. 13-4, and Raymond J. Barrett, "Indicators of Insurgency," Military Review, LIII, 4 (1973), 41-2.

[88]Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla, op. cit., pp. 95-6 and his, "Civil Violence in the Urban Community," Riots and Rebellion, eds. L. H. Masotti and D. R. Brown (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1968), pp. 430-1.

-Operations may be shifted to the countryside and vice versa to escape government countermeasures or to take maximum advantage of opportunities presented by both areas.

-Finally for insurgent victory, control or influence in both areas must be achieved.

Despite these important linkages, there are some fundamental differences in the general conduct of U.I. as compared to rural insurgency. Ithiel de Sola Pool noted:

> The urban concentration of power does not favor protracted warfare on a large scale. Full scale combat usually only lasts for a few days; a program of terror, however, may be prolonged--unless one side brings in an overwhelming preponderance of power.
>
> The city is a checkerboard of diverse groups and political tendencies, many of which are highly organized, motivated, and politicized. Urban insurgent movements, therefore, must put together much more sophisticated coalitions (united fronts) than do peasant movements. The ratio of politics to fighting is higher in urban movements.[89]

In addition to these basic differences, the operationalization of a rural or urban insurgent strategy will bring out a myriad of tactical and situational variations. Some of the more obvious dissimilarities will include differing leadership requirements, levels and methods of violence, and organizational variations.

Roles of the Urban Area in Insurgency

What are the potential roles of the urban area in an insurgent attempt at power seizure? Michael C. Conley and Joann L. Schrock in their Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas identified four such roles and developed them as follows:

Model One - The urban demonstration.

Model Two - The bid for power through seizure of a city.

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[89] de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. 1-14.

Model Three - Precipitation of nationwide insurgency.

Model Four - Support of rural operations.[90]

Model One, the urban demonstration, is a violent protest directed at government but is undertaken with no intent to immediately seize political power. Conley and Schrock further identify three forms of the urban demonstration--premediated, spontaneous, and terroristic. The first two forms employ mass mob violence. The latter relies on terrorism, sabotage and other forms of extralegal activity but is unable to elicit popular support. Since the objective is not the violent overthrow of government, the urban demonstration has no application to this research except that the tactics may also be employed by an U.I. The difference then is the goals sought through violence.[91]

The three remaining models are germane to this study in that they all seek the seizure of power and provide differing roles for the urban area. Model Two, the attempted seizure of power in the city, combines the tactics of a Model One situation with leadership and organization and the goal of power seizure.[92] This is the classic "city rising" long associated with the barricades of Paris but employed as

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[90]Michael C. Conley and Joann L. Schrock, Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas (Washington, D. C.: American University, 1965), p. 16. For the historical background upon which these models were developed see, by the same authors, Preliminary Survey..., Appendix A, (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1965).

[91]Conley and Schrock, Preliminary Survey..., op. cit., pp. 16-20.

[92]Ibid., p. 20. The authors also include the coup d'etat in this model.

recently as 1968 in Paris, in La Paz, Bolivia, 1952 and in the Dominican Republic, 1965.[93] This approach with or without support from the rural areas will be further explored in chapters 4 and 5.

Conley and Schrock's Third Model envisions insurgent activity in the city serving as a prelude to the development of a rural movement.[94] The insurgents aim at recruiting, inflicting the maximum physical and psychological damage upon government and advertising their existence and strength. Two options are open to the insurgent after the initial establishment and development of the movement. The first is to continue activities in the city at a high level while concurrently developing the rural portion of the movement. This was the pattern of activities followed by General Grivas in late 1954 and early 1955 on the island of Cyprus.[95] Carlos Marighella proposed a similar scenario for Latin America.[96]

The other course of action open to the insurgent is a gradual decline in the tempo of urban activities as the rural movement begins to prosper. This can devolve to a Model Four situation where the city serves primarily as a supply source for rural activities. The election of methods may not be solely based on insurgent desires as was the case

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[93]Ibid., pp. 20-2. Also see, Georges Duveau, 1848, The Making of a Revolution, trans. A. Carter (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 161-81; Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, Red Flag/Black Flag (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968) and Raymond M. Momboisse, Riots, Revolts, and Insurrections (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1967), p. 446.

[94]Ibid., pp. 23-4.

[95]See George Grivas, General Grivas, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1965), and Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 45-55.

[96]Marighela, op. cit., pp. 98-101.

in Hanoi in 1946 and Singapore in 1947-48. The effectiveness of government countermeasures forced a retreat to the countryside.[97]

The Fourth Model, support of rural operations, views the city as little more than a center for supply plus personnel and other requirements. Such activities do not require mass involvement, and it may be to the insurgents' advantage to maintain a low level of violence in order not to call attention to these urban activities. This is the view of the urban area espoused by Debray and Guevara and exemplified in Cuba, 1956-58, and in the city of Algiers, 1954-62.[98]

All of these models can have application in Latin America and Models One and Four have been employed traditionally, however, it is Models Two and Three which are germane to this research. Chapters 4 and 5 will evaluate their application to the current scene in Latin America based on the available U.I. theory and practice.

Summary

This chapter has reviewed the status of urbanization in Latin America; investigated the potential for support of U.I. among the urban population; surveyed the advantages and disadvantages of U.I. activities, its linkages with rural operations, and the roles the city can play in insurgency.

A high degree of urbanization especially in the more developed Latin nations is a fact. This urbanization has been advancing steadily

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[97]Conley and Schrock, Preliminary Survey..., op. cit., pp. 23-4.

[98]Ibid., p. 24. Also See Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., pp. 5, 27-9, and Debray, Revolution..., op. cit., pp. 69, 75. And Bashir Hadj Ali, "Some Lessons of the Liberation Struggle in Algeria" NLF..., eds. D. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 107-13.

and is generally in advance of industrial development. The result is a situation which severely taxes the already overextended urban facilities.

Four broad socio-economic classes were investigated to determine who might provide support for urban insurgency. These classes were the urban poor, the workers, the middle class and the elites. It was noted that on the surface the urban poor appeared to be a potentially explosive force. Further discussion revealed a number of factors which have tended to mitigate this potential for violence.

The urban worker also presents a difficult target for the U.I. practitioner. The typical urban worker is unionized and enjoys a paternal relationship with government through the union structure. As with the urban poor, the worker will most likely respond to U.I. appeals based on economic themes and proposals which employ immediate personal gain.

It was the middle class which revealed the highest potential for support of U.I. In the more developed Latin nations this class is growing in strength and holds a somewhat radical political viewpoint. The students and intellectuals were identified as elements of this class which have traditionally supported radical causes. The status of the military officer corps was reviewed, and potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities among this group were identified. For U.I. to have any chance for success, segments of this group must be either co-opted or neutralized.

The urban elites were the last group reviewed. It was noted they prove to be the principal scapegoat for U.I. propaganda appeals directed at the nation's real or perceived ills. Additionally this group

holds limited potential among its dissatisfied elements for support of U.I.

The next topic investigated was the relative advantages and disadvantages which can accrue to an insurgent organization operating in the city. The advantages identified centered around the ability of the urban environment to provide:

-Qualified personnel to lead and staff the movement.

-For the logistical needs of the movement.

-Ready access to the communications media.

-Intelligence information.

In effect the city provides the sinews on which insurgency can develop. The principal disadvantage of such activities relates to the relative strength of the insurgent vs. the government. The U.I. meets the government at its point of greatest strength and capability. Other disadvantages which were noted addressed the limitations imposed on U.I. due to security requirements, organizational and operational constraints.

After investigating the urban area, the possible linkages with rural insurgency were researched. The interdependencies exposed in this review mainly concern maximizing the insurgent potential of both the rural and urban areas. The city can support rural activity by providing manpower, access to the national and the foreign press, logistical support, intelligence information and a safe haven or alternate area of operations. The rural areas in turn can provide a base for attacks on the city and serve as a point of contact with foreign support.

The last topic surveyed was the roles the urban area can play in insurgency. Employing a series of models developed by Conley and Schrock

the four roles listed below were evaluated:

-Model One - The urban demonstration.

-Model Two - The bid for power through seizure of a city.

-Model Three - Precipitation of nationwide insurgency.

-Model Four - Support of rural insurgency.[99]

Model One is of little concern to this research due to its lack of focus on the violent seizure of power. Model Four views the city in its classic role as a supply source for a predominately rural movement. It is with Models Two and Three which the remainder of this research will concern itself. Model Two envisions the seizure of power via the "city rising." Model Three foresees urban insurgent activity providing the catalyst for the later development of a rural movement. Ultimately this activity expands to a nationwide insurgency. These later two models of U.I. activity will be further developed in the following chapters.

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[99]Ibid., p. 16.

Chapter 4

URBAN INSURGENT THEORY AND PRACTICE

The preceding chapters have developed the concept of insurgency and reviewed the capability of the Latin American urban environment to support urban insurgency (U.I.). This chapter will investigate the need for a new Latin U.I. strategy and will survey the available U.I. theory and practice to determine what is available and the trends in its development. The framework for a new U.I. strategy will emerge from this research. Chapter 5 will develop this proposed strategy in some detail.

The Need for a New Urban Insurgent Strategy

The Latin insurgent activities of the 1960's were previously reviewed. These attempts at power seizure, which mainly followed a rural and elitist strategy, all ended in failure. The popular front approach which was given new life under the Allende government in Chile has again been eclipsed. During this same period, U.I. was attempted in a number of Latin nations and although all such attempts failed it did show some promise.

Viewing the objective conditions for insurgency on a continental basis an aspiring Latin insurgent leadership faces a rather bleak outlook. The rural areas have proven to be an inhospitable terrain due to the political passivity of the peasants and the effectiveness of government countermeasures. Popular front activities are always subject to a veto in the form of military intervention. Almost by default the insurgents of Latin America have turned to the city as an area for their activities.

In some nations, e.g. Uruguay, the insurgents have no other option based on the geographic and demographic situation. In others, the urban areas have developed to a point where they cannot be ignored by insurgents.

Based on these factors a number of commentators have proposed the requirement for a new U.I. strategy for Latin America. Whether such a strategy is needed is a value judgement beyond the scope of this research. However, as will be explored below, such a strategy is in the process of development.[1]

Donald C. Hodges in reviewing recent insurgent activity in Latin America noted:

> a new insurrectional strategy is in the process of being formulated in large part based on a critique of Debrayism; the rural basis... and the highly centralized military organization of the foco is... an obstacle to a strategy of long-term protracted struggle. In place of 'Foquismo'... there is the practice, if not yet a fully articulated theory of urban guerrilla warfare.[2]

Hodges considers the point of departure for the development of this new U.I. strategy to be the lessons learned in "Che" Guevara's Bolivian debacle. He notes new forms of political-military organization have appeared and considers these recent developments to be a synthesis of past experience which has resulted in an insurgent strategy which embraces:

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[1]See, James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements," Latin America: Reform or Revolution? eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 368-9; Priscilla Clapp, "Urban Terrorism in Latin America: The Politics of Frustration and Fury;" The Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 1971, p. 11, and James Nelson Goodsell, "Urban Guerrillas: Ebbing Influence or Wave of the Future?" The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 3, 1971, p. 13.

[2]Donald C. Hodges, "Toward a New Revolutionary Strategy for Latin America." NLF, National Liberation Fronts, 1960/1970, eds. D. C. Hodges and R. E. A. Shanab (New York: Morrow, 1972), p. 220.

-The preparation for a long term struggle.

-The objective of a people's war on continental dimensions.

-Reliance on a favorable population rather than a favorable terrain.

-An insurrectionary strategy that combines armed action with the organized movement of the masses.

-A concentration on urban guerrilla warfare supported by armed struggle in the countryside.[3]

Other authors taking note of these conditions have recognized the requirement for a new U.I. strategy, however, they are less definitive than Hodges as to its characteristics. This is especially the case with the counterinsurgents,[4] who as a group have tended to minimize the potential impact of U.I. in Latin America. Jack Davis, for example, noted U.I. is, "still in need of a strategy to convert their sometimes powerful capability for disruption into a revolutionary force." He considers that the current emphasis on urban terrorism provides the insurgent a distructive capability but, "not necessarily with an effective revolutionary strategy."[5] Russell and Hildner take a similar position and

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[3]Ibid., p. 221. Also see, J. Bowyer Bell, Myth of the Guerrilla (New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 48, and Eldon Kenworthy, "Latin America Revolutionary Theory: Is it Back to the Paris Commune?" Review of Luis Mercier Vega, Guerrillas In Latin America (Praeger), and Jose A. Moreno, Barrios in Arms, (University of Pittsburg Press), Journal of International Affairs, XXV, 1 (1971), 167.

[4]For purposes of this research the counterinsurgents will include those authors who address the subject of insurgency with the goal of developing effective countermeasures to such activity. For example, John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1966); James E. Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963); Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority Operations (New York: Walker, 1967).

[5]Jack Davis, "Political Violence in Latin America," Adelphi Papers, No. 85 (London), Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972, pp. 18, 34.

generally assume U.I. equates to urban terrorism.[6] Granted terrorism has played a significant role in recent Latin U.I. activities. The assumption, however, that all such activity will revolve around terrorism appears unwarranted.[7]

John L. Sorenson, writing in the mid 1960's, noted research should be directed to identify the strategy of the U.I.[8] Cross also noted the differences between U.I. and rural activity, and the requirement for new approaches by the insurgent.[9] Robert Moss in a series of studies and his book, War for the Cities, has investigated U.I. and provides a number of observations concerning its development. He considers that the manner in which U.I. will develop, "has still to be mapped out."[10] Although

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[6]Charles A. Russell and Robert E. Hildner, "Urban Insurgency in Latin America," Air University Review, XXII, 6 (1971), 55. Part of the problem with the term "terrorist" especially rests with those British authors who employ the term to include all anti-governmental elements. The British Government habitually refers to such elements as: Communist Terrorists (CTs) in Malaya, Greek Terrorists in Cyprus, and I.R.A. Terrorists in Northern Ireland, etc. For example see, Robert Moss, War for the Cities (New York: Coward-McCann and Geoghegan, 1972). For purposes of this research all participants in insurgent activity will be termed insurgents, even though some of them may take part in terrorist activities.

[7]See, Kenworthy, op. cit., pp. 167-8; Cross, op. cit., pp. 40-1, and John H. Hoagland, "Changing Patterns of Insurgency and American Response," Journal of International Affairs, XXV, 1 (1971), 136-7.

[8]John L. Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases (Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Research Corp., 1965), p. 131.

[9]Cross, op. cit., pp. 40-1.

[10]Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 15, 137, 158. Also see his, "Urban Guerrillas in Latin America," Conflict Studies, No. 8 (London), The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970; "Uruguay: Terrorism Verses Democracy," Conflict Studies, No. 14 (London), The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1971; and "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," Adelphi Papers, No. 79 (London), Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.

not completely developed, a Latin American U.I. strategy, as will be discussed below, has begun to emerge from the theory and practice of the last decade. Before investigating this subject a brief survey of the literature addressing U.I. will point out the general lack of research in this area.

The Need for Research in Urban Insurgency

Harry Eckstein in his, "Introduction" to Internal War, (1964) noted the relative neglect in social science analysis of insurgency and subjects related to what he termed "internal war."[11] Since that time there have been a number of studies and approaches offered to explain political violence and insurgency. For some unexplained reason the urban aspects of insurgency in the developing nations have until recently been neglected.[12] Sorenson stated:

> A detailed history of urban political disorders has yet to be written.... One looks in vain in recent decades for new thinking or a newly expressed doctrine of urban revolt.[13]

He further notes Communist insurgent doctrine contains:

> no current body of explicit doctrine... for carrying on urban operations... the dominant Mao-Giap-Guevara position treats the city as a strictly secondary environment.[14]

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[11]Harry Eckstein, "Introduction," Internal War, ed. H. Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 1-7.

[12]See Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969), pp. 16-7; Cross, op. cit., pp. 40-57, and Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 7.

[13]Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases, op. cit., pp. 4-5, 7. Also see his, The Relationship of Rural to Urban Insurgency in Venezuela and Colombia (Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Research Corp., 1965), p. 1.

[14]R. D. Holbrook and J. L. Sorenson, Urban Disorders Research-Tentative Program Formulation (Santa Barbara, CA: Defense Research Corp., 1964), p. 23.

A perusal of the counterinsurgent literature reveals the same dearth of attention to U.I. Bert "Yank" Levy's, Guerrilla Warfare devotes only a brief chapter to "the City Guerrilla" in a work primarily devoted to rural insurgency.[15] Brigadier Frank Kitson's, Low Intensity Operations, written after he had served as a brigade commander in Northern Ireland, mentions a possible "swing towards the lower end of the operational spectrum... sabotage and terrorism, especially in urban areas."[16] However, he provides little information as to how such activities might be conducted.

The U.S. Army has also been extremely slow to recognize the potential for urban insurgency. Its field manual on the subject of insurgency when republished in 1967 did not address U.I. This oversight was corrected by the later publication of an additional chapter devoted to the topic. The latest edition of this manual (1973) has reduced the treatment devoted to this subject.[17] Brigadier C.N. Barclay's caution that, "General staffs of the Western world would be well advised to give the problem of countermeasures against urban guerrillas," serious consideration appears to have been ignored.[18]

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[15]Bert Levy, Guerrilla Warfare (Boulder, CO: Panther Publications, 1964).

[16]Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1971), p. 199.

[17]U.S. Army, Stability Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine, FM 31-23, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1967 and 1973). Although John Sorenson's, et. al., research was funded by the Department of Defense few of their findings have been incorporated into this field manual.

[18]C. N. Barclay, "Countermeasures Against the Urban Guerrilla," Military Review, LII, 1 (1972), 90. Also see, Jay Mallin, "Terrorism in a Vulnerable Society and the Counter Role of the Military," (Coral Gables, FL: Institute for the Study of Change, n.d.) (mimeo.), p. 6.

Much of the insurgent literature evidences the same oversight. The Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army, does not specifically orient on urban activities, although much of the tactical material it contains has application in urban areas.[19] Likewise, Alberto Bayo's, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla, contains information relevant to U.I. (especially as regards terrorism and sabotage) but is again mainly rural oriented.[20]

There are some bright spots in this otherwise bleak picture of the lack of research into U.I. The writings of Robert Moss, a British journalist and researcher, have explored much of the recent U.I. activity in Latin America and his book, War for the Cities, is a valuable contribution to the literature.[21] Martin Oppenheimer's, The Urban Guerrilla, although restricted to the potential for U.I. along racial lines in the United States, explored a number of factors which have worldwide impact.[22] A RAND Corporation study, The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, by Brian Michael Jenkins investigated the manner in which U.I. can develop and described the process in some detail.[23]

The most significant additions to the literature relating to U.I. in Latin America are the writings of Carlos Marighella and Abraham

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[19]Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army, Issued by General Headquarters, 1956 (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, n.d.).

[20]Alberto Bayo, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla (Boulder, CO: Panther Publications, 1963).

[21]See footnote number 10 above for a listing of Robert Moss' publications relating to U.I.

[22]Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla, op. cit.

[23]Brian Michael Jenkins, The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Challenge of the 1970's (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1971).

Guillen.[24] Donald C. Hodges in translating the writings of Guillen has brought him to the attention of the English speaking audience and to date Guillen has provided the most complete proposal for a coherent Latin U.I. strategy. In addition, as an editor of NLF, 1960/1970, Hodges, in a series of twelve articles, has provided a cross section of the contemporary views of U.I. in Latin America.[25] These current proposals for U.I. activities will serve as the basis for the discussion below.

Latin American Urban Insurgent Theory and Practice

In the last decade, most of the Latin nations have experienced some degree of U.I. activity. It is not the intent of this research to chronicle all such activity since most attempts at U.I. have been quickly suppressed and amounted to little more than criminal activity, e.g., bank robbery, arson and kidnapping, with some political motivation on the part of the participants.[26] Instead the principal trends in Latin U.I., which are exemplified in the writings of Abraham Guillen; the theory and practice of the "National Liberation Action," (ALN) under Carlos Marighella in Brazil; the "Movement for National Liberation," (MLN) (the Tupamaros) in Uruguay will be reviewed.

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[24]See, Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil, (hereafter referred to as Liberation) (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1971), and Donald C. Hodges, ed. and trans., Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, the Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen (New York: Morrow, 1973).

[25]Hodges, "Part Four, Latin America," NLF, 1960/1970, eds. D. C. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 217-310.

[26]For a discussion of recent U.I. activity in Latin America see, Moss, "Urban Guerrillas...," op. cit.; Russell and Hildner, op. cit.; Davis, op. cit., and Brian Crozier, Annual of Power and Conflict, 1972-3 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1973), pp. 33-46.

The methodology established in Chapter 2 for evaluating insurgent strategies and activities will be employed as the vehicle to compare and contrast these various U.I. approaches. The insurgents perceptions of the objective conditions and roles for U.I. will also be investigated. The approach will be to survey the principal proponents of U.I. in Latin America, compare and contrast their views and make some limited judgements as to the feasibility of their major tenets.

To accomplish this task the U.I. activity in Brazil and Uruguay will be evaluated as indicative of the developments in the 1960's and early 1970's. Guillen's writings and proposals for U.I. in Latin America will next be discussed and compared with this activity. Two trends will be noted, which closely parallel the insurgent strategies developed in Chapter 2. The earlier activity generally followed an elitist strategy and attempted to transplant the foco concept into the city, while more recent proposals have tended to move toward the adoption of a mass strategy. The conclusion of this chapter will assess the maturation process of U.I. strategies in Latin America.

The Brazilian Case. The writings of Carlos Marighella will provide the vehicle for evaluating U.I. trends in Brazil. His, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," (1969) has received more notice than any other publication addressing U.I.[27] Although a significant addition to the literature, it has been given more note than it deserves due to the lack

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[27]Sources of the, "Minimanual," include: Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 61-97; Moss, "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," op. cit., pp. 20-42; Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, n.d.).

of similar material.[28] Extremely tactical in its approach to U.I. it evidences an over concern for such topics as: individual marksmanship, physical fitness, motor vehicle operation, etc. The, "Minimanual," was only one of Marighella's many publications, and its proposals can only be properly understood if taken in light of these other works which tend to place his overall approach to insurgency into clearer perspective.[29]

Carlos Marighella was an interesting personality and his background clearly shaped his approach to insurgency in Brazil. Of mixed Afro-Italian and poor parentage he entered the Communist Party at the age of sixteen, and by the mid 1960's was the leader of the Party Committee in Sao Paulo, Latin America's most important industrial area. At this point, he was in his 50's and strongly entrenched in the Party bureaucracy. A number of factors appear to have influenced his break with the party in 1967. First, he was deeply influenced by the Castro success in Cuba and the writings of Guevara and Debray. Second, the Brazilian military's seizure of power in 1964 and the continuing ineffectiveness of the Communist Party seemed to him to allow for only one option--violent revolution. His frustration with over forty years of the Communist Party's bureaucratic activities with its lack of action strongly biased him toward a strategy of violence. He envisioned insurgent actions which

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[28]To characterize Marighella as the champion of U.I. is to ignore the fact that he considered the urban area secondary to the rural struggle. Representative of the articles commenting on the, "Minimanual," are: Shaun M. Darragh, "The Urban Guerrilla of Carlos Marighella," Infantry, Vol. 63 (July-August, 1973), pp. 23-6; Moss, "Urban Guerrillas...," op. cit.; Mallin, "Terrorism...," op. cit.; and Enrique Martinez Codo, "The Urban Guerrilla," Military Review, LI, 8 (1971), 3-10.

[29]The only English language source for the complete writings of Marighella is, Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil, op. cit.

would be unhampered by the restraints of internal party squabbles and manifestos. He died at the hands of the Sao Paulo police on November 4, 1969, while attempting to put his insurgent ideas into practice.[30]

Marighella's perception of the objective conditions in Brazil (1968) which would support insurgency embraced the following:

-The Brazilian government had sold the country to the United States who he considered, "the peoples worst enemy."

-The workers were faced with unemployment and inflation was out of control.

-There was a complete lack of freedom due to the repression of the military government and complete press censorship.

-Corruption was widespread in and out of government.[31]

Faced with these conditions Marighella considered that the situation in Brazil demanded action and provided "a climate favorable to our growth."[32] He was not so naive as to assume the populace would flock to his cause once it was proclaimed. In his assessment of the potential class support for insurgency he noted "the proletariat is the only class interested in Socialism at the moment."[33] Further he considered that the eventual support of three classes--the proletariat (the urban worker), the peasantry and the middle class--would be required to bring his strategy to

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[30]For background information on Carlos Marighella see, Richard Gott's, "Introduction," to Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 7-15, Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 190-4, and Darragh, op. cit., p. 23.

[31]Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 19-21.

[32]Ibid., p. 33.

[33]Ibid., p. 108.

fruition. These groups which would eventually line up behind his movement, would oppose the military dictatorship which he considered was supported by "United States imperialism, the Brazilian oligarchy-capitalists and the Latifundiarios."[34]

In a document, "Problems and Principles of Strategy," January 1969, Marighella outlined his general approach to insurgency as follows:

> The basic principle of revolutionary strategy in a context of permanent political crisis is to unleash, in urban and rural areas, a volume of revolutionary activity which will oblige the enemy to transform the country's political situation into a military one. Then discontent will spread to all social groups and the military will be held exclusively responsible for failures.
>
> The main aim of the revolutionary strategy, when the permanent political crisis has been transformed into armed struggle and the political situation into a military one, is to annihilate the bureaucratic-military machine of the state and replace it by the armed people.
>
> In our view revolutionary strategy is a total strategy, both in the sense that it opposes the global strategies of US imperialism, and in the sense that it includes both political and military strategy as an indivisible unity and not as two separate activities. Moreover, tactics must be a function of strategy and there is no possibility of deploying tactics which do not serve a strategy.[35]

The essence of Marighella's strategy is in the statement concerning the transformation of the political situation into a military one. This is a scenario for insurgency which Robert Moss terms a strategy of "militarization."[36] This approach closely parallels the elitist strategy developed in Chapter 2, and the views of Guevara and Debray. There are however, some important differences in Marighella's proposals which

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[34]Ibid., pp. 103-4, 120.

[35]Ibid., p. 46.

[36]Moss, "Urban Guerrilla...," op. cit., p. 3.

mainly concern the geographic areas in which operations would be initiated. In developing his strategy Marighella considered:

> Our struggle against imperialism is being carried out with new concepts and unique techniques, and we are therefore not concerned with establishing any kind of guerrilla foco in Brazil. The path we are following depends on an overall strategy of developing revolutionary warfare in its three dimensions of urban guerrilla warfare, psychological war and rural guerrilla warfare. Our main effort is concentrated on rural guerrilla warfare, not through the foco system, but as a result of the establishment of a guerrilla infrastructure wherever our revolutionary organization appears. Given the fact that Brazil is a country of continental size, we envisage guerrilla warfare as a war of movement and not a war centered on a foco.[37]

Although basically elitist in his approach, various aspects of his strategy, if not his practice in Brazil, addressed the requirement to elicit mass support. In some respects Marighella talked or wrote a somewhat mass strategy, but acted out an elite strategy. Impressed with the role that violence would play in his activities, Marighella seems obsessed with the requirement for, "fire power." He considered the masses could not progress without it. Violence was to provide the ultimate solution to Brazil's problems and it would galvanize the elements of the population into action in support of revolution. He conceived of "a popular revolution using guerrilla tactics" and "a long war, not a conspiracy."[38]

In the first issue of the ALN's official publication the, Guerrilla Fighter, (April 1968) he outlined three phases of action through which the movement would progress:

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[37]Marighela, "Liberation...," op. cit., p. 38.

[38]Ibid., p. 22, Also see, pp. 21-23, 39, 44, and Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., p. 195.

Phase I - Planning and preparation for guerrilla warfare.

Phase II - Initiation of guerrilla warfare.

Phase III - The transformation of guerrilla warfare into "formal war" with the emergence of a Revolutionary Army of National Liberation.

He foresaw the insurgent violence beginning in the urban areas with its eventual expansion into the countryside during the latter part of Phase II. In Phase III both areas would be enveloped in insurgent violence with the development of nation wide insurgency and the eventual fielding of a "Revolutionary Army of National Liberation."[39]

The close parallel with the phasing suggested by Mao and Giap is obvious, however the implementation varies considerably. This is especially true with regard to the role which the formal party organization would perform, and the sequence and importance of urban and rural operations.[40]

Although the, "Minimanual," has been proclaimed the handbook of the urban insurgent, the city in Marighella's view represents only a "tactical area." He considered that due to the objective conditions in Brazil (and Latin America in general, except Uruguay) the city could only provide the fuse which would in turn ignite rural, and eventually nation-wide, insurgency. The rural areas he considered the "strategic area" and the decisive area.[41] This outlook closely follows the Conley and Schrock,

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[39]Ibid., pp. 36-8, 98-9.

[40]For information concerning the development of insurgency according to Mao and Giap see, Chapter 2, Table 2, p. 43.

[41]Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 47-9.

Model III situation which envisions urban activity followed by a shift in emphasis to rural, and concluding in nationwide insurgency.[42]

The ex-Brazilian Army Captain, Carlos Lamarca, a contemporary U.I. of Marighella, took exception to this arbitrary categorization of urban "tactical" and rural "strategic" areas. He considered a combined urban and rural struggle must be waged without arbitrary distinctions as to strategic or tactical areas. Urban and rural activities should be integrated based on the conditions peculiar to that region.[43]

The city, in Marighella's view, provides for a tactical diversion of government resources and attention. His U.I. activities did not envision a "mass struggle," rather, small "fire groups" would undertake violent actions and the masses seeing such activity would identify with it and support it. In addition, U.I. would steel the insurgents through violence, train recruits in essential skills and provide the nucleus for the movements expansion into the countryside.[44]

At one point Marighella indicated that prior to initiating rural violence an infrastructure to support such operations must be established. He considers, however, that the military must precede the political. No territory will be defended, and the rural insurgent must be continually mobile and not tied to one locale. How these mobile insurgents will

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[42]The models of U.I. proposed by Michael C. Conley and Joann L. Schrock, in Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1965), were discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 113-6.

[43]See Hodges, ed., Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 15-7, and Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 201-3. Carlos Lamarca was the leader of the, "Popular Revolutionary Vanguard," (VPF) which was active in Brazil during the same period and coordinated some of its activities with the ALN.

[44]Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 48-9.

subsist and gain the necessary intelligence information given the recognized "limited political awareness" of the peasant is not clearly defined.[45]

Marighella's views on insurgent organization are akin to those of Debray and Guevara in that he holds the armed elements to be the vanguard of the movement. It is this element which will precipitate the party (the leadership elite) through its violent actions versus words. This should not imply that the movement will be without leadership, but it will not be bureaucratic and Marighella strictly disavows the use of political commissars to over-watch the armed elements. With regard to mass support and its politicization he falls into the trap of other elitist insurgents. Desiring action now and unwilling to await the enlightment of the lethargic masses, such support is assumed to be forthcoming. The movement, however, cannot await it. Thus the drive for violent action overtakes efforts to politicize.[46]

Rejecting his long experience with the Brazilian Communist Party, Marighella considered the armed elements and their program of violence must not be restricted by the restraints of a formal political party organization. He envisioned a decentralized organization not burdened with reports, manifestos and over-supervision, which would be judged by its violent deeds alone. Individual initiative would be encouraged and leadership positions earned through outstanding performance in armed actions and not through administrative expertise.[47]

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[45] Ibid., pp. 49-50, 98-9.

[46] Ibid., pp. 30-1, 39, 55. Also see, Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., p. 195.

[47] Ibid., pp. 33-44.

To control the proposed nationwide insurgent effort Marighella envisioned an organizational scheme as depicted in Figure 9, page 137. This diagram is mainly based on his document "Questions of Organization" (December 1968) and reflects more of what he planned to accomplish, versus what was achieved.[48] Within this organization he envisioned three functional elements which he termed "fronts": guerrilla fronts, mass fronts, and supply or support fronts. The guerrilla fronts and the mobile units in the urban and rural areas were to be the key element and combine the political and military direction of the ALN movement.[49]

The mass fronts had the mission of politically mobilizing the masses and gaining popular support for the insurgent cause. Marighella considered students would initially be in the forefront of such activities, later as the movement grew members of other groups, e.g., union members, urban poor and peasants would become involved in the mass fronts. He foresaw the mass front stressing violence, to demonstrate through armed propaganda actions, the objectives and goals of the movement. An example of such an action was the kidnapping in 1969 of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Burke Elbrick. In return for his release the Brazilian government was forced to broadcast a ALN manifesto and free from prison and provide safe passage out of the country for fifteen so called, "political prisoners."[50]

This approach to the politicization of the populace differs significantly from the role ascribed to mass organizations by insurgents

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[48] Ibid., pp. 52-60.

[49] Ibid., p. 22, 54-6.

[50] Ibid., pp. 25-9. Also see, Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 202-3.

FIGURE 9

Insurgent Organization - Based on the Proposals of

Carlos Marighella



Source: Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1971), pp. 52-60.

following a mass strategy. Marighella draws a distinction between the "mass front" and "working with the masses." He considers the masses will coalesce around the fire power exhibited by the mass front and, "the mass movement cannot survive without the support of fire power."[51]

The supply front or support network as the names imply is responsible for the logistical requirements of the movement. Here again Marighella stresses violence as the method for obtaining such provisions.[52]

The mobile units, depicted in Figure 9, which include the, strategic task force and the tactical armed groups are the core of Marighella's insurgent organization. These are the units which will initiate U.I. activities, and as they grow in strength and experience, will expand into the rural areas. In Phase III, the Revolutionary Army of National Liberation would arise with these units at its core.[53]

Employing the clandestine cellular concept, the basic structural element of this organization is a small cell of three to five individuals. Linked together with extensive precautions taken to insure security, each cell is a self-contained unit with a leader, skilled insurgents, and the requisite arms and equipment. Within broad limits such units were expected to undertake independent operations.[54]

Although opposed to the development of a bureaucratic structure, Marighella was forced to recognize the requirement for some type of central direction and control. At the national level the strategic command would

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[51] Ibid., p. 39, 55.

[52] Ibid., p. 22.

[53] Ibid., pp. 53-5.

[54] Ibid., pp. 36, 60, 71.

perform this function. Subordinate regional coordination groups would supervise and direct the movement's activities on the lower levels. Such a regional coordination group might be established in a large city, e.g., Sao Paulo, or it might include a number of states in its domain. Marighella proposed that the mobile units and later the Revolutionary Army of National Liberation would receive support from the regional coordination groups, however, it would operate independently and respond to the dictates of the strategic command.[55]

The training center, initially established in the city of Sao Paulo, provided, technical and political training to the insurgents. As the movement developed other such centers would be established in both urban and rural areas.[56]

Recognizing that at the time (1968-9), there were a number of small insurgent groups operating in Brazil, Marighella proposed a "United Front" to pull these various groups together. Not a device for entering politics, which Marghella rejected as impossible in Brazil, the "United Front" was simply to be an amalgamation of the various insurgent groups into a nationwide movement.[57]

Marighella's writings contain one of the most complete contemporary proposals for a Latin American insurgent strategy and the methods for its actualization. He places heavy, although not primary, emphasis on the U.I.

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[55] Ibid., pp. 52-60.

[56] Ibid., pp. 53.

[57] Ibid., pp. 41, For a discussion of the other insurgent groups active in Brazil see, Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 191-2 and Gott, "Introduction," to Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 7-15.

aspects of insurgency in Brazil. His approach can be classified as an elitist strategy based on his emphasis on the role of the armed elements, violence, and lack of a structured effort to politicize mass support. While clearly drawing many of his concepts from Debray and Guevara and the writings of Guillen, he has added a degree of sophistication, especially in the areas of organization and tactics, not found in earlier such proposals.[58]

Not just an insurgent theorist, Carlos Marighella attempted to put his concepts into practice in Brazil. How did his strategy work out in application? Only one of the many groups advocating U.I. in Brazil at the time, the ALN was most active in the Sao Paulo area during 1968 and 1969. Starting with a small number of activists, mainly drawn from those dissatisfied with the factional disputes within the Communist Party, students, and with a smattering of workers and urban poor, the ALN in 1968 undertook a number of successful operations aimed at securing money through bank robberies, and arms through raids on military installations and stores. For a few months the government did not recognize the motives behind these activities and treated it as common crime. With the robbery of an armored payroll van, in November 1968, Marighella's group the ALN came to the notice of government and public.[59]

In 1969, the tempo and scope of ALN operations increased and in September it kidnapped the American ambassador to Brazil, Burke Elbrick.

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[58]The writings of Guillen will be investigated later in this chapter.

[59]Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 198-209 and Darragh, op. cit., pp. 23-6.

This action was the high point of Marighella's short career as an urban insurgent, because in November 1969 he was killed in a gun battle with the Sao Paulo police. This loss was a heavy blow to the U.I. movement in Brazil. Others attempted to carry on his work, however, due to the intense internal strife among the various insurgent groups, and the effectiveness of government countermeasures they were rendered ineffectual.[60]

Did Marighella's insurgent strategy fail? First, it was never implemented beyond the urban areas and in these areas was restricted to terrorist type activity. This would be the early stages of Phase II operations as described by Marighella. Although it represents only a partial test, some observations can be made. First, his over emphasis on the tactical aspects of insurgency tended to obscure more important political considerations, such as insuring the development of political appeals and a structure behind which many diverse groups could coalesce. An exiled Brazilian insurgent described this problem as:

> We lacked experience, and we lacked structure.... We were too anxious to get away from the traditional schemes of the Communist Party; we were in too much of a hurry. The early successes spoiled us... we made no political preparations. We concentrated too much on the military aspects.[61]

Marighella was much more elitist in his actions than in his writings.

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[60] Ibid.

[61] Alan Riding, "The Death of the Latin American Guerrilla Movement," World, 7/3/73, II, 14 (1973), 30, and Moss, War for the Cities, op. cit., pp. 195-6, 209.

Second, a key element of his strategy was the development of a "military situation" to replace the "political situation." This is the common insurgent scenario of provoking a government overreaction. In this case Marighella's strategy failed. The increased repression, which was quite severe, did not produce widespread opposition to government. Conversely, the insurgents provided the government with a pretext for a general repression of civil liberties.[62]

Given his ill-fated attempt at U.I., Carlos Marighella still stands out as a principal spokesman for such activity. First, because he did document his proposals when other action oriented insurgents simply acted and left little or no trace of their origins, objectives or rational for action. Second, he did attempt to put his proposals into action and in the process exposed some of the weaknesses inherent in them.

The Uruguayan Case. The activities of the Tupamaros, the "Movement for National Liberation," (MLN) in Uruguay generally parallel Marighella's U.I. activities in Brazil in time and its general approach to insurgency. The MLN however, was much more successful in developing its movement to the point where in 1970-72 it presented a considerable threat to the Uruguayan government. The trust of this inquiry will be to establish how this U.I. organization was able to accomplish this task.

The Tupamaro's in evaluating the objective conditions for insurgency in Uruguay determined the following concerning the economic and political state of the nation:

> -The nation has surrendered its sovereignty to foreign capital and interests, especially to the United States and the International Monetary Fund.

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[62] Ibid.

-The nation had abandoned its democratic and representative framework through its use of repression, and the actual control of government was in the hands of an exploiting and corrupt elite.

-The nations economy was bankrupt, inflation was out of control, repeated currency devaluations had failed and high unemployment was endemic.[63]

Their analysis identified two principal targets for insurgent propaganda: foreign economic domination and the "oppression of the oligarchy."[64]

There is no doubt about the validity of the MLN's evaluation of Uruguay's economic situation. Since 1955 Uruguay had been experiencing a prolonged and severe economic downturn. The processing and export of agricultural products, mostly beef, mutton, hides and wool, had all declined. These products amounted to 85% of Uruguay's exports and it depended on them for its foreign exchange earnings. Faced with declining prices on the world market for its products, antiquated agricultural techniques and declining productivity the nation was forced to borrow heavily from foreign sources. Saddled with an increasing foreign debt and the flight of capital out of the country, Uruguay experienced a

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[63]See: Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 3 and 7; Carlos Nunez, The Tupamaros, (New York: Times Change Press, 1970), pp. 29-30; "Interview with a Leader of Uruguay's, National Liberation Movement (TUPAMAROS)", NLF, 1960/70, eds. D. C. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 222-7; Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 212-3; Jose Diaz, "The Situation in Uruguay," The Tupamaros (New York: The Liberated Guardian, n.d.), pp. 3-5, and Eduardo Galeano, "Uruguay: Promise and Betrayal," Latin America, Reform or Revolution, eds. J. Petras and M. Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 454-66.

[64]Porzecanski, op. cit., p. 7.

record 135% per annum rate of inflation in 1967.[65]

The government, the most democratic and representative in Latin America, was slow in coming to grips with the long standing economic problems which had plagued every administration since 1955. The sagging economic situation was only one of the many problems faced by the government. Uruguay, since early in this century, has been in the forefront of nations with advanced social welfare institutions.

Programs such as a public insurance system, progressive income taxes, free education, unemployment benefits, et. al., are all expensive to maintain. The administration of governmental functions absorbed a large percentage of the work force and placed another financial burden on the already strained financial resources of the state. In addition, the unemployment rate, mainly among industrial workers, averaged over 12%.[66]

Given decreasing revenues and the considerable demands for resources, the government was faced with curtailing some of the social welfare programs or looking for alternate sources of income. It attempted to do both and created increased popular dissatisfaction as the result of curtailed public services and wage and price controls. The resort to foreign loans only accelerated the already high rate of inflation.[67]

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[65]See, Moss, "Uruguay...," op. cit., pp. 3-6; Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 210-4; Galeano, "Uruguay...," Latin America, eds. J. Petras, et. al., op. cit., pp. 454-5, 459-65, and Nunez, op. cit., pp. 4-7.

[66]Ibid. Also see T. E. Weil, et. al., Area Handbook for Uruguay (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), and Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

[67]Ibid. Also see, Jay Mallin, "The Military vs Urban Guerrillas," Marine Corps Gazette, LVII, 1 (1973), 20-1.

The Uruguayan government, which has been controlled by two parties of the center for over 50 years, debated and reshuffled cabinets. As the 1960's progressed however, it became increasingly clear it was ill prepared to take the actions necessary to correct the severe financial crisis faced by the nation. We thus, to some degree, have two of the critical objective conditions for insurgency--widespread dissatisfaction with the economic situation and a partial governmental failure.

Into this situation must be added the MLN, the insurgent organization dedicated to exploiting and exacerbating these conditions. The early origins of the organization are unclear. What is known is that the leader of the MLN, Raul Sendic, a lawyer and one time member of the Socialist Party, was deeply involved in the early 1960's in attempts to organize the sugar cane and sugar beet workers in the northern areas of Uruguay. As a result of this activity Sendic came to two conclusions: first, reform within the political system was impossible; and second, the only route to power outside the system was through insurgent activity. Since all political and economic activity was centered in Montevideo, this city would have to be the focal point of the insurgency.[68]

The years 1962-63 saw the formation of the MLN[69] with about twenty militants drawn from elements of the leftist parties in Uruguay. Its actions were completely clandestine for a year and a half. In July 1963 the MLN conducted its first militant action. It raided the Swiss Rifle Club (a resort in the Uruguayan countryside) to secure arms and ammunition.

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[68]See, Nunez, op. cit., pp. 11-13 and Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 214-5.

[69]The MLN did not start using the name Tupamaros until 1965. See, Moss, War..., op. cit., p. 211.

It was some time later, however, before the authorities identified the MLN as responsible for the theft. In the late 1960's the organization grew until it reached an estimated strength of over 3,000 in 1970. This is a considerably sized movement if one considers it was drawn from a population of 1.25 million inhabitants in the greater Montevideo area. Although representing a small percentage of the total population the Tupamaros through effective organization, intelligence gathering, propaganda and the skilled use of violence, created a situation by 1972 which clearly put the government in jeopardy. It was only after the government committed the nation's armed forces to suppress the MLN that the situation was stabilized.[70]

The obvious question is--given the other insurgent failures in Latin America why was the MLN so successful? The first factor in favor of the Tupamaros was Uruguay's long standing democratic traditions. The government and populace of this nation which has been termed the "Switzerland of the Americas" simply could not conceive of any group attempting to overthrow the government. The police and military were especially ill prepared in the intelligence gathering area to react to such a threat. The economic crisis, described above, was another factor. Probably the most significant factor was the Tupamaros themselves and their very astute analysis of the situation in Uruguay and the exploitable opportunities it presented.[71]

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[70]For a discussion of the general development of the MLN see, Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 210-39; The Tupamaros, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Nunez, op. cit., pp. 10-4, and Serigo H. d'Oliveria, "The Tupamaro Myth," Military Review, LIII, 4 (1973), 25-36.

[71]Moss, "Uruguay...," op. cit., pp. 1, 4, 6; Porzecanski, op. cit., p. xi, and Galeano, "Uruguay...," Latin America, eds. J. Petras, et. al. op. cit., pp. 455-6.

Evaluating the MLN is a difficult task due to the lack of accurate documentation on their activities and objectives. Their violent actions in the Montevideo area (1964 to 1974) have been recorded, however, their political activities are much more difficult to discern and in most cases escaped detection by government and the media. Unlike Marighella and the ALN in Brazil who layed out a rather complete picture of their insurgent strategy, the MLN was long on action but short on providing detailed explanations for its actions. The most complete description of its goals and methods was contained in a document "Thirty Questions to a Tupamaro" which was released in 1967.[72] This document, plus a few other questions and answer type interviews, articles by Tupamaro sympathizers, and documents released by the Uruguayan government are all that is available.

According to Tupamaro sources the theoretical concepts upon which their movement was based can be summarized as follows:

> -Revolutionary action in itself the fact of being armed, prepared, equipped, the process of violating bourgeois legality, generates revolutionary awareness, organization and conditions.[73]
>
> -The objective conditions for insurgency existed in Uruguay and required the presence of a fuse (the MLN) to trigger the explosion.[74]
>
> -Armed struggle is the only appropriate method since the government cannot and will not answer the peoples needs, and it is determined to stay in power. Once threatened the government will respond with force.[75]

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[72]All sources cited in this section draw heavily on this document. See, Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 8; "Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 282-95, Nunez, op. cit.; The Tupamaros, op. cit., and Moss, War..., op. cit., p. 218.

[73]Nunez, op. cit., pp. 23-4.

[74]"Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., p. 289.

[75]Ibid.

The above is a restatement of the Guevara's approach to insurgency in Latin America. To exploit these assumed vulnerabilities the MLN analyzed the particular objective conditions in Uruguay and determined:

> The possibilities for rural guerrilla warfare were practically nil, since we have neither vast jungles nor mountains... we can to the conclusion that the development of urban struggle was possible thanks to some very interesting specific conditions.... It was considered feasible to begin the experiment in Latin America of a guerrilla force whose action would be centered in the cities instead of the countryside.[76]

That the MLN came to this conclusion simply reflected the fact that in a nation of two and a half million, over 70% of the population resided in the Montevideo area. The next largest city was only 60,000 in population. The countryside is generally flat, open grass and farm lands and under-populated.[77]

Recognizing the city of Montevideo, as their battleground the Tupamaros undertook to apply the foco concept to this environment:

> If there is no adequately prepared group, the revolutionary situations are wasted.... The armed group gives the struggle efficiency and cohesion and guides it to its destiny. Furthermore, the armed group can contribute to creating the revolutionary conditions.[78]

Not only can the conditions for the struggle be immature, but the MLN also considered it unnecessary to await the unity of all forces desiring action to begin the struggle:

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[76]Ibid., p. 290.

[77]Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 14-5.

[78]Nunez, op. cit., p. 24. Also see, "Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., p. 289.

> The famous unity of the left can take place in the struggle... the forces that call themselves revolutionary (once the struggle begins) are obliged to choose between supporting it or disappearing.[79]

As with other elitist insurgent proposals it was assumed that "the popular masses will also awaken with that struggle."[80] This traditional view of the masses following in the wake of armed action is tempered somewhat by the following statement:

> Work among the masses that leads the people to adopt revolutionary positions is also important."[81]

In practice, as will be noted below, the Tupamaros did make extensive efforts to engender mass support for their movement and were somewhat successful in this regard.

With regard to the requirement to provide a detailed explanation of the movements, methods, goals and objectives the MLN considered their very nature (a revolutionary organization) as self-defining. Everyone knew what they were attempting so why belabor the point with long and involved manifestos? In their words:

> It is not only polished principles and programs that make revolution. The basic principles of a Socialist Revolution exist and are experienced in countries like Cuba and nothing more need be said. It is sufficient to adhere to these principals letting facts point the way to the insurrectional path to achieve their application.[82]

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., pp. 24-5.

[81] Ibid., p. 26.

[82] Ibid., p. 25. Also see, "Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., p. 287, and Porzecanski op. cit., pp. 11-8.

According to MLN documents they recognized the need for a strategy, however, they did not view it as "a lovely object for reflection."[83] Rather than a detailed strategy along the lines proposed by Carlos Marighella, the MLN put forth what they termed "some general strategic lines that are themselves subject to modifications with changes in circumstances."[84]

Piecing together the various MLN statements it appears they planned to develop in the following manner:

Phase I - Clandestine organization.

Phase II - Urban violence phase combined with mass politicization activities and some rural insurgent activities.

Phase III - A mass uprising in Monetevideo led by the MLN and supported by some rural insurgent activity.[85]

During the clandestine organizational phase the framework for the movement was established, basic political goals and general methods of operation agreed upon, personnel recruited and trained, and some supplies and equipment obtained. This covered the period 1962 to mid-1964.[86]

Having established itself, the MLN was prepared to undertake active insurgent operations in 1964. This phase of the movement's

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[83]Ibid., p. 29.

[84]Ibid. Also see, Carlos Beque, "Robin Hoods of Uruguay," Atlas, XVIII, 1 (1969), 47.

[85]The MLN did not describe their development using the term "phases." The term is used here only as a shorthand reference to the activities which they considered essential to their development and final seizure of power.

[86]See, Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 215-7.

development would continue until the conditions were ripe for the final seizure of power in Uruguay. Three tasks were essential to advance to this last phase. Not directly tied to any set time table, these tasks were:

1. To destroy the government's forces of coercion--the police and the armed forces. The aim was to demoralize, discredit and cause to defect rather than the direct military defeat of these forces.

2. To win over the masses to the MLN cause and gain their support for a mass uprising. A key concern was the infiltration and control of Uruguay's highly developed labor unions.

3. To psychologically prepare the MLN membership for implementation of the movements ideological objectives once power was seized.[87]

The MLN envisioned the accomplishment of the first two tasks through what they termed a "dual power" situation.[88] Through both military and political actions the MLN attempted to not only present a military threat to the government but also command the loyality and adherence of significant sectors of the population. The development of this dual power situation, according to Porzecanski, would facilitate MLN activities by:

-Making it easier to conduct tactical operations designed to gather intelligence and sustain the movement.

-Allowing for the easy recruitment of new members. The MLN would have considerable freedom of action and would be operating in the midst of its potential recruits.

-Allowing the MLN to operate as a shadow government.

-Providing an opportunity for the populace to perceive what the de facto MLN organization would be like as the de jure government.[89]

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[87]Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 19-25.

[88]Ibid., pp. 17-8.

[89]Ibid.

The development of this dual power situation was not an end in itself but just one stage in the move toward power seizure. To be successful it required not only military actions directed at the government but also the accompanying activation of mass support. By 1970-1 the Tupamaros had been successful in this attempt in a military sense and partially in the political field.[90]

In a document published in 1972, the MLN recognized the principal problem inherent in such an approach to establishing power duality.[91] Their military capabilities had outrun their ability to politicize. The result was a Tupamaro versus government struggle, with the population acting as spectators to the contest. In most cases the populace would not respond to government appeals for assistance in eliminating the MLN, however, this did not imply active support for the MLN. The resulting status quo situation in the long run favored government for it still retained its coercive capability, however impaired, and the MLN was at an impass.[92]

Capable of maintaining a significant level of violence, however, it could not move beyond this point without active support from major elements of the urban population. The MLN also noted that after years

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[90]Ibid., p. 17. Also see, "Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 282-3, and d'Oliveria, op. cit., pp. 27-37.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid. Also see, d'Oliveria, op. cit., pp. 27, 32; Russell and Hildner, op. cit., p. 60; Beque, op. cit., p. 47, and Moss, "Uruguay...," op. cit., p. 9.

of violence such activity became routinized and did not have the impact it once had. In an attempt to break this impass the MLN undertook more extensive military activity in 1972. "Plan Tatu"[93] a limited move into the countryside to direct government attention away from the city and split its forces was initiated. Direct attacks on the military in Montevideo were also undertaken. These moves caused the heretofore reluctant armed forces to move decisively against the MLN. In the resulting actions over 5,000 suspects were jailed, hideouts discovered, Raul Sendic, the leader of the MLN, was wounded and captured on 1 September 1972 and the movement crushed. Thus the MLN was never able to move beyond the military aspects of Phase II.[94]

Although never able to progress to Phase III, the final seizure of power, the MLN did propose a method for its accomplishment. Termed El Salto, literally a leap or escalation, this was a tactic to be employed when the objective conditions were ripe for the immediate seizure of power. Having achieved power duality, created a broad mass following, neutralized or significantly impaired the capability of the armed forces, and discredited the government, the MLN would turn the elitist struggle into a mass popular uprising. This is an updated version of the classic "city rising."[95]

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[93]This plan was named for a variety of armadillo found in Uruguay which lives underground. For a discussion of this ill fated attempt to expand MLN activities to the countryside see, d'Oliveria, op. cit., pp. 33-4; Mallin, "The Military...," op. cit., pp. 21-2, and Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 16, 69.

[94]See, Moss, "Uruguay...," op. cit., p. 3; Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. x, xi; d'Oliveria, op. cit., pp. 29-36; and Malling, "The Military...," op. cit., pp. 24-5.

[95]Porzecanski, op. cit., p. 24.

Having reviewed the MLN's concept for U.I. in Uruguay various specific aspects of its activities will now be investigated. The MLN divided their military activities into three categories: tactical, propaganda, and direct actions. Tactical actions were the almost continuous activities carried on to obtain supplies. Many of these actions were akin to Mafia activities: the robbing of stores and banks; the transport, storage and disposition of supplies. Although violence was used, it appears the Tupamaros purchased much of their logistical requirements with the funds obtained through bank "expropriations." Propaganda actions were important during the early development of the movement in order "to define the movement's objectives and conduct" to the population.[96] Relying on the propaganda of the deed, these actions included the "hunger commandos" who in 1964 stole food trucks and distributed the produce in the slums of Montevideo. In later years, once the movement was well known, actions based only on the propaganda motive decreased in favor of direct actions. The police, military and other representatives of the government were the principle targets for direct action operations which included intimidation, assassination, kidnapping, and confinement in so-called "peoples jails."[97] An expected result of direct actions was to drive the government into a campaign of counter-terror.[98]

It was in the area of these tactical actions where the MLN achieved considerable success and publicity. One measure of this success was the

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[96]"Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. D. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., p. 285.

[97]Ibid., pp. 255-6.

[98]Ibid. Also see, The Tupamaros, op. cit., pp. 40-1; Moss, "Uruguay ...," op. cit., p. 3, and Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 223-4.

inability of the Uruguayan government to locate or free MLN kidnap victims. During the period August 1968 to August 1971 a number of individuals were kidnapped by the MLN, however, not one was located by the authorities. Part of this insurgent success was based on the effective intimidation and infiltration of the national police, and to a lesser degree, the Uruguayan armed forces. A police strike in 1970 exposed the degree of this intimidation when they demanded higher pay, but also the right to work in civilian clothes.[99]

Recognizing what it termed "progressive elements" within the armed forces, the Tupamaros considered they could deal with these individuals in order to obtain intelligence information, and neutralize major segments of the military. Based on the armed forces response in 1971, and especially 1972, to the governments call for action to suppress the MLN, this hope for manipulation of the military seems unfounded.[100]

The size and state of training of the police and armed forces was another plus for the MLN. The entire strength of the armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) barely exceeded 16,000 men.[101] The national police force was also small, 17,000 men,[102] and both organizations had no experience in counterinsurgent operations and little initial capability to obtain intelligence concerning the MLN. From 1967 to 1971 the Tupamaros confounded the police at every turn. It was not until 1971 and

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[99]Porzecanski, op. cit., p. 56; Davis, op. cit., p. 10; Moss, Uruguay...," op. cit., p. 8, and Moss, War..., p. 211.

[100]Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

[101]Two thirds of this force was in the Army. See, Ibid., p. 65.

[102]Of this force only 3,500 were assigned to the Montevideo area. Ibid., p. 53.

1972 when the armed forces were given the responsibility for coordinating all military and police actions that the efficiency of counter-MLN operations improved.[103]

Following in the footsteps of "Che" Guevara and Regis Debray, the MLN discounted the requirement for a formal political party. They proposed the standard elitist view that the armed elements would precipitate the party in the process of making the revolution, etc. The MLN, although it originated from militant elements of the Socialist Party, denied any affiliation with the existing parties of the left. Since they were attempting to provide a haven for all the dissatisfied elements within the society they believed if the movement became identified with one or more of the traditional leftist parties it "would exclude other sectors possibly in the majority from... joining the movement."[104] Further they noted the "organization of a party demands the expenditure of efforts and resources that necessarily would be turned into almost exclusively political work."[105] Whether called a party or not, the MLN did recognize the requirement to politicize the populace through other than the demonstration effect created by its violence. The unions were a principle target since a third of the labor force was employed by government and it was all unionized. Most other urban workers were also union members. By establishing what it termed "Committees of Support of the Tupamaros" within the union structure the MLN hoped in the final

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[103]Ibid., pp. 53-6, 64-70; also see, d'Oliveria, op. cit., pp. 34-5; Mallin, "The Military...," op. cit., p. 23, and Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 230-1.

[104]The Tupamaros, op. cit., p. 39.

[105]Nunez, op. cit., pp. 16-7.

seizure of power to be able to "attack a state that is semi-paralyzed by strikes."[106]

The 1971 Uruguayan national elections presented the MLN with an interesting political decision. The parties of the left, including the Communists and the Socialists formed a so-called "Broad Front" to oppose the two traditional center parties. The question for the MLN was whether to support this "Broad Front" given their avowed opposition to working within the political system. In an apparent attempt to appear as a rational political group the MLN gave its limited support to the front while restating that the "people can win power only through armed struggle."[107] During the election period the level of insurgent violence was also curtailed. The "Broad Front" failed to make a significant showing in the election and gave further impetus to the Tupamaro claim that there was only one way to change the system--through violence.[108]

To control this multifaceted insurgent movement, the MLN developed a highly compartmentalized and covert organization. The chart at Figure 10, page 158, depicts this organization as it existed in the late 1960's. The National Convention was nominally the Tupamaros highest governing body. Made up of elected representatives it was designed to meet every year and a half and provide general direction to the movement. It was

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[106]Porzecanski, op. cit., p. 21. Also see Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 219, 236-7.

[107]Moss, War..., op. cit., p. 235.

[108]Ibid., pp. 234-6. Also see Mallin, "The Military...," op. cit., p. 22, and Joseph Novitski, "Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay Seem to Have Modified Tactics," New York Times, July 7, 1971, p. 3.

FIGURE 10

Organization of the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)



Sources: Robert Moss, "Uruguay: Terrorism verses Democracy," Conflict Studies, No. 14 (London), The Institute for the Study of Conflict, August 1971; Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 32-37, and Jay Mallin, "The Military vs Urban Guerrilla's," Marine Corps Gazette, LIII, 1 (1973), 22-3.

FIGURE 11

Organization of the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)

Column Political Section



Sources: Robert Moss, "Uruguay: Terrorism verses Democracy," Conflict Studies, No. 14 (London), The Institute for the Study of Conflict, August 1971; Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 32-37, and Jay Mallin, "The Military vs Urban Guerrilla's, Marine Corps Gazette, LIII, 1 (1973), 22-3.

reported to have met in January 1966 and March 1968.[109] This method of national direction was too risky and cumbersome for the control of a clandestine movement and real power was vested in the executive committee. Made up of 6 to 8 members, including Raul Sendic, it was responsible for the day to day supervision of the MLN. Liaison officers tied the executive committee to the various column commands. The columns, which were organized on either a geographical or functional basis, provided direction to the three elements under its control--the military, political and service sections. Each section was composed of a number of cells. The MLN claimed the existence of ten such numbered columns organized on a geographical basis. Numbers 7, 10 and 15 in the Montevideo area and columns 21-27 in the rural areas. These rural columns never developed beyond the planning stage. Special columns were developed to fulfill functional needs in such areas as logistics, recruiting, medical, etc.[110]

The column political section's organization is depicted at Figure 11, Page 159. Through this organization an attempt was made to influence the target groups, i.e. students and workers in their schools and on the job, as well as where they lived through the ward sub-section. Similar cells were also established in the military and police force.[111]

A Tupamaro spokesman noted there was "a big gap between the influence of the MLN and our development of the organization of that

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[109]Porzecanski, op. cit., p. 34. Also see, "Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70 eds. D. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 284-7.

[110]See, Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 32-7; Moss, War..., op. cit., p. 222, and Mallin, "The Military...," op. cit., pp. 22-3.

[111]"Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. D. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., pp. 282-4.

influence."[112] By design the internal structure had to fulfill the essential requirements of any clandestine movement. In this respect the MLN were very successful, however, the built-in compartmentalization also had its disadvantages. It restricted the approaches to potential recruits and the mass support the movement needed to pass beyond the dual power situation.

Compartmentalization also seems to have worked better at the bottom of the organization than at the top. If a cell member was arrested he knew only the other members of his cell. Moving up the organization this security tended to break down due to the long association of members and the requirements to communicate among various elements in the command structure. The defection of a top Tupamaro leader H. Amodio Perez for example, led the government to "the whereabouts of at least 30 guerrilla hideouts, a main field hospital complex, a number of arsenals and documentation centers and the Tupamaro's famed 'peoples jail' ...."[113]

Not until 1972 did the MLN formally organize an element to facilitate foreign support and liaison under the name "Committee of International Affairs." Its functions included securing money and arms from abroad, aiding the movement of insurgents across borders and while abroad, and establishing a transnational system for intelligence gathering.[114]

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[112] Ibid., p. 284.

[113] Porzecanski, op. cit., p. 69. Also see, Moss, War..., p. 222.

[114] Ibid., p. 23.

In summary, the MLN developed an organization to obtain at least three fundamental insurgent objectives. First, the structure allowed for the effective command and control of the clandestine organization. Second, it provided a reasonable degree of security through the principal of compartmentalization. Third, it provided for the consistent acquisition of the considerable material and human requirements of the MLN.

The Tupamaros have provided the best contemporary example of U.I. development in Latin America. A MLN spokesman noted they have provided "proof that the nucleus (of an insurgent movement) can come to life, survive and develop within the city and all this in keeping with its own laws."[115] This development spanned a period of almost ten years and reached a point where the MLN posed a significant threat to the Uruguayan government.

Although heavily influenced by the insurgent programs of Guevara, Debray and Guillen the Tupamaros were astute enough to adapt their activities to the specific objective conditions in Uruguay and in the process provided an example of U.I. that will undoubtedly be looked upon by other insurgents for strategic, organizational and tactical lessons. It should also be noted that the MLN developed separate from dependency on the existing leftist political parties in Uruguay. In addition, they avoided the tendency toward the use of indiscriminate terrorism so common in other U.I. cases.

The MLN clearly demonstrated the significant influence a small clandestine group can exert on government and the objective conditions for insurgency. The inability of the Uruguayan government to respond

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[115]"Interview with a Leader...," NLF, 1960/70, eds. D. Hodges, et. al., op. cit., p. 291.

effectively to MLN violence prompted a number of shifts in government, the resort to emergency powers, press censorship and the suppression of political groups. After the 1972 suppression of the MLN, the military was no longer willing to assume its traditional apolitical role, and in February 1973, it carried out a so called "soft coup" whereby the military took control of the government without displacing the President.[116]

Like the ALN in Brazil, the Tupamaro's military actions tended to outrun its capability to engender mass support for the movement. The MLN was never able to capitalize on the "dual power" situation it had created by 1970-71, and turn the military contest into a political one. Significantly, the majority of the support it did receive was from the dissatisfied middle classes. There was little worker and urban poor support for the MLN and almost no support evidenced by the rural population.[117]

The two greatest miscalculations made by the MLN concern their estimate of the capabilities of the Uruguayan armed forces and the populaces dissatisfaction with the existing system of government. The Tupamaros mistakenly thought they could deal with elements of the military and either neutralize them or cause them to support the movement. They also underestimated the potential of these forces to conduct effective counterinsurgent operations. These errors cost them dearly when the military moved in earnest against the MLN in 1971-72.

The Tupamaros appear to have confused popular dissatisfaction with the conduct of government in the 1960's, with a willingness to support the

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[116]Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 73-6, and "Uruguay Success of a Soft Coup," Time, CIX, 9 (1973), 37.

[117]Goodsell, "Urban Guerrillas...," op. cit., p. 13; Russell and Hildner, op. cit., p. 60, and d'Oliveria, op. cit., p. 32.

violent modification of Uruguay's system of representative government. This simply was not the case as evidenced by the poor showing made by the "Broad Front" in the 1971 national elections.

The "Soft Coup" by the military in 1973 may add an interesting epilogue to this U.I. case study. If the military is unable to rectify the economic and political conditions which served the MLN in the 1960's, there may be a basis for further insurgent attempts at power seizure. In such a situation the insurgent would have the added advantage of an appeal based on the illegal seizure of political control by the military.

Abraham Guillen. The two previous case studies of Brazil and Uruguay highlight the recent practice of U.I. in Latin America. They have pointed the direction for U.I. development and in the process of their failure have exposed a number of shortcomings which others would be well advised to avoid. As yet there is no Mao or Guevara for the city i.e., an individual or group who has devised and applied a workable U.I. strategy which is capable of energizing the latent support so many consider exists in the Latin city.

Abraham Guillen, a Spanish expatriate presently residing in Montevideo, Uruguay, has proposed a strategy for U.I. in Latin America which is worthy of analysis. According to Donald C. Hodges who has translated his many works into English, he is "Latin America's first exponent and systematizer of the strategy and tactics of the urban guerrilla."[118]

He had his first experience with revolutionary activity during the Spanish Civil War where he rose from the ranks to become the political

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[118]Hodges, "Introduction," Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 3.

commissar of a Division and later a Corps Headquarters in the Republican Forces. A participant in the seizure and later defense of Madrid from the attacks of the Franco Forces, he has had some firsthand experience in urban conflict. In 1945 he emigrated to Argentina, and since then has earned his living as a political commentator and writer. Describing himself as an "anarcho-marxist," he has consistently espoused violence as the solution to Latin America's endemic economic, social and political problems.[119] Because of this advocacy, in 1962 he was forced to leave Argentina and settle in Montevideo. Since 1952 Guillen has authored over twenty books. His earlier works (1952-64) were mainly concerned with what Hodges terms analysis of the economic and political effect of "US imperialism and the native oligarchies on the destiny of Hispano-America."[120] Since 1964 his focus has shifted to works of a more military and revolutionary nature, and his best known work is Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla, first published in Montevideo in 1966.[121]

Widely read in Latin America insurgent circles, Guillen's writings have only recently been translated into English. Both the ALN in Brazil and the MLN in Uruguay had access to his writings, and according to

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[119] Ibid., pp. 2-8.

[120] Ibid., p. 27.

[121] Ibid., p. 8. Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 229-77 contains a heavily edited version of this work. A complete English translation is found in Abraham Guillen, Estrategia de la Guerra Urbana (Strategy of Urban Warfare) (Montevideo, Uruguay: Manuales del Pueblo, 1966), trans. Headquarters Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington, D.C., translation #J-4261, 24 April 1968. Hereafter this translation will be referred to as: Guillen, Strategy.

Guillen he had personal contact and discussions with members of these and other U.I. groups.[122]

According to Hodges, Guillen in evaluating the objective conditions for insurgency in Latin America has, "combined the historical and economic method of Marx with the direct action of Bakunin."[123] The result is a rejection of the bureaucratic methods of the traditional Communist parties but not the abandonment of the requirement for a political structure to support and guide the violence he considers necessary for the seizure of power.

Guillen contends the "objective conditions are present for a Second Latin American War of Independence" and he proposes a "continental struggle for liberation."[124] He considers:

> In Latin America the economic crisis and the unrestricted growth of the population are leading toward a great social revolution, despite efforts to contain it on the part of native militarism allied with yanqui imperialism.... The political parties of the bourgeoisie and national oligarchies cannot resolve the structural crisis of Latin America by parliamentary methods.... The final act of the Latin American tragedy is about to arrive: there are guerrillas in Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, etc. But there is not a continental revolutionary strategy capable of defeating the Pentagon and the Latin American military.[125]

Like most Latin insurgents he identifies "yanqui imperialism" and the "dependent Latin American capitalism" as the root cause of the

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[122] Ibid., pp. 8-26.

[123] Ibid., p. 3.

[124] Ibid., p. vii.

[125] Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 232-3. Also see, Guillen, Strategy..., op. cit., p. 20.

continents' economic and social problems.[126] In addition to these conditions, Guillen considers two other critical objective conditions. First is the development of "revolutionary war" (insurgency) which he feels provides the method for successful power seizure. Second, he considers a potentially favorable population exists which will support insurgency.[127]

With regard to the Latin population, he divides it into five classes-- "the proletariat, peasantry, middle class, big bourgeoisie and large landowners."[128] For insurgency to succeed it must make provisions for the broadest possible coalition of interests. It must seek the support not only of the peasants and workers but also the middle class to include students, white-collar workers, and the emerging professional elements of the middle class. These groups will oppose the vested interests of the big bourgeoisie and large landowners who are maintained in power by the military. Guillen proposes:

> In this perspective the strategy of revolutionary war is essentially political: if it does not begin with a broad front of liberation, the guerrillas will lose the war strategically, regardless of tactical successes, from failure to obtain the support of the great mass of the population of an underdeveloped country.[129]

The Latin economic crisis and unrestricted population growth provide a pre-revolutionary climate for insurgency to prosper, however, Guillen recognizes the insurgent must serve as a catalyst, and that there

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[126] Ibid., p. vii, also see pp. 229, 280.

[127] Ibid., pp. 280-1.

[128] Ibid., pp. 24, 252-3.

[129] Ibid., p. 253.

must be a grave failure of government for it to succeed. He cautions, "Armed insurrection should not be unleashed against the bourgeois or semifeudal state if the objective... conditions are not present."[130]

In outlining his proposals for insurgency in Latin America Guillen noted:

> At the beginning of a revolutionary war, the initial revolutionary force, a small army of liberation, should be employed where it gives more strategic results and has more possibilities of mobilizing the population.... To have a small revolutionary army and isolating it from the popular masses in mountain combat, without a territorial organization to support it, is to deliver it to the inplacable destruction by... encirclement and annihilation....[131]

Given the choice between favorable terrain and a favorable population the insurgent should:

> choose the population and not the terrain, for with the support of the population the guerrilla can conduct a revolutionary war of the people in arms against which the most powerful army can do nothing.[132]

Guillen considers "the epicenter of revolutionary warfare should be in the large urban areas" and provides the following guidance:

> In countries with a high percentage of urban population, in which the economic system is concentrated in one, two or three cities, the revolutionary war should preferably be urban, but without at the same time scorning the cooperation of the rural militia, whose strategic purpose is to divert a part of the urban military forces so as to maintain the initiative of the army of liberation.
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> In a country with one, two or three large cities, as in Argentina and Uruguay, where the human masses are in the cities, if revolutionary warfare in the rural areas and mountains were decided upon, such an absurd strategy would place the cart before the horse and would finally lead to defeat....[133]

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[130]Guillen, Strategy..., p. 34.

[131]Ibid., p. 21.

[132]Ibid.

[133]Ibid., p. 30.

In developing his insurgent strategy Guillen attempts to avoid the extremes of the elitism and militarism of the conspiratorial foco on one hand and the traditional mass politics of the popular front on the other. In this process he does not reject specific organizational techniques and tactics used by both groups which may be useful in the seizure of power. His overall approach to insurgency in Latin America can be categorized as a mass strategy. Under the direction of a political party, the broadest possible coalition of interest groups should be formed and supported by an armed element. Seeking a favorable population base, usually in the urban areas, the insurgents should prepare for a protracted political and military struggle. The movement should attempt to force the objective conditions in its favor, however, it is recognized that the movement must survive and await the proper moment to seize power.[134]

In his book Challenge to the Pentagon, Guillen outlines the development of his insurgent strategy as having "three well defined phases."[135] These closely parallel the more or less standard insurgent progression from clandestine organization through guerrilla activity into full scale combat and the defeat of the government. This scheme also offers another option, the quick seizure of power at any point in its development should the government collapse.[136] Drawing on the

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[134]Ibid., pp. 2, 21-2, 33, and Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 23-5, 233-4, 249-53.

[135]Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 286-7. Also see, Guillen, Strategy..., op. cit., p. 34.

[136]Guillen, Strategy..., op. cit., pp. 37-38, 54.

historical experience of Petrograd (1917) and Madrid (1936), he considers the final assumption of power will be through the seizure of the city or cities. In his words when the "people are in the streets and the military forces are divided" the time is right for the rapid seizure of power.[137]

Guillen considers "a highly disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries is first necessary to seize power."[138] Mass support for insurgent objectives must be organized around front organizations such as:

> An Anti-imperialist United Front
> An Army of Unity and Liberation
> A Trade Union Front, or Party
> A Youth United Front
> A Student Federation[139]

Espousing no definite ideology, these organizations must be capable of accepting all shades of political opinion from "anarchists and liberal socialists to dedicated christians."[140]

Supporting this organization, the military arm of the movement should be arrayed in three echelons, (1) local and (2) provincial militias, and (3) a "popular army." These units employ the classic

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[137]Ibid., p. 32.

[138]Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 37.

[139]Guillen, Strategy..., op. cit., p. 19. Guillen proposed these fronts should be developed on a continental basis to support the "Latin American Liberation Movement" which he envisions.

[140]Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 24.

insurgent tactics of preserving one's self while slowly causing the paralysis of the adversary through swift attacks and constant harassment.[141]

Addressing the problem of overcoming a nation's military capability Guillen proposed:

> The Latin American military should not be considered politically homogeneous with regard to the political, economic and strategic sellout to the United States. The officers, noncommissioned officers and men are experiencing at first hand the cost of living crisis... the hunger and the squalor of the popular masses resulting from economic, cultural and technological underdevelopment.... In good strategy it is necessary to make a distinction between the military bourgeoisie (high-ranking officers) and petty bourgeoisie (medium-grade officers and noncommissioned officers), in order to conduct with strategic effectiveness a policy of national liberation that will separate the top military from the lower ranks.[142]

This tactic of divide and conquer the military was attempted without much success in both Brazil and Uruguay.

Considering Latin America a "Commonwealth of the U.S.", Guillen proposed that his insurgent strategy be initiated on a continental basis. He considers this as the only way to effectively counter the threat posed by United States intervention. The implementation of such a continental strategy would require the rejection of the strong nationalistic ideals existing in the various Latin nations. This appears very unlikely. This critique of the continental dimension of Guillen's strategy, however, does not degradate its basic structure which can be implemented on a national basis.[143]

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[141] Ibid., p. 251.

[142] Guillen, Strategy..., op. cit., p. 15.

[143] Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 40-2.

Guillen was very critical of the contemporary U.I. activities in Brazil and Uruguay. He provides a twelve point critique of Marighella's Brazilian experience which noted:

-The confusion over "tactical" and "strategic" areas with regard to urban versus rural conflict.

-The lack of a "revolutionary vanguard" (party) and experienced cadres to provide political direction to the movement.

-Conflicts among the various U.I. movements.

-Failure to give the movement a broad popular character.

-Overemphasis of Marxist-Leninist phraseology as opposed to nationalist appeals.[144]

He charged Marighella and the ALN with "historical impatience", and "revolutionary voluntarism" stating:

> For them actions, as long as it takes a military form, has the quasi-miraculos capacity of unleashing a great revolutionary program.... They seem to have forgotten that revolution is the continuation of politics by violent means, that strategy must be subordinated to politics; or, better said, that politics and strategy are conjoined in revolutionary and guerrilla warfare.[145]

After giving credit to the Tupamaros for providing the "best revolutionary academy in the world on the subject of urban guerrilla warfare," Guillen pointed out their failures. He considered them brilliant in matters of tactics, but this did not extend to their strategy and especially their politics. Specifically he noted:

-The MLN became overly professionalized, militarized and generally isolated from the mass support base. It in effect practiced foquismo in the city.

-The movement came, "perilously close to resembling a political Mafia," and resorted to unnecessary violence.

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[144]Ibid., pp. 256-61.

[145]Ibid., p. 256.

-The logistical requirements of the large clandestine organization placed an excessive security and administrative burden on the movement.[146]

Summary

This chapter has reviewed the status of U.I. theory and practice, especially with regard to recent such activities in Latin America. The lack of research in this area was first noted. The main emphasis of contemporary research has oriented on insurgency's rural aspects. Only recently has attention turned to the possibility of productive insurgent activity on an urban basis.

To determine the state of development of the theory and practice of U.I., two cases, Brazil and Uruguay, were investigated. Analysis of the ALN in Brazil under the leadership of Carlos Marighella revealed a case which was very well documented however short lived its period of active insurgent operations. Marighella proposed an elitist insurgent strategy which would employ the city as the springboard for the development of a rural and later nationwide insurgent movement. He stressed the role of violence and was deeply concerned with the tactical side of insurgency. In his preoccupation with the tactical, Marighella lost sight of the overriding political concerns upon which effective insurgency is based.

The other case surveyed was the MLN or Tupamaros in Uruguay. This organization has provided the best example of the potential for U.I. in Latin America. In existence for ten years, it first withstood the test of time. Second, in the process of its development and ultimate failure,

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[146] Ibid., pp. 263-77.

it provided a number of lessons concerning U.I. strategy, tactics and organization which can have application in other Latin nations.

The writings of Abraham Guillen were next investigated. This individual is the principal Latin spokesman for U.I. His proposal for what may be termed a mass insurgent strategy employs the resources and potential of the city to the maximum in conjunction with supporting rural insurgent actions. Portions of Guillen's strategy were implemented in both Brazil and Uruguay, however a full test of his approach has not yet been attempted.

This review has revealed that the theory and practice of U.I. in Latin America is only partially developed. The remainder of this research will attempt to fill in part this void by conceptually developing the manner in which Latin American U.I. may develop.

Chapter 5

A PROPOSED URBAN INSURGENT STRATEGY FOR LATIN AMERICA

The previous chapters have accomplished three tasks: established a conceptual framework of insurgent strategies and methods for their operationalization; surveyed the potential for urban insurgency (U.I.) in Latin America, and the roles of the city in U.I.; and reviewed contemporary Latin U.I. theory and practice.

This chapter will attempt to bring these subjects together in such a manner that a proposed U.I. strategy can be developed which will have application to the existing conditions in Latin America, and embody some chance of success. The exact manner in which this strategy might evolve cannot be predicted, however, it is clear from the previous review of U.I. in Latin America that such a strategy is in the process of development. By proposing a model of such a strategy and indicating the tasks which the insurgents must accomplish, this investigation can shed some light on the subject.

In one sense to describe this proposal as U.I. strategy is a misnomer. It is an insurgent strategy which places greatest emphasis on the urban aspects of the struggle, while still recognizing the requirement for some type of complementary rural insurgent action. To term it a U.I. strategy, however, aids in overcoming the common assumption that insurgency is only a rural phenomenon--as per the Mao, Giap, Castro, Guevara, Debray mode.

Prior to discussing this proposed U.I. strategy, the assumptions made in its development and the limits of the investigation shall be established. First, this strategy will only be developed in outline. Note will be taken of the general considerations which a U.I. movement should address in the development of its strategy, supporting organizations and tactics. Where possible critical tasks and decision points will be identified. This strategy will not end up being a "blueprint for revolution." Based on historical experience this or any other U.I. strategy will fail more times than it will succeed. In fact successful insurgency outside of the anti-colonial setting is extremely rare.[1] The possibility of failure, however, has not deterred the dedicated insurgent in the past, and probably will not in the future.

Second, the development and especially the success of this strategy will be predicated on the presence of the proper objective conditions. This point was investigated in Chapters 2 and 3. Their presence will be assumed in this study. The model of U.I. will assume insurgent success since this is the only manner in which the full cycle of its development can be illustrated. Further, this investigation will orient almost exclusively on the urban aspects of the insurgent struggle, while acknowledging that in some manner supporting rural activity must be included in the overall plan.

Third, the proposal developed stresses the mass U.I., strategy approach over elitist methods. The later U.I. strategy has shown itself,

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[1]See, Brian Crozier, "The Study of Conflict," Conflict Studies, No. 7 (London), Institute For the Study of Conflict, 1970, and Robert Moss, War for the Cities, (New York: Coward, McCann, and Georghegan, 1972), p. 15.

at least to date, unworkable in Latin America. Where it is advantageous the use of typically elitist techniques, such as terrorism, will be considered. The role for U.I. described will be along the lines of Conley and Schrock's, Model Two--"The Bid for Power Through Seizure of a City." Elements of their Model Three approach, "The Precipitation of Nationwide Insurgency," will also be addressed, principally with regard to the supporting rural activity.[2]

Fourth, it is assumed a small group of individuals, whatever their ultimate motives, have decided to employ U.I. to attempt the seizure of power. The origin of this group is unimportant. What is critical to the strategies development is the role they prescribe for the city and the goal of violent power seizure.

This U.I. strategy will be devised to take maximum advantage of the urban growth and its attendant problems which are endemic to Latin American urbanization. The manner in which a broadly based insurgent movement, under the direction of dedicated leadership, can exploit these conditions will be illustrated by first describing the overall strategy. From this point the requisite organization and tactics required to put it into practice will be determined. The manner in which U.I. can develop will be described by dividing its progression into "phases" and indicating the tasks required to achieve each phase of development. A plan for the final seizure of power also will be proposed.

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[2]Michael C. Conley, and Joann L. Schrock, Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1965), p. 16.

The Strategy

There are three tasks which the U.I. movement must accomplish in its quest for power. First, it must organize itself for this form of activity; and initially the existence of the movement or at least its goals should be concealed from the authorities. Second, it must at some point in its development "go public" and attempt to gain support for its goals among the populace. Finally, it must make provisions for the violent seizure of power. For purposes of this research, these three tasks will be addressed as separate phases in the U.I. developmental process as follows:

Phase I - Incipient Activities Phase.

Phase II - Mobilization Phase.

Phase III - Seizure of Power Phase.[3]

The parallels with the phasing proposed by other insurgents is obvious, to include: Mao, Guevara, Marighella, Guillen, et. al.[4] This terminology will provide a "short hand" reference to cover the host of insurgent actions which take place in each phase. This approach should not be interpreted as a sort of set-piece progression as if following a roadmap to victory. The activities of each phase are cumulative rather than progressive. For example, the organization developed during

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[3]For other attempts to develop a phased U.I. developmental scheme see, Brian Michael Jenkins, The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1971); Conley and Schrock, op. cit., pp. 6-7; Donald C. Hodges, ed. The Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: Wm. Morrow, 1972), pp. 233-4, 286, and Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 131.

[4]The insurgent proposals put forth by these individuals were discussed in either Chapters 2 or 4.

Phase I will not stop at the termination of that phase but will continue to expand to and through the seizure of power. Furthermore, this is not a timetable. No attempt will be made in this research to specify the exact length of any phase or the entire process of power seizure. The progression to a higher phase will be situation dependent rather than time dependent. Unless the conditions are sufficient and the movement developed, there will be no progress irregardless of the time spent in such activities. Furthermore, at any one time the movement may be at various stages of development in different areas of the nation. This especially will be the case if the state is a multi-city nation as noted at Figure 7, page 76.

This insurgent developmental scheme is by no means a one-way process. Total insurgent defeat or a set back can occur at any phase. If for example the attempt at power seizure fails, the U.I. movement may find itself back at Phase I or completely eliminated.

The objectives of the mass insurgent strategy are first to develop a clandestine organization, which will facilitate the later politicization of the populace while concurrently carrying out the violent actions it deems necessary to further its political goals.[5] The activities inherent in each phase of the U.I. movement's development will now be described.

Phase I - Insipient Activities Phase, is the developmental period of the movement when the foundation is laid for later activities. Assuming the existence of a small dedicated group of insurgents, which

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[5]For a description of the mass insurgent strategy see Chapter 2, pp. 39-45, 49-51.

may number no more than 15 or 20 individuals,[6] "what objectives must be accomplished to allow the movement to advance to Phase II?" First, an overall approach to the method of power seizure should be agreed upon. It is doubtful at this point if it will have crystalized to the point where it can be termed a strategy, however, broad agreement must be reached as to the general lines of its development. This requires a rigorous examination of the objective conditions existing in the urban areas to determine what is possible, and a realistic estimation of the specific methods which will provide some chance for success. As the movement grows and conditions change, the U.I. must be prepared to modify its methods.

During this early period of the movement's existence there may be little formal organization. As it grows, however, the requirements for security and the increasing complexity of its operations will require the differentiation of roles. The first serious challenge to the movement's security will arise when it begins to recruit additional adherents and expand beyond the initial nucleus of members.

"Who will lead the movement?" should also be decided. A collegiate system may be employed, or one individual may be selected by some process to provide the required central direction. In light of the Latin American context of this proposal and their proclivity for personilismo politics, serious consideration should be eventually given to developing an individual as the actual or figurehead leader.[7] At

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[6]For example the Tupamaros began their movement in 1962-63 with about 20 individuals. See, Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 215-6.

[7]See, Irving L. Horowitz, "Electorial Politics, Urbanization and Social Development in Latin America," Latin American Radicalism, eds. I. L. Horowitz, et. al., (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 171.

this point the identity of the leadership should be restricted to those who need to know this information to carry out their duties within the organization. Another key factor will be the members' development of trust and confidence in the U.I. leadership's capabilities.

With the evolution of roles, individual members will begin to fall into the following broad categories: the party leadership; those involved in overt activities which will serve as the predecessors to the later evolution of mass support organizations; and those engaged in covert activities which will form the nucleus of the movement's armed elements.[8]

Violent actions which could prematurely bring the movement to the attention of the authorities must be avoided. Internal security and self-defense, in case of discovery by the police, must be emphasized. Since the early adherents to the movement may have been long associated with each other, the U.I. movement is extremely vulnerable to compromise if a key member is arrested or defects to the government.[9]

The movement's overt activities during this phase will be based on the type of political structure in the nation. An attempt should be made to exploit this system where possible through legal means. A legal political party or faction of an existing party can provide a convenient device to mask the movement's intentions. It offers the opportunity to: train members, identify potential recruits, carry on propaganda activities, et. al. Having participated in the legal political sphere can also assist in giving an aura of legitimacy to the movement's activities during the

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[8]See, Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint For Revolution (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), p. 49.

[9]See, Ibid., p. 93-4, and Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 80.

later phases. A legal political party may be formed knowing full well that at some point the government will cease to tolerate its agitation and suppress it. This device can add credence to insurgent claims that the "system is repressive," and the only alternative is its violent overthrow.[10]

Other activity, although not openly identified with the U.I. movement, will include the placing of members in organizations which later may be subverted to support insurgent goals. Organizations e.g., unions, civic groups, church councils, neighborhood associations, sports clubs, et. al., should be identified and infiltrated based on their actual or potential influence among the populace.

Covert activities during this phase will concentrate on infiltrating and gaining information about the government especially its police, military, and special intelligence organizations. A major insurgent interest should be to determine the vulnerabilities of the government, i.e., a poorly trained and unmotivated police force, police versus military antipathy, etc.[11]

The training of its members especially in the required tactical military skills can be undertaken either in or out of the country. The training of political operatives can be obtained via their activities in legal political groups, working in the communications media, or from foreign sources.

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[10]See, Peter Camejo, Guevara's Guerrilla Strategy (New York: Path Finder Press, 1972), pp. 22-3, and Edward Luttwak, Coup d' Etat (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 105-6.

[11]See, Momboisse, op. cit., pp. 48-9.

Depending on the political inclinations of the insurgents, foreign support may be sought at this point. A critical resource required during this phase will be cash to fund the expenses of the small but expanding movement. A "friendly" foreign government can be the source of these funds.

One of the most difficult tasks the U.I. will encounter is expanding the movement to other cities and especially to the countryside. In some manner this must be accomplished or the U.I. will face the possibility of being isolated in the city. Another option open to the insurgent would be to postpone this expansion until Phase II activities are initiated in the area of its initial organization and then attempt the expansion.

The principal tasks which the insurgent must accomplish prior to progressing to Phase II activities can be summarized as:

- The initial establishment and expansion of the movement.
- General agreement by the U.I. leadership as to the methods for power seizure.
- Undertaking overt and covert actions to prepare for the political and violent activities of Phases II and III.

In many respects the activities during Phase I are not unlike those carried out by the ALN in Brazil and the MLN in Uruguay. There is one important difference, however, which should be recognized. This is the protracted nature of the mass U.I. strategy as compared to the less than one year in Brazil and two years in Uruguay spent in developing the basis for the movement.[12]

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[12]See the discussion of these two U.I. movements in Chapter 4.

Phase II - Mobilization Phase. Ideally the U.I. movement's progression into Phase II activities will reflect their evaluation of the situation and be at their discretion. Discovery of the movement's existence and goals by the government may force the U.I. to prematurely initiate Phase II operations. Where Phase I was characterized by a clandestine existence, with the advent of Phase II the movement in effect "goes public." The goal of violent overthrow may be initially concealed behind front organizations and reformist appeals, however all actions by the U.I. ultimately will be directed as this goal.

To succeed in this phase of its existence, the U.I. must accomplish the following tasks:

-Expand the skeletal organization developed in Phase I to embrace a mass support structure and armed elements.

-Retain strict party direction and control of the movement.

-Initiate supporting activities in the countryside and in the smaller urban centers.

-Through the effective politicization of a base of popular support and the appropriate violent acts, erode the capabilities of the government.

-Create a situation of continued turmoil in which the government is on the defensive, and is discredited due to its lack of capability to effectively respond to the crisis.

-The U.I. must present a coherent political program to solve the crisis it has in-part created.

The task of welding popular discontent to the U.I. cause is one of the most difficult objectives which must be accomplished during this phase. Without it the movement will stagnate, or it can elect to disregard the factor of mass support and undertake a campaign of violence (an elitist approach) in the hopes that due to fortuitous circumstances the mass support will develop later. The activation of mass support must not

be left to chance. It must be organized and made responsive to party direction. Through the manipulation of the masses in strikes, riots, protect demonstrations, et. al., the U.I. movement must be made to appear as representative of the legitimate desires of the bulk of the population. As a Tupamaro spokesman noted, there is a great difference between popular sympathy for the U.I. cause and making this sympathy responsive to insurgent control.[13] If the infiltration efforts initiated in Phase I are successfully carried forth into Phase II, an expanding number of organizations within the society will be influenced in favor of the insurgents. This support in most cases will not be openly identified with the insurgent cause. The front organizations will be employed to compound the crisis situation by opposing the government, discrediting its actions and policies, and serving as a sounding board for pro-insurgent propaganda. Fronts will also be created by the insurgent to pull support away from organizations which have resisted infiltration. For example, "A Progressive Students Association" to supplant the existing student organization which may be controlled by government or a political party.

Gaining control of such organizations as student associations and unions provides a number of benefits. First, it allows the U.I. to take over an organization in being and precludes the considerable expenditure of resources required to build a new organization. It brings experienced personnel into the movement and allows the party to scrutinize the organization's membership for potential recruits. Such organizations many times have significant financial resources; endowments,

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[13]Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 284.

pension funds, dues income, etc. With control of the organization will come access to these funds. They can also serve as purchasing agents for the U.I. movement. If the front organization is respected as an opinion former in the nation, statements put out under its auspice will have greater credence than the same statement put forth by an insurgent spokesman. The most important benefit derived from a well constructed network of front organizations will be the ability of the U.I. to influence and manipulate broad segments of the population.[14]

Recent U.I. practitioners have debated the role of the armed elements versus the requirements for political direction of the movement. Whether the party leadership sees itself as a military elite or a political elite is immaterial. What is important is that all decisions be made in light of their probable political impact. Military and tactical considerations must not be allowed to override the political.[15] Just because an operations, e.g. robbing a bank, is technically feasible, it should not be considered a valid rationale for carrying on with the activity. Two questions must be answered before any armed activity is carried out:

-What will be the probable political impact of the planned action?

-How can it assist in attaining U.I. political goals?

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[14]See, Luttwak, op. cit., pp. 144-5, Momboisse, op. cit., pp. 179-84; Conley and Schrock, op. cit., p. 11, and Robert J. Black, "A Change in Tactics? The Urban Insurgent," Air University Review, XXII, 1 (1972), 56.

[15]For example see, Hodges, Philosophy... op. cit., pp. 250-1, 252; Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 30-1, and Jack Davis, "Political Violence in Latin America" Adelphi Papers, No. 85 (London), Institute For Strategic Studies, 1972), pp. 33-4.

Unless the planned action can be clearly perceived as supportive of U.I. goals it should be avoided. The trap of "violence for violence sake" has been the downfall of many insurgent movements in Latin America. This does not imply that the U.I. should espouse non-violence. There will be almost continual violence: riots, disturbances, selective assassinations, kidnapping, hijacking of aircraft, bank robberies, et. al. The point is it must be constructive from the insurgent point of view, contribute to building the image of the movement, and discredit and neutralize the government.[16]

At this point it will not be necessary to field large armed elements in the city. It is doubtful if they could be employed productively. They would present a significant security problem, and their large size would make them unwieldly in the rather close quarters encountered in the city. Rather than combining the armed elements into larger units, efforts should be directed at creating additional cells of 3 to 5 armed and well trained individuals. These small units will experience a high attrition rate, and provisions must be made for a constant supply of trained replacements.

As the violence increases during Phase II, a degree of specialization will develop among these small armed cells due to their experiences in various types of actions. For example, some will become experts in bank robbery, others in the theft of supplies, bombing operations, etc. Not many of these highly trained operatives will be required. A larger number of less well trained armed groups will be required to provide the "muscle" to back up the development of the mass organizations. For example,

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[16]See, Marighela, op. cit., p. 80.

as the movement begins to gain control of a slum area by co-opting the existing neighborhood association or housing co-operative's board of directors, some means to coerce or threaten coercion may be required. Once control of the area is achieved, the armed element will assume a police-type function and also prevent or at least inhibit effective government presence in the area. The idea of sending a number of individuals from the city to fight in the countryside seems ill-advised.[17] They will be as out of their element as a peasant brought from the farm and placed in the city. If the rural arm of the movement is unable to obtain recruits in its own area, the tactics employed, appeals being made, or the individuals in charge of this portion of the movement should be reconsidered.

The U.I. moving forward on the mass front, with active armed elements and with both areas being coordinated by the party, is typical of the scope of Phase II activities. This situation can only be further exploited if the following can concurrently be accomplished:

-The need for the violent overthrow of government must be clearly demonstrated.

-The government and particularly its police and military must be discredited so as to cause some elements to question the wisdom of supporting the government.

-The moderate reform option must be eliminated from consideration. This may include bringing some of the moderates into an insurgent front organization and exploiting them.

-The U.I. must put forth a political program which makes sense to the bulk of the populace. It should provide a rational explanation for its resort to violence and a very general view of its goals once in power. The U.I. must legitimize its claim to political power.

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[17] Ibid., pp. 98-101.

These items, which were discussed in previous chapters, depend more on the increasing political sophistication of the movement than its ability to conduct armed attacks.[18]

The U.I. must also be prepared for unforeseen contingencies--both favorable and unfavorable. A coup d'etat which overthrows the government; the collapse of the government as with the Batista regime; the arrest of the major portion of the party's leadership, etc. There is no way to plan for such events, thus the movement must be ready to exploit opportunities as they develop or retrench in defeat and attempt to rebuild. This capability to persevere will be in part a factor of the insurgent's acceptance of the idea of a protracted struggle.

As the U.I. movement progresses into the latter stages of Phase II activities, its actions will be highly visable and will become "newsworthy" material for the international press. No effort must be spared to portray a favorable image in the press. At the same time equal efforts must be made to show the government as "reactionary, repressive, un-democratic," etc. This campaign in the world media, while it will have little impact on Phase II operations, will be a critical element in the final seizure of power, for it must be conducted in the full view of the media.

The movement, after it has been able to sustain Phase II activities and has developed what the Tupamaros termed a "dual power" situation, must determine when the time is right for the final seizure of power.[19]

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[18]Also see, Jenkins, op. cit., pp. 4-10.

[19]Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 17.

This will be the most critical decision made by the insurgent leadership. The timing of this move will be all-important, and ideally the U.I. leadership whould select it when they consider the situation most opportune. A chance event can offer such an opportunity. The U.I. may be able to employ an event such as rioting in response to an unpopular coup d'etat, strikes, or a revolt by elements of the military, etc. as the take-off point for the final seizure.

Phase III - Seizure of Power Phase. The question facing the Latin American U.I. is, how to go about seizing power in the modern city? The techniques to accomplish this via the coup d'etat are well documented in Edward Luttwak's the Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook. However, he assumes an apolitical populace who are a passive element in the exchange of political power.[20] With U.I. an activated and armed populace under party direction will take the place of the coup forces.

The tasks essential to the successful accomplishment of Phase III appear to be:

-Developing the U.I. movement through Phase II.

-Exploiting a crisis in government, or on some other pretext initiating mob violence.

-Providing direction to the rioting to extend it to a general strike situation and arming the populace.

-Extending the insurgent activity throughout the nation.

-Seizing critical targets in the city(s).

-Consolidating insurgent control in the city(s), and continuing attacks on government forces in the countryside.

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[20]Luttwak, op. cit., pp. 11-12, 48-9.

-Proclaiming the existence of a new "provisional government."

-Insuring the defection or neutralization of elements of the police and military.

-Presenting the remaining armed forces with the option of" destroying the city in order to save it" or capitulating and allowing the "provisional government" to assume power.

-Insuring that the world press sees only the insurgent's side of the struggle, so that it appears to be a "people" versus the "reactionary military" encounter.

Rural insurgent theorists have proposed the fielding of a more or less conventional military force and a continued protracted struggle as the vehicle for the final defeat of the government.[21] This concept has little application in U.I. The military must be defeated via psychological means as opposed to its physical anniliation by the insurgents. Given the modern means available to the Latin military--tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, jet aircraft, et. al., no U.I. movement can hope to defeat such forces in battle. What then are the alternatives?[22]

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[21]See Chapter 2, pp. 43.

[22]For various proposals on the methods of power seizure see: Momboisse, op. cit., 285-9; Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 91; Luttwak, op. cit., p. 51; James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 53; Ithiel de Sola Pool, et. al., Report on Urban Insurgency Studies, I (New York: Simulmatics Corp., 1966), pp. I-8, I-9; Atlantic Research Corporation, Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela (Alexandria, VA: Atlantic Research Corp., 1964), p. vii; Hodges, Philosophy ..., op. cit., pp. 241-52; Jane Elizabeth Decker, "A Study in Revolutionary Theory: The French Student-Worker Revolt of 1968," Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, Washington University 1971; Patrick Seale, and Maureen McConville, Red Flag Black Flag (New York: Ballentine Books, 1968); Wilfred H. Crook, Communism and the General Strike (Hamden, CN: Shoestring Press, 1960).

If the U.I. movement has been successful in co-opting military elements either to support its cause or simply to stay neutral, this is the first step.[23]

The attempt to seize power must take on a nation wide perspective and must be accomplished quickly. These nation wide insurgent moves must be almost simultaneous. Behind the turmoil and rioting, the U.I. must be in effective control of its mass support apparatus. The arming of the populace and the erection of barricades, etc. will have little effective tactical significance; however, the motive must be to create the impression of a "people at arms."[24]

Essential U.I. military activities will be carried out by groups drawn from the movement's armed elements, which have been previously formed and trained, but not activated until this point. Their missions will be to secure vital targets in the city. The first type of target will be symbolic--historic locations, the congress or legislative buildings, presidential palace, etc. More critical targets will be: the arrest of key government officials; seizure of communications facilities and the news media; isolation of any military garrisons

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[23]For a discussion of this critical factor see, Luttwak, op. cit., pp. 52-6, 63-6, 89-90, 94-5, 98-102; Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 116; Eldon Kenworthy, "Latin America is it Back to the Paris Commune?" Journal of International Affairs XXV, 1 (1971), 168-9; and Chalmers Johnson, "Revolution and the Social System," Struggles in the State, eds. G. A. Kelly, et. al. (New York: John A. Wiley, 1970), p. 99.

[24]For a discussion of views on the "city rising" see, Doris M. Condit, "Modern Cities Insurgent Opportunity of Insurgent Trap," Paper presented at meeting of the 29th Military Operations Research Society, June 27-9, 1972, Colorado Springs, CO.

still loyal to the government; blocking of the main avenues of approach into the city including rail facilities, airports, and seaports. The aim must be to paralyze the government so the U.I. can consolidate its hold on the city. Indecision on the part of government due to the elimination of its leadership and the loss of its communication capabilities will be the ally of the U.I.

With the nation in a state of turmoil and the city or cities in arms, the U.I. attempt at power seizure has now reached a critical stage. This situation will continue until the government capitulates or the U.I. is defeated. With worldwide attention on the struggle, the insurgents must keep the urban population in the streets while consolidating its control and coordinating activities in the other cities and the countryside. Keeping the now armed populace energized will be the task of the mass support organizations developed during Phase II. The struggle must not devolve to the point where a handful of insurgents versus the government, or it will be lost.

The U.I. has now created a stalemated situation. It has seized power in some areas, but the government forces, however impaired, probably could still crush the uprising if they are willing to apply the force at their disposal. The question which must remain unanswered is "will the governement in effect elect to destroy the city in order to preserve itself?" This is where the social consciousness of the Latin military will come into play. Will they fire on their countrymen in support of a government which has generally been discredited and suppress an organization which has at least created the appearance of wide popular support? It appears any indecision on the part of government will be the ally of the U.I. The longer the U.I. is allowed to

remain in control the more difficult it will be for the government to move decisively against it.

Another element which the U.I. must consider is foreign intervention by either a neighboring Latin nation, the United States, or both. If willing to apply the necessary force, they probably could in time suppress the insurgents. The crucial factor will be time. By providing a nationwide scope to the U.I. movement it will be impossible to quickly suppress it by occupying one city. The remaining insurgents in the other cities and the countryside could carry on the struggle. With the current attitude of "no more Vietnams," the prospect of a prolonged "pacification campaign" in Latin America would most likely have little appeal to U.S. decisionmakers. Any type of foreign intervention would also turn the U.I. movement into the champion in an anti-foreign struggle.

Assuming that there would be no foreign intervention and the capitulation of the existing government, after a brief and perhaps violent struggle the U.I. organization must complete its consolidation of power. The insurgent organization, which has been formed and tested in the struggle for power, will now serve as the basis for the new governmental structure. Since this proposal is concerned only with the methods of power seizure, this discussion will be terminated at this point.

This brief outline of the proposed U.I. strategy for Latin America has by no means addressed all the activities inherent in its development. It has attempted to describe the principal factors which will impact on its success or failure and the general manner in which a mass based U.I. strategy might develop based on current Latin conditions. As opposed to

earlier U.I. activity, it tends to place the insurgent's violent actions in support of the political along the lines proposed by Abraham Guillen. This strategy is largely untested. Carlos Marighella and the ALN in Brazil never got beyond the initial Incipient Activities Phase, and the Tupamaros in Uruguay only progressed to the militant aspects of Phase II. Neither movement was able to engender any great degree of popular support.[25]

To provide additional depth to this proposed U.I. strategy, a series of topics critical to the effective implementation of this model will now be discussed.

Organization. It is central to this U.I. strategy. Rather than attempting to predict the manner in which such a movement might organize, the basic principles which underlie the organization will be investigated. The requirements for a party, mass organizations, and armed elements have already been established. In developing its movement the insurgents' prime concern must be the retenion of complete control over its activities.

The previous discussion addressed mass support and armed activity separately. In practice there will be such an intricate interplay between the political and military aspects of U.I. that they cannot be neatly separated. As a practical matter, at the lower echelons of the movement an organizational element may perform both political and military tasks simultaneously.

The exact nature of the U.I. organization will be a function of the geographic and demographic characteristics of the nation, however, it

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[25] See the discussion of these two U.I. movements in Chapter 4.

will usually be divided into roughly three levels or echelons. At the top are the party leaders who will be supported by a small number of co-workers. This element provides the overall direction to the movement and may directly supervise some very sensitive operations such as; the high level infiltration of government; contacts with nations providing foreign support, and critical intelligence and internal security tasks.

An intermediate level of command will probably develop during Phase II, when the movement has grown beyond the capability of the top leadership to exercise close direction and control. This intermediate structure will duplicate the functions of the national leadership on a regional level. The main function of this element will be to interpret and implement the movement's goals based on local objective conditions.

At the bottom of the organization will be the various insurgent element's--front organizations, and armed elements. Figure 12, page 197, depicts the manner in which U.I. may organize at this level.[26] Coordination of this complex structure will be a formidable task. This demands that the U.I. resist the temptation to become bureaucratic. It must rely on the utilization of a small compact core of dedicated and reliable individuals loyal to the movement or the individual leader. The party's strength will not be a factor of its numbers, but the dedication of its members and the effectiveness of its organization.

Political Mobilization. The activities essential to the politicization and mobilization of popular support are less apparent than the violent side of U.I. but no less important. Effective mobilization

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[26]Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), p. 128.

FIGURE 12

Diagrammatical Representation of an Urban Insurgent Organization



Notes

1. White circle indicates member of overt committee who is NOT a member of the subversive organization.
2. Black circle indicates member of subversive committee who is also a member of an overt committee. Each black dot in column (a) represents the same person as one of the black dots in column (b).
3. White squares represent members of subversive org who are NOT on overt committee.
4. There is no relationship between appointments held and the question of whether a man is a member of an overt committee as well as a covert one.

Source: Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), p. 128.

of mass support will require a combination of persuasion, some intimidation, and most importantly organization.

For the insurgents to view the "masses" simply as a mass is a mistake. They are actually a great number of interest groups--students, workers, the urban poor, soldiers,--each of which can be further sub-divided down by areas of employment, residence, religion or other criteria. Any appeals to these so-called "masses" and attempts to organize and mobilize these groups must address these variances. Thus recognizing the non-homogenious nature of the masses will be key to its effective mobilization.[27] Although speaking of the rural rather than the urban environment, this process of politicization is well described in the following statement by Mao Tse-tung:

> What is political mobilization? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political objective of the war. Every soldier and every civilian should be made to understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him.... Next, how to mobilize? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through schools, through mass organizations and through cadres.... Next, it is not enough to mobilize only once; political mobilization... must be done regularly. Our job is not merely to recite our political programme to the people... but we must link it up with the developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, thereby transforming the political mobilization for the war into a regular movement. This is a matter of the first magnitude on which victory primarily depends.[28]

The methods for achieving these goals in an urban context are described in a handbook, The Organizers Manual which proposes "practical

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[27] See, Momboisse, op. cit., pp. 54-5; Luttwak, op. cit., pp. 144-5, and Conley and Schrock, op. cit., p. 11.

[28] Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Works, II (New York: International Publishers 1954), pp. 204-5.

suggestions for small group and grass-roots organizing--political self-education--mass-education and communications ... mass actions...." This book describes in detail "strategies for organizing high schools--universities--racial groups--women--the military--labor--the professions."[29] In a critique of Che Guevara's insurgent strategy, Peter Camejo noted:

> One general role ... is to try to use the most legal forms possible in order to do mass work. That is, to find the opening that makes easiest the organization of the workers.[30]

Unless the Latin U.I. can cross the threshold and provide for politicized popular support for the movement, it will be restricted to the military actions typical of the ALN in Brazil.

Political Violence. Once into Phase II the U.I. will undertake violent actions of various types. The following discussion presents some of the objectives which the insurgent can hope to achieve through the effective use of violence in support of political goals. Particular emphasis will be placed on so-called "terrorism," since it has played such a prominent role in past Latin U.I. experiences.[31]

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[29]O. M. Collective, The Organizers Manual (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), Front cover. Also see Saul Alinsky Rules for Radicals (New York: Random House, 1971); de Sola Pool, op. cit., p. II-65, and Black, op. cit., p. 56.

[30]Camejo, op. cit., p. 22.

[31]For differing views on insurgent violence see: Marighela, Liberation ..., op. cit.; Carlos Nunez, The Tupamaros (New York: Times Chance Press, 1970); Porzecanski, op. cit., pp. 39-50; Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 38-67, and Crozier, "Study ...," op. cit.

This discussion will treat terrorism as a tool or tactic of the U.I.--one to be used rationally. Although it may be employed for irrational ends, the emphasis in this review will be on terrorism which is instituted as part of a planned program to achieve political objectives.

In attempting to understand the subject better, it may be useful to distinguish between--terror, the mental or physical state; the terrorist, the actor; and terrorism, the tactic or the act. Terrorism may be defined as the attempt to influence political behavior through the use of a symbolic act which employs the use or threat of violence.[32] The terrorist act is intended to an end beyond itself and is a form of psychological operations (PSYOP), in which violence is the medium that is employed to influence attitudes, opinions, and behavior. Thus terrorism is PSYOP of the deed or armed propaganda. Incidentally, since the term terrorism has a pejorative meaning, insurgents will only employ it with regard to government actions--never their activities. The elimination of a government official is not terrorism or murder; it is "revolutionary or people's justice."

What can the insurgent hope to gain through terrorism? One approach would be to investigate it from its functional or utilitarian aspects. In analyzing the functions of terrorism, Brian Crozier draws a distinction between its disruptive and coercive functions.[33] This

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[32]Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon," Internal War, ed., H. Eckstein (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 73. Also see, Eugene V. Walther, Terror and Resistance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[33]Ibid., pp. 82-8, and Crozier, "Study...," op. cit., p. 9 outline many of the objectives or functions of terrorism described in this section.

categorization is employed below.

From the insurgent point of view the disruptive functions of terrorism may be:

-To advertize.

-To build insurgent moral and prestige.

-To break down the traditional relationship between the government and the governed.

-To provoke a government overreaction.

-To justify additional insurgent activity.

-To just keep the "pot boiling."

One basis of U.I. violence will be the advertizing motive. If it is to be effective it must be noticed. This thought was foremost in Kropotkin's mind, concerning 19th century Russia, when he stated:

> Indifference (following a terrorist act) is impossible. Those who originally did not even ask themselves what 'those lunatics' were after, are forced to take notice of them, to discuss their ideas, and to take a stand for or against. Through the deeds which attract general attention, the new idea insinuates itself into peoples' heads and makes converts. Such an act does more propagandizing in a few days than do thousands of pamphlets.[34]

Terrorism has been characterized as a weapon of the weak.[35] However, it may also be a vehicle for demonstrating insurgent strength beyond its actual strength. If the U.I. can strike with relative impunity, it may provide a needed boost to insurgent morale. This may be of primary importance when the organization is young and weak (early in Phase II) or when demoralized after a series of defeats. In addition,

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[34]Ibid., pp. 82-3 who cites Pierre Kropotkin, Paroles d'un Révolté (Paris: C. Marpon et E. Flammarion, undated).

[35]Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 159.

the fact that the insurgent organization can successfully carry out terrorist acts may raise its prestige among the populace.

Insurgent violence can also be used to drive a wedge between the populace and the government by raising doubts about the ability of the government to govern, to protect the populace, and to polarize the political scene into a "we" vs. "they" atmosphere.

Terrorism and other insurgent activities may be used to prod the government into taking repressive actions which not only target on the insurgent, but also impact on the civilian community. Government efforts to counter insurgent violence are time-consuming, frustrating and often unfruitful, especially for the security forces involved. Unable to get results, harried by the insurgent on one hand and a growing sense of impotence on the other hand, the security forces may vent their frustration in such a way as to scandalize the government. If successful in forcing the government to overreact, the insurgent may bring the political decisionmaking process out of the halls of government and into the streets where the tactical advantage may be on the side of the insurgent. Always faced with the problem of legitimizing its use of violence to the populace, the U.I., if successful in forcing a government overreaction which transcends the accepted definition of legitimate law enforcement, may employ these acts to justify additional violence.

There may be occasions when the insurgent has little hope of achieving its ultimate political goals, but still wants to reserve for itself a piece of the "political action." Terrorism is a way to maintain this presence while the insurgent awaits the arrival of the objective conditions deemed necessary for full scale activities. It may also be employed to keep rival or moderate groups from reaching a compromise

which would be detrimental to long term insurgent goals.

The disruptive functions of insurgent violence discussed above may accrue certain advantages to the insurgent, however its ultimate function is to coerce--of prime importance is the attempt:

-To discredit and demoralize the governmental authorities.

-To obtain resources.

-To control people through fear--both in and out of the insurgent organization.

-To eliminate the opposition.

This aspect of insurgent violence attempts systematically to emasculate national, regional, and local government through effective terrorism. The result is a political vacuum at all levels of administration which is filled by the insurgent and his governing organization. The Tupamaros targeted the upper echelons of government and influential members of non-governmental institutions. They successfully exposed corruption in high governmental and commercial circles. Documents were stolen which linked ministers to large firms or exposed illegal financial operations. With these documents in its possession, the Tupamaros were in a position to: blackmail individuals; kidnap and place them in "peoples jails;" or release the documents to the public and place the burden of prosecution on the government. According to a Tupamaro spokesman, "Actions against the regime are mainly aimed at undermining the foundations of the regime itself."[36] As a result the populace may begin to question the propriety of the existing system on both utilitarian

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[36]"Interview with a Leader of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)," National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970, eds., D. C. Hodges, et. al. (New York: Wm. Morrow and Co., 1972), pp. 285-86. Also see, Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 224-5.

and moral grounds. Governmental functioning may suffer with bureaucrats unwilling to vigorously enforce laws and regulations, judges reluctant to find insurgents guilty, and the police either barricaded in their stations or simply "not seeing" and not reporting insurgent activity.

One usually considers insurgent violence to be employed against outsiders, however, its role as an internal policeman should not be overlooked. The U.I. movement by its very nature cannot tolerate traitors in its midst, and their punishment or elimination can serve as an example to the unfaithful of the hazards of deviation.

With regard to the populace at large, the insurgent might ascribe two broad objectives to the coercive uses of terrorism. First, to mobilize support for the insurgent cause, and second, to immobilize assistance and support available to the government. This later state of popular neutrality is a significant intermediate U.I. goal.

Rarely will an insurgent movement develop without rival leaders or factions arising. As discussed above, terror may be an effective method to control the organization internally and "solve" leadership disputes. Another target for insurgent terrorism is the moderate elements which may desire some change, but are unwilling to embrace the more militant U.I. movement and its methods. As long as these moderate elements exist and hold open some hope for compromise within the existing political system, the insurgent has little chance for success.

The U.I. movement, once it reaches Phase II, will require considerable resources both human and material. Terrorism is one method of obtaining and insuring a continued supply. Being "leaned on" (Mafia style) is not much different when conducted in Sao Paulo, Caracas, or Boston. The kidnapping of foreign business executives by various U.I.

movements has almost become a business in Argentina.[37] Although not the only reason for these activities, they also advertize the movement; for example, the income so derived can provide a substantial boost to the insurgent coffers.

The foregoing discussion has attempted to delineate the utilitarian view of insurgent violence. In practice these arbitrary distinctions will overlap, for any insurgent act may support a number of objectives. In other cases these functions of terrorism may work at cross purposes, and the insurgent must accept a negative impact in one or more areas to make what is considered greater gains in other areas.

The discussion thus far has emphasized the positive gains which a U.I. movement might obtain through the use of terrorism. It also carries with it many potential disadvantages. The first and foremost concerns the always troublesome question of popular support. Terrorism can backfire on the practitioner, and rather than gaining in popular support, may drive this support to the government. It appears that terrorism will result in an increase in popular support for insurgency only if the basis for that support already exists.[38] If this basis for popular support is nonexistent, terrorism will probably be counterproductive.

One of the virtues of terrorism, from the standpoint of the insurgent, is its economy. If carried out successfully, terrorism promises returns far in excess of the effort, money, time and materials invested in it. This may be one reason why it is a weapon of the weak.

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[37]Moss, War..., op. cit., pp. 159-60.

[38]Crozier, Rebels, op. cit., p. 191.

The ease with which terrorism may be undertaken, however, may also be a liability. Since the U.I. needs only a gun or a few bombs to undertake a terrorist campaign, it may be just too easy to start before the conditions and the insurgent organization have developed to a point where it can sustain and productively use the tactic. A clumsy, poorly planned terrorist act can alienate the populace, solidify support for government, and may be used as the basis for the government's repression of the entire insurgent organization.

If terrorism in not strictly controlled, the movement may end up serving the end of continued violence rather than the attainment of defined political goals. Terrorism thus may become an end in itself. Violence is an integral part of the proposed U.I. strategy. Especially during Phase II, the activities described above along with the development of popular support, can assist in creating a crisis situation and preparing the way for the seizure of power.

Unless this insurgent violence serves the greater goal of political power seizure, it will be disfunctional to the movement's overall objectives. Based on the development of the proposed U.I. model, the relative levels of this insurgent inspired violence are depicted at Figure 13, page 207. The level of violence will be low to non-existent in Phase I. With the commencement of Phase II, it may rise significantly for a period of time in order to advertize the movement's existence and establish a crisis environment. The violence may then level off at a lower but still significant rate. With Phase III, the attempted seizure of power, the level of violence will rise dramatically, be maintained until power is secured, and drop as the insurgent consolidates power.

FIGURE 13

Diagrammatical Representation of the Level of Urban Insurgent Inspired Political Violence Related to the Phase of Insurgent Development



Ideology or Cause. The acceptance of terrorism as a legitimate and necessary tactic in the quest for political power is part of a much larger task faced by the U.I. Beyond the program of violence there must be some basic interest which ties individuals together in this rather dangerous endeavor, and which will allow them to develop the insurgency into a protracted struggle. This may be termed a cause, ideology, or just a rationale for action. Whatever term is employed, the functions served appear to be constant.[39]

A major consideration which an insurgent ideology must address is justifying the resort to violence and the requirement to overthrow the government. If the movement is to gain widespread support for its cause, it must provide an acceptable explanation for its actions and goals. The insurgent must somehow convince the potential and actual supporters that the government is "unfit to rule," and resort to force as the only alternative. This "unfitness" may also apply to the social and economic structure which supports the government. Therefore, from the insurgent point of view, it too must be changed or abolished. The insurgent, thus, must be able to call in question the legitimacy of the existing government, the principal political actors, and depending on his ultimate goal--the whole structure of society.

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[39]For a discussion of the role ideology can play in political activity see: Maurice Deveger, The Idea of Politics (New York: Henry Regnery, 1966), pp. 74-9; Momboisse, op. cit., esp, pp. 54-6, 119; Davis, op. cit., p. 10; Crozier, "Study...," op. cit., pp. 3-5; Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), esp. pp. 152-3; Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper and Row, 1951); Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); Moss, War..., op. cit., p. 159, and Carleton Beals, The Nature of Revolution (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970).

Another consideration the insurgent ideology should consider is what will result from this violent overthrow. It must somehow address the question "For what goals are we fighting?" both in the short and long term. This usually will entail appeals to nationalism and a brighter day in the future for all once the stigma of "Yanqui imperialism" is removed.[40]

A third function ideology can perform is to coordinate and systematize individual and group discontent, so that it can be focused on the goals of a larger conflict.[41] Although many people may be frustrated with their conditions and life in general, it is doubtful many would focus their aggression on the overthrow of the government. Usually the government is too vague and general a target, therefore one's aggression will be expressed in terms of local conflict or local goals. An effective ideology along with U.I. organization and leadership must be used to inflate and inflame this random discontent and to focus it on the attainment of a higher goal--namely overthrow of the government.

An effective ideology can give the insurgency the appearance of a conflict of values which in turn may cause a deeper and more absolute commitment to the movement. There must be little room for shades of gray between the ideological position of the insurgent and the government. The U.I. must attempt to demonstrate that the government and its supporters are "bad" and of course the insurgents "good." One thus is either with the insurgents completely, or by definition one is an "enemy of the revolution."

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[40]For example see, Marighela, Liberation..., op. cit., pp. 23-4, and Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., pp. 229-31.

[41]Déverger, op. cit., pp. 74-9.

By defining a new set of values or modifying old values, the ideology can serve to integrate individual behavior, and beyond this it can also influence this behavior. The ultimate goal of the U.I. is to motivate people into action. To accomplish this may require that existing values be modified. By accepting the insurgents ideological views, one accepts the insurgent definition of "good and bad," "right and wrong," etc. In its extreme, this equates to the movement's values becoming personal values.

The requirement for ideological support for U.I. can also be considered to be a function of the government's legitimacy and strength. If the government is corrupt, weak, and inefficient, and this fact is known to all, then simple opposition to the government by the U.I. may be all that is required to maintain popular support for insurgent goals.

Few will follow a movement which is doomed to failure. Somehow, by resort to religious, political, or philosophical justification, the insurgent must convince its supporters that success of the revolution is somehow inevitable or preordained. "One must only strive hard enough and the ultimate victory will be attained." By defining the ultimate success as inevitable the movement can accept reverses and defeats as only minor stumbling blocks in the long road to success.

In approaching what an ideology should embrace, the U.I. faces a number of options. First is the question of vagueness vs. specificity. If the attempt is to appeal to broad sectors of the nation, the differing values and goals of these sectors must be considered. This consideration would prompt ideological goals to be stated in rather vague terms and general goals on which most can agree, e.g., freedom for all; liberty, equality, and fraternity; democracy, etc. There is a danger inherent in

too much vagueness in insurgent appeals. Vague philosophical approaches will usually appeal only to limited sectors in the nation. If the ideas put forth are to have mass appeal, they must in some way be identifiable with the popular discontent among the populace. Therefore, if the insurgent is to influence a mass audience, its ideology must be oriented towards these mass listeners.[42]

Another consideration is consistency in insurgent appeals. Confusion may result if the population is bombarded with an ever changing ideology. This does not mean that the same things have to be said over and over again, but that all mass appeals should support the achievement of a few well-defined and consistent goals.

The discussion of these additional considerations in the development of the proposed U.I. strategy have been included in order to provide a more complete picture of the critical strategic, organizational and tactical decisions which must be addressed by the U.I. leadership.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of this U.I. model? First, on the side of its strengths, it should provide for a movement which will be viable and able not only to withstand the attacks of government, but also capable of providing the required political direction to the movement. It is structured to take advantage of the potential for dissidence offered by the objective conditions existing in Latin America especially in the urban areas. In the event of a major failure at some point in its development, especially after it has expanded into Phase II, the movement

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[42]See, Hodges, Philosophy..., op. cit., p. 260. Guillen notes "The revolutionary cadres must have socialist training; but they should say nothing about socialism or related matters publicly."

should be able to reestablish itself from the remaining elements. Finally, the insurgent organization can provide the basis for a new governmental structure.

On the negative side this proposed strategy for U.I. in Latin America is only a model. Therefore, it only indicates the general manner in which such activity can develop. No model will be so thorough as to completely describe this complex process of power seizure. Its initiation and development is predicated on the proper objective conditions and the existence of an insurgent group determined to exploit them. In a specific case they may not exist, or they may be misinterpreted by the insurgents. This strategy requires patience on the part of the insurgents, a factor which most Latin movements have failed to exhibit.

Given those general weaknesses in this proposed model of U.I., it is still considered to be representative of a strategy which can have some hope for success in a field of endeavor which is littered with failure.

Latin insurgents, having tried the elitist approach in the city and found it wanting and with little hope for a rural campaign, may now adopt a mass U.I. strategy and attempt to exploit the potential it offers.

Summary

The proposed U.I. model has attempted to combine the techniques of the mass strategy in such a manner that it can exploit the objective conditions and previous U.I. experience in Latin America. Recognizing the inability of previous Latin U.I. activity to engender popular support for their activities and their almost total reliance on violence, this

strategy attempts to balance off these factors to maximize insurgent effectiveness.

To structure the discussion of the U.I. model, certain assumptions and limitations were stated, and the overall development of the strategy was characterized as a three phase process as follows:

Phase I - Incipient Activities Phase.

Phase II - Mobilization Phase.

Phase III - Seizure of Power Phase.

Each of these phases was then discussed and the insurgent activities appropriate to each were identified. The tasks which the U.I. must accomplish and the critical decision points in its development were noted. A generalized plan of the final seizure of power was also offered.

After outlining the overall development of the proposed U.I. strategy, a series of topics critical to its effective implementation were reviewed. The insurgent organization was characterized as having a high degree of centralized political direction including the effective integration of the political and military aspects of insurgency. In all circumstances insurgent violence must serve political ends, or it will be disfunctional. The complex problem of political mobilization of popular support for U.I. was next addressed. Effective politicization of elements of the populace is at the heart of this mass U.I. strategy.

The roles which violence can play in U.I. were investigated, first from the aspects of its advantages and later from the viewpoint of its disadvantages. The various disruptive and coercive functions of terrorism or insurgent armed attacks were identified. The disruptive aspects of U.I. violence seek to create a general atmosphere of crisis and societal insecurity. The coercive use of terrorism supports the U.I.

attempt to create an alternate power structure within the state and force compliance with its dictates. The liabilities inherent in the misuse of violence were also acknowledged.

The last topic discussed was the requirement for the insurgent to put forth some type of ideology or cause to provide a rational explanation to the populace for its objectives and methods. While prescribing no set ideology, the functional requirements which should be addressed in its development were identified.

Finally, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed U.I. strategy for Latin America were assessed. While surely no panacea for insurgent success, it is proposed that this strategy may be indicative of future U.I. activity in Latin America.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This thesis has evaluated two trends in Latin America--urbanization, and the fledging attempts to develop the theory and practice of urban insurgency (U.I.). The objective of this investigation has been to determine the relationships which may exist among U.I. strategy, organization, and tactics by proposing a model of U.I. and conceptualizing its development. It was proposed that the thorough research of these topics would lead to the development of a conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing U.I. in the context of present day Latin America.

The procedures employed to achieve this objective included: the delineation of the concept of insurgency, and the conditions in a nation on which it can develop; review of the urban environment in Latin America, and its capabilities to support U.I.; and a survey and analysis of U.I. theory and practice in the Latin context. Based on this analysis a proposed U.I. strategy was developed.

The limits imposed on this study addressed: its constraints with regard to time--only the post 1945 period; its orientation on insurgent strategy, organization, and tactics--the how as opposed to the why, i.e., insurgencies causal or motivational aspects; its almost total emphasis on the insurgent side of the insurgent/government struggle.

Chapter 2 developed the concept of insurgency, and identified the conditions in a nation (the objective conditions) which can support

such activity. This investigation was undertaken without regard to the geographical context of insurgent activity--Latin American, urban, or rural, etc. Beginning with a review of the methods of violent and illegal power seizure, a typology of such activities was developed, and the concept of insurgency defined as:

> An attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite elements of the population of a nation into forcibly overthrowing its existing government.

Insurgency was typified as a process with definite political goals, but with varying methods available for its accomplishment. The means employed (strategy, organization, and tactics) by an insurgent movement were hypothesized to be a function of its view of the objective conditions, as noted below:

- -The resort to insurgency by a group (party) will be directly related to their analysis of the objective conditions in a nation which will support such activities.
- -The development of an insurgent strategy will be directly influenced by the insurgent's view of the objective conditions.
- -The insurgent strategy developed will directly influence the organization and tactics employed in its implementation.

A broad spectrum of possible insurgent strategies was identified, and characterized according to various criteria. For purposes of this research, these insurgent approaches were grouped into two broad categories entitled the elite and mass strategies. They were presented as ideal types, and illustrative of the multiple options open to an insurgent movement.

The conditions upon which insurgency can prosper were next investigated. To structure this discussion the factors of popular discontent, government failure, insurgent organization, foreign support, accelerators, and chance events were each discussed in relation to their

possible impact on the overall objective conditions for insurgency. It was determined that insurgency is most likely to have some possibility of success when:

-A nation is subject to widespread discontent.

-A belief grows which identifies the sources of this discontent, attributes certain characteristics to its sources, and specifies the government as a contributing factor to this discontent.

-An insurgent movement is operative.

-Precipitating factors focus attention on the sources of the discontent.

-Some type of foreign support is available to the insurgent.

The above items were presented as the general conditions sufficient for the initiation, and possible successful outcome of insurgency.

Narrowing the scope of this investigation to Latin America and the urban context, the status of its urbanization and the ability of the city to support U.I. were researched in Chapter 3. The characteristics of the highly developed urbanization in Latin America were noted, and the impact this rapid urban growth can have on insurgent activity was assessed. The potential for various social elements in the urban milieu to support U.I. was investigated. The emerging middle class stood out as the major potential source for such support. The urban worker and the poor have considerable potential, however, they will be much more difficult to politicize. The roles of the elites, the military, and the church were also surveyed.

The demographic aspects having been reviewed, the relative advantages and disadvantages of insurgent activities in the city, and the roles the urban area can play in it, were analyzed. The advantages associated with insurgent activities in the city centered around its

ability to provide:

-Qualified personnel to lead and staff the movement.

-For the logistical needs of the movements.

-Ready access to the communication media.

-Intelligence information.

The principal disadvantage of U.I. related to the relative strength of the insurgent versus the government. The insurgent meets the authorities at their point of greatest strength. Other disadvantages noted addressed the limits imposed on U.I. activities due to security requirements, organizational, and operational constraints.

The possible linkages between urban and rural insurgent activity were next researched. The interdependencies exposed in this review mainly concern efforts to maximize the effectiveness of insurgent capabilities in both areas.

The roles which the urban areas can play in insurgency were surveyed based on a series of models proposed by Conley and Schrock. These roles include:

Model One - The urban demonstration.

Model Two - The bid for power through seizure of a city.

Model Three - Precipitation of nationwide insurgency.

Model Four - Support of rural insurgency.

Models One and Four were determined to be of little concern to this research. The other two models, Two and Three, were considered germane to this study; with Model Two envisioning the seizure of power via the "city rising"; while Model Three views the city as the catalyst for the later development of rural, and eventually nationwide insurgency.

Chapter 4 reviewed the theory and practice of U.I. in Latin

America, and noted the lack of research in this area. To determine the state of development of Latin U.I. practice two cases the "National Liberation Action" (ALN) under Carlos Marighella in Brazil, and the "Movement for National Liberation" (MLN) (The Tupamaros) in Uruguay were reviewed.

The analysis of the ALN's activities took note of its short life, reliance on violence, and preoccupation with the tactical aspects of insurgency. Carlos Marighella, in his "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" and other writings proposed an elitist insurgent strategy which employed the city as a springboard for the initiation of rural, and later nation-wide insurgency. This proposal closely follows Conley and Schrock's Model Three situation--"Precipitation of Nation-wide Insurgency."

The MLN or Tupamaros in Uruguay have to date provided the best example of U.I. in Latin America. It followed a generally elitist strategy, but with more efforts to politicize the populace than the ALN. The movement managed to survive for almost ten years, and caused the Uruguayan government considerable concern. Like the ALN in Brazil, the Tupamaros military actions tended to outrun its capability to engender popular support for the movement. This factor combined with the MLN underestimation of the capabilities of the Uruguayan Armed Forces led to its almost complete suppression in 1972. In the process of its growth and failure, however, the MLN has provided a number of insights concerning U.I. strategy, organization and tactics which can have application in other Latin Nations.

The writings of Abraham Guillen, the principal Latin spokesman for U.I., were reviewed. He proposed that the activities of the ALN and MLN, et. al. were self-defeating if they did not address the overriding

requirement to develop a base of politicized popular support and center insurgent activity on the cities. Espousing a mass based U.I. theory, with provisions for supporting rural activity, he hoped to exploit to the maximum the cities potential for political violence. Many of Guillen's ideas concerning insurgency were incorporated in the U.I. strategy developed in Chapter 5. This review revealed that the theory and practice of U.I. in Latin America is only partially developed, and in transition from elitist to a more mass based strategic approach.

Having established a conceptual framework of insurgent strategies, the potential for U.I. in Latin America, and reviewed contemporary Latin U.I. theory and practice, Chapter 5 proposed a U.I. strategy for Latin America. This proposal combined the techniques of the mass strategy to exploit the conditions in the Latin city, and the previous U.I. experience.

Certain assumptions and limitations in the development of the model were addressed, and the overall process of power seizure subdivided into the following phases:

Phase I - Incipient Activities Phase.

Phase II - Mobilization Phase.

Phase III - Seizure of Power PHase.

The U.I. model stressed the mass strategy over elitist methods. The latter U.I. strategy having shown itself, to date, unworkable in Latin America. This proposal parallels Conley and Schrock's, Model Two situation, "The bid for power through seizure of a City," and also contains aspects of their Model Three approach, "The Precipitation of Nationwide Insurgency" in its use of supporting rural insurgent activity.

The objectives of this proposed mass U.I. strategy are first to develop a clandestine organization, which will facilitate the latter politicization of the populace, while it concurrently carries out the violent actions it deems necessary for the furtherance of its political goals. Phase I is the developmental period when the movement, which is characterized by its clandestine nature establishes the foundation for its later expansion. The progression into Phase II reflects the maturation of the U.I. movement. It now "goes public" in its attempt to develop popular support and discredit the government. The U.I. moving forward on the mass front, with active armed elements, and with both areas being coordinated by the party is typical of the scope of Phase II operations. After developing for an extended period of time, the insurgents must determine when the final seizure of power should be attempted. This is Phase III and it involves the activation of turmoil throughout the nation and the seizure of the city, or cities, by the insurgent. This seizure is carried on behind a screen of urban rioting and a general strike situation which gives the activity the characteristics of a "people at arms." The success of this bid for power will be dependent on the insurgent's ability to control its now activated mass support apparatus, and the progress made in subverting or neutralizing the nation's military and police forces.

To provide additional depth to the discussion of this U.I. strategy the topics of organization, political mobilization and violence, and the role of ideology or a cause were discussed in detail. The manner in which each can assist the U.I. in the implementation of the strategy was explored.

This U.I. strategy was only developed in outline, however, it attempts to describe the principal factors which will impact on its success or failure. As opposed to earlier Latin U.I. activity, this strategy tends to place the insurgents armed operations in support of the political, along the lines proposed by Abraham Guillen. Latin insurgents having failed to implement the elitist strategy in the cities, and with little hope for a successful rural campaign, may now adopt a mass U.I. strategy along the lines of this proposal and attempt to exploit the potential offered by the objective conditions embodied in Latin urbanization.

Conclusions

The introduction to this study noted as objectives the development of a model of U.I. for Latin America, and the construction of a conceptual framework upon which to build this proposed strategy. What can be concluded concerning the achievement of these objectives?

First, the U.I. strategy for Latin America, offered in Chapter 5, is considered indicative of possible future trends in Latin political violence. If the analysis of the objective conditions in Latin America, especially with regard to the more developed states in the region, is accurate it appears that any insurgent movement will ignore the urban areas at its own peril. Further in reviewing past U.I. insurgent failures it was noted that while capable of implementing a program of politically inspired violence, they have generally been unable to engender significant popular support for their activities. The proposals of Abraham Guillen addresses correcting this situation through the development of a mass based insurgent strategy.

Bringing together the objective conditions in the Latin urban milieu, the U.I. failures of the past, and the proposals for the future, this U.I. strategy is proposed as a model of the manner in which future such activity may develop in Latin America. It is offered as an ideal type or model recognizing that as such it will rarely exist in pure form. Further it is not proposed as a panacea for U.I. success, like all other such activity it can only develop if the proper objective conditions are active.

A further conclusion which can be drawn from this research concerns the use of the methodology employed in isolating and developing the proposed U.I. strategy. The method was rather "geometrical" in the sense that a set of basic requirements to describe insurgent activity were isolated, and from these were deduced a series of observations concerning the conduct of insurgency. Described as the elitist or mass strategy, they were characterized according to their varying approaches to the exploitation of the objective conditions, use of organization and tactics, and other criteria. This methodology was developed without regard to a geographical area, and therefore should have application in the further analysis of insurgency in other contexts.

Employing this perspective of insurgency, and the methodology employed in later chapters may be a useful approach to the analysis of insurgency, and the development of case studies. For example, by combining an analysis of the objective conditions in the area under study, with a review of recent and proposed insurgent activity, insights into future such actions can be obtained. This analysis could be conducted on a continental basis, e.g., as in this study of Latin America, or on the basis of a single nation or group of nations. Thus the basic

approach employed in this research may have application in individual case studies, or the cross national analysis of insurgency.

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